
The Neo-romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy

(Thesis approved for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Calcutta University in 1919).

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Dedication.

To my beloved nephew Manujnath, to whose boyish enthusiasm I first owed the impulse to write a systematic philosophical work, this thesis is dedicated with much love.

PREFACE.

My apology for writing the present thesis is that although the neo-romantic movement has been studied in various ways and from various points of view, its importance for philosophical speculation of the present day has not yet been sufficiently realised. I must of course notice an exception. "Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart" of Prof. Ludwig Stein has pointed out very clearly the significance of the neo-romantic movement for contemporary thought. But I believe this movement more thoroughly permeates modern thought than even Prof. Stein has succeeded in showing. For one thing, the great voluntaristic upheaval of the present day is a symptom of romanticism and not of the idealistic world-view, as Prof. Stein supposes.

But if I say this I must be prepared to give a clear definition of romanticism. Romanticism, as I understand it, is an attempt to view the real in its concrete totality. It is his love for the total, the complete, which makes the romanticist dissatisfied with the rationalist's interpretation of the world. The romanticist is not tied to feeling or the will or any other single principle, though in his anxiety to escape the narrowness of rationalism, he very often stops at one or other of these as a temporary resting-place, as a provisional halting-ground in his onward

march towards a full and complete realisation of the nature of reality. Romanticism is different from irrationalism, for it aims not merely at a demolition of the rationalist's structure but at positive constructions of its own. The romanticist, in fact, is never satisfied with a merely negative attitude but always seeks a positive, constructive world-view. His viewpoint also embraces the rationalist's as part of a wider whole, as we see in Bergson who assigns to intellectualism the whole of our practical life.

As regards originality, it would be highly presumptuous on my part to claim that I have been able to discover things which have not been discovered before or to explore hitherto unexplored regions. But though I make no such pretensions, I humbly believe that mine is perhaps one of the first attempts, if not the first attempt, to study the neo-romantic movement from the standpoint of the logic of the real.

I have availed myself freely of the work of others. If I were to mention the names of all books from which I have derived assistance, it would fill a very large space. But there is one book which I must mention in this connexion, as being one which first opened my eyes to the vastness and the all-embracing character of the neo-romantic movement. I refer to the celebrated work of Prof. Ludwig Stein, entitled *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart.* I have also derived considerable assistance from Aliotta's recent work, entitled *The Idealistic Reaction against*

Science and from Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. The collections of essays called *Systematische Philosophie* and *Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* have also been of great help to me, as have Windelband's *Präludien* and Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*. It is a pity space does not permit me to acknowledge my indebtedness to all authors from whose works I have derived assistance, but I may mention here that whenever I have quoted the words or used the arguments of any writer, I have been careful to mention the fact either in the body of the work or in the foot-notes.

A word may not be out of place here regarding the method followed in this work in describing the various systems of thought which have been discussed. As in an academic thesis of this kind, space is naturally very limited, I have had to employ a process of selection and so have chosen types to represent each line of thought. Thus, in describing individualistic romanticism I have chosen Nietzsche as the type of this mode of thinking. This has had the effect which is somewhat unfortunate, that many familiar names do not find a place in the present work, but I think it will be admitted that when I have had to choose between omitting some familiar names and making my account vague by trying to include too much matter in too little space, I have chosen the lesser of the two evils.


Some of the chapters of the present thesis have

already appeared in "The Journal of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner". These, however, form a very small portion of the thesis.

CALCUTTA,
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72, LANSDOWNE ROAD.

SHISHIR KUMAR MAITRA.

CONTENTS



The Neo-Romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy

CHAPTER I.

General Idea of the Neo-Romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy.

Two spirits strive for ever for supremacy in the human breast. The one is the impulse for method, form, the other the striving for what is formless, shapeless, for what no systematic thinking can ever reach. For the one the meaning of the world is to be sought in motionless being, in ever-peaceful, ever-silent repose, for the other, the whole significance of life lies in its never-ceasing struggle, in its eternal unrest. The one brings the universe down to the level of the categories of thought, the other lifts up art and poetry till they become the image of the world. The one is a lover of peace, or order, the other, a violent advocate of unrest, of disorder. The favourite symbol of the one is a

mountain at rest, whereas the favourite sign of the other is a flowing river. To the first type of thinking, we give the name classicism, to the second, the name romanticism.

For the romanticist, the individual is everything, the alpha and omega of the universe. For the classicist, on the other hand, the individual counts for every little and it is the race, the species that is important.

So careful of the type she seems
So careless of the single life.

This sums up the attitude of the classicist towards the relative importance of the race and the individual. Romanticism, on the other hand, exhibits great love for the individual. And it is because romanticism has such a strong predilection for the individual that it shows an instinctive preference for the artistic element in life. For art is the expression of the individual, the outlet through which flows everything that is intimately personal.

The romanticist rebels against all "Ordnungsbestie". He is the born enemy of all order, of all system. As Dr. Stein says in his "Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart",

the romanticist has for his object, not the end, peace, but the means, warfare. "The surging, fermenting, chaotic element, the unrest in the struggle of everybody against everybody, in short, the mobile equilibrium in society brings him unexpected raptures, that 'heroic enthusiasm' which Giordano Bruno has described to us so vividly".

The romanticist feels the "Unendlichkeitsdrang". And it is because he feels it that his system is never a complete and rounded whole, like that of the classicist, for the infinite cannot be expressed but only pointed out. Romanticism, however, does not simply play with the infinite but makes it the basis of its philosophy. "Foolish coquetting with the superhuman," says Prof. Stein, "makes as little a romanticist as the mere wearing of a hat makes a gentleman or the fastening of a garter makes a true knight." What is wanted is that the impulse of the infinite should become an intellectualised passion, a reasoned emotion.

The romanticist's love of the infinite makes him dissatisfied with any partial constructions. His view of reality is a most comprehensive one

and he feels an instinctive repugnance for all systems which sacrifice breadth of view for the sake of unity and simplicity. His protest against rationalism is the protest of a complete view of things against all one-sided constructions. The 'total', the complex, the unresolvable and the unanalysable is the delight of the romanticist and he is most at home in his attempt to lose himself in the infinite complexity of things. His gaze is towards the infinite and he is never so happy as when he can bring the infinite into a sort of living contact with himself.

To understand romanticism, we have, in fact, to bear in mind that it arises as a protest against the one-sided character of rationalistic systems. The romanticist believes that the rationalist has lost sight of the complex nature of reality and has fixed his attention upon the most elementary aspects of the complex total which we call the world. Romanticism, in fact, is an attempt to construct a philosophy of the real. Its opposition to classicism is not the opposition of unreason to reason, of vague guessing and imagining to precise thinking and clear reasoning, but it is the opposition of the

sturdy spirit which is not content till it has grasped the whole or till it reaches a stage after a hard march from which it gets a glimpse of the entire path that lies stretched before it, to the soft spirit which accepts what it gets in a complacent mood.

All philosophy is in a sense romanticism, for it is the search for what is deep and complex, for what is not apparent on the surface but has to be found by penetrating deep into the essence of things. There are some beautiful lines written by a German poet named Kästner which run thus :—

Auf ewig ist der Krieg vermieden
Befolgt man was der Weise spricht
Denn alle Menschen heissen Frieden
Allein die Philosophen nicht.

So true is it that all philosophy signifies a spiritual unrest, a hankering after what is not easily attainable, a longing for the totality of things, that even those systems of philosophy, the avowed object of which is to assert the supremacy of reason and establish the measured gait and dignified pose of classicism have felt it necessary to make concessions to the romantic

spirit which refuses to be tied down to any logical scheme.

Romanticism feels the impulse of the infinite and it is in response to this impulse that it finds itself in opposition to rationalism. But it is a sad irony of fate that this impulse leads it precisely where it does not want to go, namely, to the one-sidedness of some principle which on examination is found to be no more satisfactory from the romanticist's standpoint than reason whose vagueness it tried to avoid. Either it is feeling or will or some other single principle which the romanticist is found to choose for himself and none of these is found adequate to satisfy the need which he feels for a world-view that will do justice to the complex character of reality.

The romanticist in his search for a principle that can better comprehend the real than reason comes across feeling. The merit of feeling is its immediacy. One of the complaints of romanticism against rationalism is that reason is too far removed from the processes of the world, that its connexion with the vital currents that shape and regulate the universe is too indirect to

be of any use in a world-synthesis. Feeling, however, has direct and constant access to the real. It is always moving with the tide of life, it is always flowing with the stream of the world-process. It is the height of absurdity, thinks romanticism, to give up a principle which has such a direct and continuous contact with the real for the sake of one which can only come in contact with the real through an extremely roundabout path, as Kant's schematism of the categories has shown.

We thus see the beginnings of Gefühlsromantik. Its favourite theme is, as the arch-romanticist Houston Stewart Chamberlain has formulated it, "Gefühl im eigenen Busen", "innere Stimme". The great mistake of rationalism, it says, is in thinking that we have to go out of ourselves in discovering the real. The real is what is nearest to us. We have only to consult our bosom to find it. It is because rationalism does not know this that its search for the real becomes a chase after a phantom.

But "feeling in one's own breast", "inner conviction" are seen to best advantage in the twilight of dreamy foreboding, in the semi-dark-

ness of mystical vision. Perhaps the romanticist believes, like Bacon, that "truth must rise not only to the price of a pearl that showeth best by day" but "to the price of a diamond or carbuncle that showeth best in varied light." But whatever that may be, the fact remains that the romanticists of feeling prefer the semi-darkness of twilight to the clear light of the day. As Prof. Stein says, "das traumhafte Zwielicht des dämmernden Ahnens und deutungsreichen Rätselns" is the thing for which they show an instinctive preference. This instinct for what is dim, this predilection for the obscure and the shady, drives the romanticist into the arms of the mystic. There is no essential difference between the secret and the obscure, between what is hidden from sight and what is dimly lighted, and the romanticist through his love for the latter is led by imperceptible degrees to the former. Hence it is that the romanticist of feeling ends by being a mystic. Thus, Novalis and Friedrich von Schlegel, by their preference for "traumhafte Dämmerung", to quote an expression of Windelband's, became adherents of mysticism. The former started from Fichte's conception of a

creative fancy which Fichte interpreted in the light of transcendental idealism but which for him became a "dreamy creation of fantasy". From this starting-point he was gradually led to the altogether mystic conclusion, "The world is a dream and the dream is the world". Friedrich von Schlegel, again, came at the beginning of his career under the influence of Goethe and Schiller. He accepted Schiller's distinction between naïve and sentimental and interpreted the latter as meaning personal. This personal element gradually developed in his system a character of formlessness and "ironical arbitrariness" which was only a shade removed from pure mysticism.

The romanticist's love for the obscure and the mystic is all the more strange in that he begins his career by searching for a principle that can explain the real better than reason. How can a principle which shines best in semi-darkness serve to interpret the world of reality? How can darkness throw more light upon the intricacies of the world than the light of reason? Moreover, how can the purely subjective acquire an objective character, for unless it becomes

objective, it cannot undertake to interpret the world? The purely subjective, again, is such a vanishing quantity, that it has hardly any durable content. The only redeeming feature of this type of romanticism is its honesty. It never wants to compromise, but follows out to its logical issue the principle of subjectivity, although it leads it to the most absurd results. Its acceptance of subjectivity and immediacy as the criterion of truth is unfortunate, but once this criterion is accepted, it is impossible, except by practising a sort of logical dishonesty, to avoid the conclusions which necessarily arise from this view of truth. It never makes any mixture of principles but follows out one principle to its logical end.

Its chief service to philosophy is a negative one. Its protest against the one-sided character of rationalistic systems constitutes its chief merit and not any positive construction which it makes. Feeling divorced from reason is a weak principle, weaker than reason divorced from feeling. But it still serves to bring into view the defects of reason. And Gefühlsromantik does a real service to philosophy in pointing out these defects very clearly. Gefühlsromantik has also done

good to philosophy in an indirect matter. It has given a tremendous push to art, especially, to poetry and painting. And the development of the artistic phase of life has reacted very favourably upon the purely philosophical activities. It has given rise to the aesthetic interpretation of the problems of life and this has greatly widened the philosophical outlook. Indeed, philosophical speculation has been considerably enriched by the aesthetic mode of looking at things.

There is again a form of romanticism which has exerted a powerful influence upon philosophical thought and which takes the will for its basal principle. Its protest against rationalism is of a very different kind from that of Gefühlsromantik. For while the latter is dissatisfied with reason on account of its mediate character, the complaint of this form of romanticism against reason is that it is a passive and not an active principle. Thought is believed to be the very antithesis of activity. To think is to be passive, and hence out of mere thinking no principle adequate to represent the world, which is ever active, ever creative, can be obtained. This defect of reason it seeks to remedy by taking will

as the essential factor in the world-synthesis. Will, and will alone, it is said, is competent to interpret reality. Thus, the centre of gravity of philosophy is shifted from thought to volition, and volitional processes, will, intention, desire occupy the place in this form of romanticism which ratiocinative processes do in rationalistic systems.

The origin of this line of thought is to be traced to Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical activities of the ego. But it was first Fichte who by his characterisation of the world as "a free act" gave great impetus to this mode of thinking. The philosopher, however, from whom this type of thought received the greatest support was Schopenhauer. It was Schopenhauer who first raised will to the rank of a world-principle and it was his authority which gave this form of thought the influence which it still possesses. Schopenhauer's "blind will" is the source in modern times of all forms of Willensromantik. This blind will he conceived to be the *Ding an sich* behind the world of appearance. The world in and for itself, said Schopenhauer, was the world as will. He called

this will blind to show its irrational character and to bring into clear relief its essential opposition to thought. Though starting from the Fichtean conception of a 'free act', Schopenhauer conceived his will in a very different way from Fichte. For while with Fichte, the will had an ethical significance, the will of Schopenhauer existed in and for itself. The characteristic of the will is an endless striving "which has no end whatever, and which, consequently, is the absolutely irrational will" (Windelband, *Gesch. d. n. Philosophie* Vol. II. p. 369). Nature is an 'objectification' of this will. This 'objectification' has three stages. In its lowest form it appears as mechanical causality, in a higher form it appears in the organic instinct and its highest form is conscious motivation in animal beings. The individual beings are forms of individuation of the will. They possess freedom of being (Freiheit des Seins), because their essence is will, and also a necessity of action (Notwendigkeit des Tuns).

His theory of the blind will led Schopenhauer to pessimism, for his will is such a principle that it can never rest content. As

the 'blind will', never sets any definite object before it, no object can possibly satisfy it. As soon as it seems to attain its object, it moves away from it in its blind search for an unattainable ideal. Indeed, one of the reasons why Schopenhauer calls will blind is that it has no definite object which it strives to attain. Will being thus incompetent to bring any peace, the soul which longs for peace will have to seek it in the restful eternal 'ideas' in which through the endless changes of the will only its constant element appears. Thus, Schopenhauer ends, as Plato did before him, by advocating a retirement in the realm of ideas from the ceaseless flux of the world.

Schopenhauer's theory of the 'blind will' logically leads to two types of thought, according as stress is laid upon the one or the other of the two characteristics of his fundamental principle, its blindness and its creative activity. Hartmann is the logical successor of Schopenhauer, so far as the first of these characteristics is concerned, whilst Hans Driesch and J. Reinke have followed in his footsteps, so far as the second of these characteristics is concerned.

Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* carries a step further the "Unvernünftigkeit" of the world-principle, as sketched by Schopenhauer, whilst Hans Driesch's *Science and Philosophy of the Organism* and Reinke's *Welt als Tat* follow Schopenhauer in the emphasis laid upon the active principle of the world. It seems, however, that the first of these characteristics, the irrationality of the world-principle, is given greater prominence in Schopenhauer's system than the second. There is even reason for thinking that in his search for a truly blind principle, Schopenhauer hit upon the will. For the will is of all human powers, the one that acts most arbitrarily and irrationally and hence its selection as a blind principle is a natural one.

The essence of Schopenhauer's protest against rationalism is, as Windelband says (*vide Geschichte d. n. Philosophie*, Vol. II., p. 348), that there is in the ground of things something which exists, which we handle and which yet we do not understand. Indeed, in "der Tiefe des 'Deduzierten' ruht ein Undeduzierbares, von dem wir nichts wissen als 'es ist' ". By the side

of the "eternal realities", there is also a *verité de fait* which is incomprehensible to the logical consciousness. As Prof. Stein says, "The sum, world, does not go without a remainder in physics and chemistry. A residue remains, something whose origin cannot be found, something inexplicable, which the romanticists, through mystical excess of feeling, pretend to comprehend through intuitive vision." (*Vide Phil. Ström.* p. 311).

The standpoint of the will is not essentially different from that of feeling, so far as the main characteristics of romanticism are concerned. In it we see, as in feeling, the same reverence of the inexplicable, the same love of the mysterious, the same "Verherrlichung der Instincte und des unverkünstelten, unreflektierten, natürlichen Menschenverstandes auf Kosten aller abstrakten Verstandeserkenntnis", as Prof. Ludwig Stein happily characterises the essence of romanticism. In all forms of romanticism, whether it is the "mneme" of Hering and Simon, the "idées forces" of Alfred Fouillée or the pragmatic method of James and Schiller, the essential

characteristic is the exaltation of the instinctive at the expense of the rational.

But the heart of romanticism is the individual. As we have already said, the individual is the alpha and omega of romanticism, its beginning and its end. With the exaltation of the instinctive character which we have just said is the chief feature of all forms of romanticism, there goes the assertion of the personal, the subjective, as opposed to the impersonal and objective, which is the theme of rationalism. Will is only "extensive subjectivity", just as feeling is its intensive aspect. Will is personality going out of itself, stretching itself to seize what is beyond itself, whereas feeling is the expression of personality in and for itself. Thus, Gefühlsromantik and Willensromantik both take personality as their starting-point, though the one conceives it as it is for itself and the other as it goes beyond itself and thus becomes active or creative. The merit of personality is its concreteness, its freedom from all vague generalisation. Personality, therefore, is the *forte* of all systems of romanti-

cism, especially, of that great system which is connected with the name of Nietzsche.

The romanticist's love of the concrete is also responsible for his preference for the biological method. The classicist thinks *more geometrico,* the romanticist, *more biologico.* Romanticism in its search for a principle that can better explain the complicated processes of the world than reason, comes across life with its teleologico-mechanical structure. Life is a concrete entity; there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it. Life, moreover, has just something in it which cannot be discovered by the logical reason, something which refuses to lend itself to any rationalistic analysis. Life, further, has the merit of blending harmoniously a multitude of divergent processes. The unity of life is a much higher unity than that of Being and satisfies better than the latter the craving of romanticism for a unity that can yet comprehend all diversity. For all these reasons, life is a favourite principle of the romanticist and some most important branches of romanticism have made it the basal factor of their world-synthesis.

But it is an irony of fate that the romanticist

by his emphasis of the personal element misses the very thing for which he contends, namely, the fulness of the concrete personality. The concrete to be full must be viewed in its totality and this can only be done by throwing the clear light of reason upon it. As we have already said, it is an *Unendlichkeitsdrang* that leads the romanticist to search for a principle which can comprehend the complexity of the world better than reason. But this search leads him precisely where he ought not to go, namely, to the vagueness of a dreamy mysticism which obscures everything.

The various forms of neo-romanticism of the present day are mixtures of the divers elements noted above. In Nietzsche's romanticism, we find the romanticist's love for the individual in a marked degree. Combined with this there is excessive fondness for activity, effectiveness. In the race-romanticism of Chamberlain, we have similarly a beautiful combination of the romanticist's fondness for feeling and his love of the concrete. Voluntarism in its various forms exhibits the romanticist's love for the active as well as for the subjective. The

love for the subjective is also markedly present in the philosophy of values, in spite of its apparently objective character. Pragmatism shows intense love of the active and practical and shares with romanticism also its biological bias. The biological bias manifests itself in a special degree in Vitalism and Energism, as well as in Keyserling's system. Keyserling's system, however, not only exhibits a biological bias but also the fundamental instinct of the romanticist, his fondness for the irrational and the alogical. This last characteristic is also the key-note of the philosophy of Dilthey. Bergson's system also exhibits this characteristic in a remarkable degree but it is somewhat subdued by an element which is even stronger than this, namely, excessive regard for the immediate and intuitive.

CHAPTER II.

The Individualistic Romanticism of Nietzsche.

Gefühlsromantik and Willensromantik, though they seek to avoid the one-sidedness of rationalism, make equally one-sided efforts at a world-synthesis. They aim at fulness, at the totality of things. They seek to reach a standpoint from which they can view the whole field of reality. But though they attempt so much, they accomplish very little.

One reason for the failure of these two types of romanticism is vagueness in the formulation of their first principles. What is wanted to make romanticism a living movement is to take a principle which is at once definite and broad.

Such a principle Max Stirner and Nietzsche seek in individualism. The individual is a perfectly definite notion and is at the same time broad enough to comprehend the real. The individual, moreover, is a concrete principle and so satisfies the need which the romanticist feels

for something which is not abstract or general. In the individual the romanticist, further, finds a principle of unity, which is deeper than that of the classicist. For the highest form of unity which the classicist attains is organic unity and even this is nothing in comparison with the unity of the individual. The unity of the individual is a unity running through all parts and all aspects. Conceptual unity in its highest form is a one-sided unity: it is unity in some point which is considered most vital. It is not unity of all the parts, still less, a unity of all the aspects of a thing. Organic unity, or the unity of all the parts of an organism for the maintenance and development of life, is the ideal which the unity of concept seeks to attain but which yet it never wholly reaches. In the teleological concept we have as near an approach as possible to the organic unity which the classicist is capable of making. But in organic unity, there is only unity which reveals itself in a stronger and stronger form as it meets with a multiplicity of ends, with a diversity of purposes. There is no unity which shows itself all the more complete, all the more perfect as it emerges out of a

seeming choas of conflicting ends, opposed purposes. But the individual is precisely such a unity. It is a unity which shows itself best in "varied light."

It is love of this unity which leads Max Stirner to postulate 'Eigenheit' as the fundamental principle of his world-view. 'Ownness' is the highest expression of unity. It is when an individual loses himself in a thing that he can call it its own. Ownness is thus an expression of individual unity. This 'ownness' Stirner advocates in an extremely bold manner. What is absolutely our own need alone be accepted. Everything which is beyond us, even that in us which is beyond us is to be rejected ("Nicht bloss das Jenseits ausser uns, sondern das Jenseits in uns muss zerstört werden"). It follows that there can be no objective system of morals, no system of Government, for the individual can never be bound by any external authority. He is a law unto himself and is under absolutely no obligation to obey any external laws. The State is only a "Verein von Egoisten" (Vide Vorländer, Gesch. d. n. Phil. Vol. II p. 406).

Thus Stirner advocates what Prof. Stein calls the "moralenfreies Leben der Lumpenproletarier," or what Marx sarcastically designates "Schinderhannes-Standpunkt." It is an ethical solipsism of a kind which has never been surpassed in its outrageous boldness by any system of morals either in ancient or in modern times. The extravagance of this view, however, is its own destruction. In vain has Mackay tried to represent this ego-cult as the expression of super-human wisdom, as the revelation of a genius. What this 'I am I'-theory, this 'autonomy of the individual' really signifies is the hopelessness of a philosophy based upon a purely personal principle.

But if Stirner is a Don Quixote of individualism, Nietzsche, as Prof. Stein says, is a genius in this field. In Nietzsche we have a rare combination of deep philosophical thinking and poetical imagination. Nietzsche, in fact, is a poet-philosopher. The poetic element in him gives an elasticity, a breadth of view to his philosophical thinking, while his strong logical sense prevents him from committing the excesses of Stirner's anarchical system. A touch of the

poetical element, in fact, is a help rather than a hindrance to philosophy. The greatest philosophers have in all ages shown a great love for, and appreciation of poetry. Thus, among the Greeks, Heraclitus and Plato were saturated with the poetic sentiment. The latter, especially, exhibited a very high degree of poetic genius. In our own country, the great Sankaracharya, one of the greatest philosophical and religious geniuses the world has ever seen, was a poet of no mean order. Coming to modern times, we notice in Hegel a strong under-current of poetical sentiment. His philosophy, in fact, is a sort of conceptual poetry (Begriffsdichtung).

Thus, Nietzsche is very happily gifted. And he makes the best use of his gifts for the sake of preaching highly original, and to a great extent, unpopular doctrines. His poetic sentiment gives him a power of expressing his thoughts in a way which captivates the imagination. This is very necessary for a man who, like Nietzsche, has to preach extremely novel doctrines. Nietzsche, in fact, had to advocate from the beginning of his career most unfashionable and highly original principles. He was a

lover of intellectual freedom and so he often found himself in opposition to the prevailing tendencies of his time. It was his own fiery independence that probably led him to his individualistic theory. For he could never accept any authority except that of his own personal convictions and was hence naturally inclined to look upon the individual as the measure of things.

The individual, says Nietzsche, must always assert himself. He must always wage war against error and illusion. He must give no quarter to what is bad, must denounce all false and corrupt practices, all the weaknesses and falsehoods of civilization. He must follow the Dionysian spirit and abandon the Socratic spirit of trying to be at peace with the world. The ideal he holds up for our admiration is, as Lichtenberger says (vide *The Gospel of Superman p*. 58), "man according to Schopenhauer," "the man, that is, who knows that true happiness is impossible, who hates and despises the vulgar worldly prosperity aimed at by the average man, who destroys everything that merits destruction, heedless of his own suffering; heedless also of

the suffering he causes to others, borne up in his painful journey through life by his resolute will to be true and sincere at all costs." The most beautiful thing that a man can realize is "a heroic existence." Nietzsche, therefore, never accepts Schopenhauer's doctrine of resignation. In fact, he is violently opposed to all theories which advocate a calm submission to the inevitable, an easy-going acceptance of the order of things. What he values in man is his revolt against all tradition, his battle against blind and foolish chance. He condemns in unmeasured terms all philosophy of "disheartened wisdom" which makes humanity subordinate to science. This is the "destructive character" of Nietzsche's philosophy which Prof. Stein has pointed out in his "Philosophical Currents of the Present Day" and which he thinks is not quite in harmony with the needs of the age which requires a constructive rather than a destructive genius.

But Nietzsche's destructive philosophy was only a prelude to his constructive synthesis. His revolt against tradition, against all established order and law was simply to show the necessity

for the production of the 'heroic man,' the man of genius. Herein lies Nietzsche's point of divergence from Stirner, for not every individual, but *the* individual, the true man of genius, is the measure of all things. True history is not the history of the masses but the history of the men of genius. "The time will come" says Nietzsche, "when we shall keep away from all constructions of the world-process, or even of the history of man, a time when we shall no more look at masses but at individuals who form a bridge over the wan stream of becoming" (*Use and Abuse of History*). As Lichtenberger in his *Gospel of Superman* observes, Nietzsche, like Flaubert or Renan, "admits that a people is a round-about path taken by nature to produce a dozen great men, and he lays down the principle that 'humanity must always act so as to bring men of genius into the world—this is its task, it has no other.' " This doctrine that the only end of humanity is the production of a few perfect individuals, or, what he calls "supermen," he carries to such an extreme that he calls man only an intermediate stage, a temporary halting-ground. "Was gross ist am Menschen,

das ist, dass er eine Brücke und kein Zweck ist: was geliebt werden kann am Menschen, das ist, dass er ein übergang und ein Untergang ist" (*Also sprach Zarathustra* Neumann's Edition p. 16). In another place he said, "Man is something that must be overcome." The existence of the present race of men is, indeed, in Nietzsche's opinion, only to be tolerated as an intermediate stage through which humanity must pass before it can reach the stage of the superman. Thus, through the mouth of Zarathustra, Nietzsche says, "I love those who do not seek in the stars the reason of going down and offering themselves for sacrifice but who offer themselves to the earth, in order that the earth may belong to the superman. I love him who lives in order that he may know, and who wants to know in order that once the superman may live........... I love him who works and feels, in order that he may prepare the house for the over-man and keep the earth, beast and plant ready for him; for thus he desires his downfall." This earth and everything must crumble in order that the superman may rise out of the ruins. Thus, Zarathustra is made to

say, "Still is the ground not rich enough for it (the planting of the highest hopes). But this ground will once become poor and stale and no tall tree will any more grow upon it." And it is then that the superman will descend upon earth as lightning and create a new world out of the ashes of the old. "Seht, ich bin der Verküundiger des Blitzes and ein schwerer Tropfen aus der Wolke: dieser Blitz aber heisst Übermensch" (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, Neumann's Edition p. 18). The superman is thus a sort of Messiah whose advent is hailed as meaning the deliverance of the world from its load of sin and corruption. Nietzsche therefore is not a believer in a gradual progress of the world from lower to higher stages. The world, if it is to be improved at all, must, he thinks, be improvd by violent means. No compromise or half-measures will do when the question is one of remodelling the world after a higher and nobler plan. There must be a total destruction of all that is wicked and corrupt, as also of all that is weak or unstable.

Nietzsche is an opponent of all theories of equality. His philosophy is based upon in-

equality. The race of 'supermen' is indeed a race of aristocrats, for the supermen rise by destroying the ordinary, commonplace human beings. Hence in Nietzsche's system there can be no place for democracy, for democracy deals with a race of mediocres. "With these preachers of equality" says Nietzsche, "I shall not be mixed up. For justice tells me "Men are not equal." And they shall not also become so. What would be my love for the superman if I spoke differently?" (*Also sprach Zarathustra* Neumann's Edition p. 147). Thus, the 'love of the superman' leads Nietzsche to discard the doctrine of equality. Democracy, indeed, is a levelling influence and is fatal to the production of the man of genius. The real reason why the present is an age of mediocrities is the wide prevalence of democratic ideas throughout the world.

We thus arrive at what is the central phase of Nietzsche's philosophy, his "Umwertung aller Werte." All philosophers, says Nietzsche, even the most independent and original, have hitherto followed mainly the traditional ideas of truth and falsehood. That the true is the only

oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards selflessness, belong as definitely to 'noble' morality as do a careless scorn and precaution in presence of sympathy and the weak heart," whereas it is precisely this sympathy and this weak heart which are assigned a high place in slave-morality. The same is the case with Truth. The antithesis, truth and error, is a great delusion of the philosopher. "The fundamental belief of metaphysicians" says Nietzsche in *Beyond Good and Evil,* "is the belief in the antitheses of values. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary) though they have made a solemn vow, "De omnibus dubitandum." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below, "frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters." The dis-

tinction of truth and error, therefore is no more real than that of good and bad.

This transvaluation of values is extreme romanticism. All romanticism seeks a modification in the scheme of values. When rationalism puts reason at the head of the table of values, romanticism tries to disturb this table and put some other principle, such as feeling or will, at the top. But the romanticism of Nietzsche is romanticism run mad. For no system of values can be conceived in which the true and the good have no place. If the true and the good are abolished from the scope of philosophy, its subject-matter will vanish. Indeed, no intelligible talk is possible unless we assume that there is something which is true or good. What that something is, may be a matter of dispute, but that there must be something which is true as well as something which is good is the pre-condition of all discussion. All philosophical and scientific discussion hinges on the question, What is true?, as does all discussion about human conduct on the question, What is good? All philosophy as well as all science is nothing but an attempt to answer the

question, What is true?, just as ethics is an attempt to answer the question, What is good?. To say that the true and the good do not exist, is tantamount to saying that all thinking is impossible. For whether we assert anything or deny anything, we have to assume the existence of truth. So whether we praise or condemn any action or any person, we have to assume the existence of such a thing as good. When Nietzsche says that the true is only relative, what he means is that what is customarily called true is subordinate to the Will to Power. But this is only another way of asserting that the Will to Power is truth. There can thus be no getting rid of the notion of truth. So also there can be no escape from the notion of good. The "trans-valuation of values," therefore, in Nietzsche's sense is absurd, although all philosophy is more or less a re-valuation of values and a re-arrangement of the scheme of values.

Nietzsche's individualism may be called an Unabhängigkeitsromantik. It is romanticism of the sturdy spirit which refuses to bow to any authority and which seeks to guide its course simply by its own light. But it is not the absurd

romanticism of *Eigenheit* which Stirner preached, not a deification of what is purely personal and subjective at the expense of all that is universal and objective. Its standard is not "Gefühl im eigenen Busen," but the strong and healthy sense of a reformed and re-vitalised individual. The individual *per se* is not the measure of things for Nietzsche, but the heroic individual, the man who has broken loose from all corrupt traditions and has been able to cultivate a 'free spirit.' Such an individual is a "creator of values." As Lichtenberger says (*Gospel of Superman* p. 173), "he creates with every freedom and independence, heedless of good or evil, truth or error: he creates his own truth; he creates his own morality."

The romanticism of Nietzsche further shows itself in his love of movement, in his belief in a ceaseless flux of the world. He believes in the instability of the present state of the human race. "Man" he says, "is only a bridge and not an end........................a way to new dawns" (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, Neumann's Edition p. 289: *On Old and New Tables*). There is nowhere any standing still,

there is everywhere continuous march. Life is only a temporary halting-ground, a rest-house in this ceaseless march from lower to higher forms of existence. Life, according to him, is "something that must always surpass itself" (*Also sprach Zarathustra.* Neumann's Edition p. 167: On Self-Surpassing) Life is not a place where we can cast anchor but one past which we must always move in our voyage through eternity. Nietzsche therefore can say with Keyserling:—

> "Seht die ungeheure Welle im Welt-
> "meer. Immer dar sich selber gleich
> "rollt sie vorwärts unbeirrbar nach
> unbekannten Zielen."

It fills a poet's mind with sorrow to think of a ceaseless onward march. Lamartine was pained by this thought and cried in despair—

> Ne pourrons-nous jamais sur l'océan
> des âges
> Jeter l'ancre un seul jour?

But Nietzsche takes delight in thinking that the world, instead of remaining at a standstill, is ever progressing onward. It is true his doctrine of Eternal Return runs to some extent

counter to the principle of eternal progress. But this doctrine is not an integral part of his system, as appears from the fact that Nietzsche viewed it with a certain amount of horror. It was in an aphorism of the *Joyful Wisdom* that Nietzsche for the first time expounded the doctrine of Eternal Return as a disquieting theory. The reason why this doctrine fills Nietzsche with so much alarm is thus stated by Lichtenberger: "The world means nothing, it is the work of blind dsetiny; there results from it a senseless and mathematical action of forces which combine among themselves, realizing in haphazard fashion a certain number of possible groupings. Universal evolution leads nowhere, but follows itself indefinitely by ceaselessly turning round in the same circle; this life which we are leading to-day is one which we shall recommence eternally without any hope of change; and every minute of sadness, pain or disgust shall be relived identically as it was, not only once, but an infinite number of times." There is no reason for thinking, however, that this doctrine is really opposed to the doctrine of progress as sketched in the philosophy of the superman. For

the cycle may not be a narrow one: it may embrace innumerable gradations of existence; it may not affect the rise of the superman out of the present race of mankind. There may not be even much ground for alarm, for though one cycle may bring us back to our present miserable condition, another may take us on to higher and happier forms of life. We must confess, however, that this doctrine is an excrescence and in no way an integral part of Nietzsche's philosophy. Indeed, it fits rather loosely into his system.

In Nietzsche therefore we find a rare combination of the various elements of romanticism. The artistic, the poetic, the mystic and the rationalistic elements have united to produce a system of great power and beauty.

CHAPTER III.

The Race-Romanticism of Chamberlain.

Nietzsche's philosophy emphasised the need of a higher individual. But this higher individual must himself belong to a higher race. What Nietzsche advocated was in fact the creation of a race of higher individuals. We have become a degenerate race, Nietzsche thinks, and what is needed is to produce a purer and nobler race. There is, therefore, no essential change in the philosophical attitude in accepting race instead of the individual as the fundamental reality.

A race-romanticism, moreover, can have all the characteristics of subjectivity, immediateness, etc., which distinguish individualistic romanticism. Chamberlain's romanticism, in fact, does not yield in any of these features to the romanticism of Nietzsche. It is eminently personal, full of subjective convictions and subjective certainty. It appeals more than Nietzsche does to "feeling in one's own breast," to

"innere Stimme." It is by following a purely subjective criterion that Chamberlain arrives at his notion of Race. "Directly convincing as nothing else is, is the possession of race in one's own consciousness. Whoever belongs to a markedly pure race feels it daily." His "own consciousness," the "feeling in his own breast" guarantees for Chamberlain the validity of his remarkable proposition, "Race is fact." For Chamberlain, indeed, the greatest wonder is we ourselves. "At every step," says Chamberlain, "we meet wonders: the greatest wonder, however, is we ourselves."

Chamberlain, says Prof. Stein, is a thoroughly artistic personality like the romanticist Rousseau with whom he has much in common, in spite of the great difference between the zealous race-aristocrat and the equally earnest democrat. For him art is of the essence of philosophy. The artist, as Chamberlain conceives him, sees the whole of things; he has in him "the pulsing blood-system of the higher spiritual life". He feels the throb of the universe and is therefore best fitted to interpret it. He is in fact both a poet and a philosopher—a

poet, because he possesses in a remarkable degree the creative instinct which is of the essence of poetry and a philosopher, because on account of his intimate acquaintance with the real, he can understand and interpret it better than a philosopher *pur sang* can. The artist in Chamberlain gives him his insight into the history of the world as also his wonderful creative power. Chamberlain is nothing if he is not original and creative. His "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" is the work of a creative genius of a very high order. Every page of it exhibits the work of a highly original and powerful mind. And the basis of this originality and power is the strong aesthetic perception. The artistic sense in Chamberlain is, moreover, responsible for that sturdy independence which does not shrink from accepting unpopular and unfashionable doctrines. Art is its own master and cares nothing for the opinion of the world.

We have mentioned "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century." In it Chamberlain has set forth his doctrine of Race. It is a most wonderful book. Lord Redesdale thus describes the impression which this book has

produced upon him: "What is this book? How should it be defined? Is it history, a philosophical treatise, a metaphysical inquiry? I confess, I know not; probably it is all three. I am neither an historian, alas! nor a philosopher, nor a metaphysician. To me the book has been a simple delight—the companion of months—fulfilling the highest function of which a teacher is capable, that of awakening thought and driving it into new channels" (Lord Redesdale's Introduction to the English translation of "Die Grundlagen" (p. viii.)) It created quite a sensation in Germany when it appeared in 1899. It was not a very popular book. Its views were in many cases diametrically opposed to those commonly accepted by scholars. As Lord Redesdale says, "that this book should be popular with those scholars who are wedded to old traditions, was not to be expected. He has shattered too many idols, dispelled too many dearly treasured illusions. And the worst of it is that the foundations of his belief—perhaps, I should rather say, of his disbeliefs—are built upon rocks so solid that they will defy the cunningest mines that can be laid against them."

The main teaching of this book is that race is the most important factor in human history. The movement of history is not a vague movement of progress but a definite evolution of a particular racial type. It is not engendered by the crash of innumerable forces striving for supremacy but is due to the steady and gradual development of one single force, namely, one individual race. There is nothing arbitrary or chaotic in this movement, as there would be if it was the result of a conflict of divers forces, but it is perfectly regular and systematic. History is not the expression of a general progress of mankind but "the work of a definite, individual racial type, a type possessing, like everything individual, great gifts but also insurmountable limitations." The obscurity of our historical groupings arises from our floating about in boundless space and ignoring that "which is concretely presented and which alone effects anything in history, the definite individuality".

But what is this individual racial type which is the all-important factor in history? What is this notion of a definite, concrete type of race which is to supplant the traditional views of

history? Race, according to Chamberlain, gives a certain individual character to a man. It stamps him out as possessing certain well-defined and clearly recognisable qualities. These constitute the essence of what he is. "Nothing is so convincing" says Chamberlain, "as the consciousness of the possession of Race. The man who belongs to a distinct, pure race never loses the sense of it. The guardian angel of his lineage is ever at his side, supporting him where he loses his foothold, warning him like the Socratic Daemon where he is in danger of going astray, compelling obedience and forcing him to undertakings which, deeming them impossible, he would never have dared to attempt. ....Race lifts a man above himself: it endows him with extraordinary—I might also say, supernatural—powers, so entirely does it distinguish him from the individual who springs from the chaotic jumble of peoples drawn from all parts of the world; and should this man of pure origin be perchance gifted above his fellows, then the fact of Race strengthens and elevates him on every hand, and he becomes a genius towering above the rest of mankind, not

because he has been thrown upon the earth like a flaming meteor by a freak of nature, but because he soars heavenward, like some strong and stately tree, nourished by thousands and thousands of roots—no solitary individual but the living sum of untold souls striving for the same goal''.* Race, thus, confers a unique character upon a man. In fact, the most essential qualities of a man are those which he derives from his race. The race-qualities are not, as is commonly supposed, distilled out of the individual qualities but the individual qualities get their distinctive character from those of the race. Race is not a general concept abstracted from the individuals composing it, but it is a perfectly definite, perfectly intelligible thing. To understand it one has only to look at it. ''Whoever wishes'', says Chamberlain, ''to see with his own eyes what noble race is, and what it is not, should send for the poorest of the Sephardim from Salonica or Serajevo (great wealth is very rare among them) and put him side by side with any Ashkenazim financier;

* *Foundations*, Vol I. p. 269.

then will be perceived the difference between the nobility which race bestows and that conferred by a monarch." (Foundations Vol. I. p. 275).

If it is said that race produces characteristics which are extravagant, Chamberlain replies that so does everything which is truly great, for it is one of Goethe's wisest sayings that only that which is extravagant makes greatness ("Einzig das Überschwengliche mache die Grösse"). This characteristic of "something extravagant" is, indeed, what we observe in all pure and noble races. "Is not the Greek", says Chamberlain, "in the fulness of his glory an unparalleled example of this "extravagance"? And do we not see this "extravagance" first make its appearance when immigration from the North has ceased and the various strong breeds of men, isolated on the peninsula, once for all begin to fuse into a new race, brighter and more brilliant, where, as in Athens, the racial blood flows from many sources, simpler and more resisting, where, as in Lacedaemon, even this mixture of blood has been barred out."*

* *Foundations*, Vol I. p. 270.

Race, then, is the most essential factor in history and is a perfectly definite, perfectly intelligible notion. Again, not race in the abstract, but a wholly individual type of race is the guiding principle in history. The question thus arises, What race is it which is such an all-important factor in world-history? Chamberlain's answer is, The Germanic race. By this, however, he does not mean the race of Germans, for his word would then have been "Der Deutsche", whereas the expression he uses is "Der Germane". As Lord Redesdale observes in his introduction to the English translation of Chamberlain's work, in this term are included the Celts, the Germans, the Slavs and all those races of Northern Europe from which the peoples of modern Europe have sprung (evidently, also the people of the United States of America). The Germanic race, as thus conceived, is the maker of history. It is the creator of modern civilization. It is a mistake to suppose that the peoples of Northern Europe were responsible for the "Night of the Middle Ages"; on the contrary, Chamberlain thinks, this night rather followed the "intellectual and

moral bankruptcy of the raceless chaos of humanity which the dying Roman Empire had nurtured". It is in keeping with this theory of the racial superiority of the peoples of northern Europe, that Chamberlain does not consider the so-called Renaissance the turning-point in the world's history. The turning-point is rather the year 1200 when the Teutons first came into prominence and set a new wave of culture. The advent of these people brought new life into the world which had lain for centuries in an almost lifeless condition. The fall of the Roman Empire was a slow process and was not a sudden event; during the whole time that this Empire had been crumbling and decaying, culture was practically at a standstill. It is the entry of the Teutonic peoples into the history of the world that revived decaying culture, put new blood into a civilization that was fast withering away, in short, gave mankind a new lease of life. And this happened in or about the year 1200. "If we ask ourselves", says Chamberlain, "when it is that we have the first sure indications that something new is coming into being, a new form of the world in place of the

old shattered ruin, and of the prevailing chaos, we must admit that they are already to be met with in many places in the twelfth century (in Northern Italy, even in the eleventh), they multiply rapidly in the thirteenth—the glorious century, as Fiske calls it....................And, I repeat, if when looking back we try to discover when the first shimmer of those rays of hope can be clearly seen, we find the time to be about the year 1200."* At the beginning of the thirteenth century the powerful Hansa and the Rhenish Alliance of Cities was formed. It was about this time also that money began to take the place of natural products in buying and selling. But the advance in trade and the growth of the idea of civic freedom were not the only things which characterised the beginning of the thirteenth century. More important than these was the great movement of religion inaugurated by Francis of Assisi. In the province of science, too, a great advance was made. Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon laid the foundation of modern science. A new era in

* *Foundations*, Vol. I. Author's Introduction p. lxx.

the history of mathematical science, too, began in the thirteenth century. In this the guiding spirits were Leonard of Pisa, who introduced the Indian numerical system, and Jordanus Saxo, who initiated Europe into the art of algebraic calculation. Poetry also flourished greatly in this century. Dante belonged to the thirteenth century. Even "in the heart of the most genuine Teutonic life", in the north, creative poetic genius showed itself. In the year 1200, Chrestien de Troyes, Hartmann von Aire, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Walther von der Vogelweide, Gottfried von Strassburg were living and they were all poetical geniuses of a high order. The thirteenth century also witnessed the discovery of other parts of the world and Marco Polo added many new lands to the realm of known countries. This was of great importance, as it gave the European people a possibility of expansion and laid the foundation for that saturation of the world with European thought which is such a characteristic feature of the present day. For all these reasons the year 1200 may be regarded as the turning-point in the world's history.

Next to the Germanic peoples, the Jews have exercised, according to Chamberlain, the greatest influence upon history. The Jews possess strongly marked and distinctive racial characteristics. By strict in-breeding and the exercise of proper selection, they have been able to preserve intact their racial qualities. It is true that Chamberlain has shown the vast superiority of the races of Northern Europe over the Jews but still he thinks that culture owes a great deal to the Jews. Thus, speaking of the race-less chaos which happened at the time of the disintegration of the Roman Empire, Chamberlain says, "If we contemplate the southern and eastern centres of culture in the world-empire in its downfall and let no sympathies or antipathies prevent our judgment, we must confess that the Jews were at all time the only people deserving respect."* Prof. Stein has given great prominence in his *Phil. Strom.* to the contrast made by Chamberlain between the qualities of the Teutons and the qualities of the Jews, but we think it will be a gross misrepresentation of the

* *Foundations*, Vol. I pp. 253-54.

views of Chamberlain to say that he has a very low opinion of the Jewish race. The "entrance of the Jews into Western History" is regarded by Chamberlain as one of the greatest events in European history and a very lengthy chapter is devoted to this subject in his "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century".

To the question, who is the Jew? Chamberlain replies by stating the following facts:—(*Foundations* Vol. I. p. 359).

1. The Israelite people has arisen from the crossing of quite different human types.
2. The Semitic element may be the stronger morally, but physically, it has contributed scarcely one-half to the composition of the new ethnological individuality and that, consequently, it is wrong shortly to call the Israelites "Semites".
3. The real Jew only developed in the course of centuries by gradual physical separation from the rest of the Israelite family, as also by

progressive development of certain mental qualities and systematic starving of others; he is not the result of a normal national life, but in a way an artificial product, produced by a priestly caste which forced, with the help of alien rulers, a priestly legislation and a priestly faith upon a people that did not want them.

The races of Northern Europe and the Jews, especially, the former, are in Chamberlain's opinion, the makers of modern history. It is significant that Chamberlain has made no mention of the Indian people. Perhaps, they are included in the word 'Germane', but their culture-history ought to have had a separate place assigned to it in his work. This omission is of some significance, for if Chamberlain had treated of Indian civilizaion, he would probably have had to modify his theory of race as the most important factor in history. For in the history of Indian civilization, race probably plays the least important part. The Hindus and the Buddhists were racially identical, yet they followed two

distinct lines of culture. Even within Hinduism, various sects were formed by people who did not differ racially from one another in any respect.

Coming now to religion, the question arises, Is race a principle adequate to represent the phenomena of the rise and growth of religions and of the conflict of religions? Can it be maintained that race is the most essential factor in the evolution of religion? Chamberlain seems inclined to believe that it is race which gives a distinctive character to a religion. The principal features of the religion of a people are nothing but a reflexion of the fundamental characteristics of the people themselves. But Chamberlain has also to admit that the reverse process, namely, religion influencing the fate of the race, also takes place. He has to confess that race is something "plastic, inconstant and a compound of manifold elements almost always striving with each other for mastery" and that "frequently, the victory of a religious dogma has given one element preponderance over the others and thus determined the whole future development of a race or nation." Chamberlain further believes that there is something eternal

and immutable in a religion which is not affected by the varying fortunes of a race. Thus, the personality of Christ, he says, is the eternal and permanent element in Christianity and the mistakes we make in our judgment of the historical value of Christianity arise from our failure to distinguish "the personality of Christ—that ever-gushing, constant spring of the loftiest religiosity—from the structures which the changing religious needs, the changing mental claims of men, and—what is more important—the fundamentally different natures of dissimilar human races have erected as the law and temple of their worship."* This admission that there is in a religion something permanent which endures through the vicissitudes of a race goes much further than Chamberlain is prepared to go. For if the eternal element in a religion, e.g., the personality of Christ, as Chamberlain himself says, gives it its peculiar character, what becomes of Chamberlain's theory that it is race and nothing else which is the all-important factor in religion, as in other spheres of human

* *Foundations*, Vol. II. p. 15.

activity? The fact is, Chamberlain had too much respect for Christianity, too great a perception of its merits, to allow him to bring it under his race-formula. If he had studied the history of the religious consciousness in India, he would have arrived much earlier at the conclusion to which his study of Christianity led him, namely, that a religion possesses an abiding principle which manifests itself through all the vicissitudes of fortune of races.

But the abiding element in religion is, in Chamberlain's opinion, also an intimately personal element. It expresses our inmost essence, the deepest core of our being, the inner nature of our personality. Thus, the personal-eternal is the characteristic feature of religion. As Chamberlain says with regard to the personality of Jesus Christ, the religious element in it is "something in the inmost recesses of our souls, something apart from time and space—something which cannot be exhaustively or even adequately expressed by any logical chain of thought" (*Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* Vol. II p. 501). But if it is this, it is that with which the artist is at home, for the

work of the artist is to convert the personal into the eternal, the subjective into the objective, the invisible into the visible. The eternal in the personal is therefore the theme alike of religion and of art; religion, in fact, is only aesthetics of faith. The artistic element in religion is its most important element; without it, it becomes a mere tissue of dogmas. As Chamberlain says, without the personality of Christ, Christianity loses its vitality and becomes a lifeless mass of doctrines. Chamberlain is happiest in his delineation of the characteristics of art and it is a very happy thought of his to include religion also in the category of art.

It is in the emphasis laid on the personal element that the romanticism of Chamberlain consists. This element appears most strikingly in his work on Kant. The idea of this book is to study a man's philosophy through his personality. "The manner in which a man looks upon the problems of life and of the world," says Chamberlain, "in other words, his philosophy, is born with him; it is the necessary result of his way of "seeing" (*Kant* Vol. I. p. 13). The nature of a man's work arises

"like a network of diagonal lines out of his own original self under the influence of the workings of his time and his surroundings; still at the root of all is the personality." Chamberlain's favourite word for a thinker is, therefore, *seer*; what counts is the "Welt des Auges", for here we perceive personality in its pure, unblended form. His object in writing his work on Kant is "nothing less than to draw near to Kant, to enter his actual presence."

Side by side with this adoration of the personal, there goes in this work an excessive reverence for the aesthetic element. The two are, however, related to each other, for, in Chamberlain's view, the most intensely personal element is the artistic one. "Born to see, trained to perceive"—this, in Chamberlain's opinion, sums up the whole development of man. It is no wonder, then, that Chamberlain quotes with approval the remark of Goethe, "that the studio of a great artist does more for the development of the philosopher in embryo and the poet than the lecture-room of the worldly wise and the critic" (*Kant* Vol. I. p. 31). What is most valuable in us, what, indeed,

constitutes our personality, is our power of sight, our intuitive vision.

It follows from this that all objective thinking is nothing but a projection of our intuitive vision into the world which we believe to be outside of us. Even science, according to Chamberlain, is "systematic anthropomorphism," for we 'feel' our thoughts as they are projected into nature. But if this process of "Einfühlen" is characteristic of science as well as of philosophy, do we not arrive at another form of individualism? What becomes of race as the fundamental unit of the world, if the ultimate reference is always to the individual, to the inmost recesses of subjective feeling? The truth is, as Prof. Stein points out in his *Phil. Ström.*, race as a constitutive factor is a perfectly useless principle. Hence, Chamberlain has to make no end of shifts when he comes to deal with questions having an abiding interest, such as, religion and art. The truly essential element in Chamberlain's system is not his race-theory but his romanticism. All the best 'motifs' of romanticism have operated to produce a most unique system of subjective philosophy.

Chamberlain's race-romanticism differs from that of Gobineau and Schemann, De Leusse and Le Bon, Lapouge, Ammon, Ploetz, Reibmayer, Wilser and Woltmann in this, that it brings to a focus all the divergent currents of this movement of thought. Chamberlain, in fact, is the most important representative of the romantic movement in modern times, "the philosophical mouthpiece of the neo-romantic movement of the present day."

CHAPTER IV.

The Rhythmic Romanticism of Keyserling and the Poetico-religious Romanticism of Dilthey.

The main charge of romanticism against rationalism is that the latter takes an objective and universalistic standpoint, whilist reality is individual and personal. This protest we notice in Gefühlsromantik and Willensromantik, as well as in the romantic systems of Chamberlain and Nietzsche. The 'race' of Chamberlain, no less than the superman of Nietzsche, is a principle of individuality and is a protest against the objectifying and universalising tendencies of rationalism. But a principle which in all its aspects is essentially single and which yet is sufficiently complex to escape the one-sidedness of reason will better serve the needs of romanticism than either the 'race' of Chamberlain or the 'superman' of Nietzsche, for neither of the latter principles is in itself sufficiently unitary

and both require to be made so by constant reduction to the unity of personal consciousness. A principle of this kind Keyserling believes he finds in rhythm. Rhythm is a measured flow of movement in verse or music and by analogy in other connexions, *e.g.*, "rhythm of life". The movement in a rhythm is always movement returning unto itself, and consequently, movement in a cycle. Unity is the soul of rhythm. In the eleventh edition of the "Encyclopaedia Britannica" we find the following statement in the article on *Rhythm*: "The early critic of prosody, Aristophanes, distinguished as the three elements of which rhythm is composed, the spoken word, the tone of music and song and the bodily motion. The art of the early Greek poets was devoted to a harmonious combination of these three elements, language, instrument and gesture uniting to form perfect rhythm". Thus, unity is the essence of rhythm.

Now, rhythm may be rhythm of measure as well as rhythm of number. The rhythm of measure gives us music as well as poetry, whereas the rhythm of number gives us the science

of mathematics. There is a good deal of what is strictly rhythmic in the even succession of numbers treated of in mathematics. The order of terms in a series is determined to a great extent rhythmically. As Poincaré has said in his chapter on *L'Invention Mathématique* in *Science et Méthode*, the mathematician has got a "feeling of mathematical beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and geometrical elegance".

There is therefore such a thing as a rhythm of numbers. And the philosopher who has made this rhythm the basic principle of his system is Count Keyserling.

According to Keyserling, the world is governed by a strict mathematical rhythm. The universe is a gigantic mathematical system and its unity is a mathematico-objective and not a logico-subjective one. There results thus a sort of Weltmathematik (world-mathematics) in which the eternal dualisms of philosophy, such as the dualism of sensibility and understanding, of Being and Becoming, are represented by continuity and discontinuity and by the sciences of geometry and arithmetic. Continuity and discontinuity, however, are connected with each

other by the formal unity of number. Thus, the unity of the world is a purely formal unity and mathematics governs everything. In this way Keyserling returns to Pythagoras and Spinoza.

But Keyserling's acquaintance with the results of modern science soon shows him the impossibility of resting in a mathematical synthesis of the world. Keyserling perceives very clearly that the union of force and matter cannot be effected by a mathematical synthesis, but requires the mediation of a third factor, namely, life. In the process of life matter and force are made one. For life is a permanent unity in co-existence as well as in succession. The rhythm of numbers with which he started in his "Gefüge der Welt" led by imperceptible stages to a rhythm of life. The formal unity gradually made room for an organic unity and the principles of mathematics led up by slow stages to the principles of biology. In the same work ("Gefüge der Welt") we notice this gradual transition of thought from number to life, from mathematics to biology. The transition may be described as that from Spinoza to Leibniz

and Schelling. As Professor Stein observes, the younger generation of German biologists, especially, Hans Driesch and J. V. Uexküll, have exercised considerable influence upon the thoughts of Keyserling and it is under their influence that this change took place.

There is, however, a deeper meaning of this change. Recent researches on the nature of mathematics have established the fact that mathematical processes are much more complex than they were formerly supposed to be. Hastings Berkeley has tried to show (vide *Mysticism in Modern Mathematics*) that mathematical reasoning has something mystic about it. Mathematics does not strictly follow the rules of formal logic but goes beyond them. A new logic has been created in recent years to study the principles of mathematical reasoning, as it is perceived that the ordinary formal logic is wholly inadequate for this purpose. The general tendency among mathematical logicians seems to be to reduce all mathematical concepts, even the concept of space, to types of ordered series and to make the rhythm of symbols more perfect than before. But what is this but to

make mathematics, the model of rigid logical reasoning, a form of aesthetics? The harmony of symbols, moreover, which we notice in the speculations of such a mathematical logician as Russell, is more perfect than musical harmony. It approximates the unity which we notice in a living organism.

Keyserling thus passes from a mathematical to an organic view of the world. His standpoint now is life. Life, he says, is the third category which must be added to the naturalists' two categories, matter and force, to make a complete world-view. The parallelism between matter and force, between extension and thought cannot, he thinks, be explained without reference to the central category, life. Life weaves these categories harmoniously into its own texture. It is the complex in which matter and force find a resting-place. It is the "rätselhaftes Plus" without which, as Liebmann realises, no explanation of the world-process is possible. The enunciation of this principle is no new thing for philosophy. As early as the days of the hylozoists in Greece this principle was preached. In Germany it created quite a

large school of which the founder was Oken. Driesch and Reinke are among the most zealous exponents of this principle at the present day. What is new in Keyserling is the skill with which he manipulates the latest discoveries in the realm of biological and physical sciences. It is the great merit of Keyserling's works that they exhibit the greatest consideration for the results of the natural sciences. It is a deep analysis of the currents of modern science that makes Keyserling pass from his *Weltmathematik* to a biological view of the universe. Life is the culminating point of a mathematical synthesis of the world, it is the highest stage which a rhythmic view of the universe can attain. The researches of modern biologists, such as Reinke and Driesch, have again established the fact that life contains something which cannot be expressed completely in terms of physics and chemistry. Thus, in life we arrive at a principle which is just beyond the reach of the mathematical and physical sciences, but which is so far related to these that it may be considered a continuation of them, a prolongation of the rhythmic and active elements noticed in them.

The highest rhythm is organic rhythm and the highest principle of activity is the protoplasm. Keyserling, therefore, in taking his stand upon life, does not abandon the rhythmic view of the world, to which Goldschmidt's discovery of the identity of the law of formation of crystals and tones first led him.

Life, thus, is the great synthesis of Keyserling. The world-mathematics requires a third category, life, in order to effect a synthesis between matter and force. This placing of life in the front rank stamps Keyserling as a romanticist. His romanticism is further shown in the way in which he looks at life. In his work entitled *Unsterblichkeit* (Immortality)[1] he speaks of life as a symbol of the *Weltmeer* which corresponds to some extent to the अप्रतौकं सलिलम् mentioned in the Rigveda.

A deeply mystic tone pervades this work. The gradual rise of mysticism in Keyserling which we notice in his transition from a mathematical to an organic view of the world, shows itself more fully in this work. Here he takes his stand definitely upon the mysterious, the inexplicable. "Alle Philosophie", says

of the world, as it ought to do. We try to picture everything as separate from and independent of everything else, whereas the truth is, that there is nothing which can be detached from its surroundings and viewed in its isolation. Everything brings with it the whole train of surrounding objects. An object detached from all other objects, a state of consciousness isolated from all other states, has no meaning. Every state of consciousness is a state of transition and prolings itself into its next state. "If a state of existence" says Bergson, "which remains the same is more complicated than one thinks, inversely, the passage from one state to another resembles more than one imagines one and the same state which is prolonged" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 2.). The apparent discontinuity which we observe in life is due to our attention fixing itself upon one thing to the exclusion of all others. It is because we perceive things by a series of discontinuous acts of attention that we look upon them as discontinuous. In reality, everything is merged into everything else, borne along in the current of life on the breast of a wave. The past is

continually prolonging itself into the present and the present is ever projecting forward into the future. The past, in fact, exists in the present, which again continues itself in the future. As Wildon Carr says, "it seems as if a great movement were in progress, sweeping us along in its course. To exist is to be alive, to be borne along in the living stream, as it were, on the breast of a wave. The actual present now in which all existence is gathered up, is this movement accomplishing itself. The past is gathered into it, exists in it, is carried along with it, as it presses forward into the future, which is continually and without intermission becoming actual" (Vide *Henri Bergson*, Peoples' Books Series, p. 15.)

This is the view of reality which Bergson presents to us. There is nowhere any fixed and immutable being, there is everywhere continuous becoming. And what is more wonderful still, this becoming is continuous self-creation. There is no such thing as an external force changing the order of things. All change occurs from within, all development is self-development. Every moment of our life is a

sort of creation. "And just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed, in any case, is modified, under the influence of the works themselves which he produces, so every one of our acts at the moment it proceeds from us, modifies our personality, being the new form which we have just given ourselves" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 7). Thus, what we do depends upon what we are, and what we are depends to a certain extent upon what we do and we create ourselves continually.

Let us try to understand what Bergson means by this process of self-creation. Every being, according to Bergson, is a living reality. And the essence of life is the capacity for continuous modification. Now this process of modification is a process of continuous creation, and reality is not an inert material substance which only changes when some external force impinges entity. True evolution, therefore is a *creative evolution,* and not the mechanical evolution with which Science deals. The mistake of Science is in thinking that inertia is the essential attribute of substances and that consequently, any change which occurs is the result of an

external impact. It is because Science takes this view that it finds it so very difficult to give an explanation of change. For it cannot give any reason why an external force should impinge upon a substance and impart to it a movement. Science, in fact, deals with an abstraction and not with a reality. The world of Science is, as Principal Trivedi happily characterises it, a वाङ्मय जगत् (a world of words). The real world, however, is a world of active, creative agents, where nothing happens except by self-exertion. The world is a world of life, whose guiding principle is self-directed movement, self-initiated, continuous change.

The essence of such a world is time. Our life as the inmost reality is time itself. There is nothing else in life than a time-existence, "a change that is a continuous undivided movement". Time is not a substance that is made up of successive moments. To think so is to make of time a spatial entity. Time is not composed of distinct moments, but it is one continuous evolving process. It cannot be divided into stages like the past, the present and the future.

element is the soul of poetry. Poetry gives life to the ideas which it clothes, it makes of barren, lifeless forms, living, active entities. It is the magic wand which kindles into life the dying and decaying forms of conceptual thought. It gives vividness and a realistic character to the vaguest abstractions. The highly abstract metaphysical thoughts which form the subject-matter of Wordsworth's "Ode on Immortality" are given such a realistic, such an impressive form in this immoral ode that they strike one as living beings and not as metaphysical abstractions.

Poetry has perhaps a more real insight into the nature of the world than philosophy. The poet is the true seer in a more real sense than the philosopher. It is true that there are thoughts which lie too deep for words, but it is equally true that words have a strange habit of following the most recondite thoughts. And poetry, by arranging the words in their most natural, most effective order, brings home to us the most complicated and most elusive thoughts. Such thoughts carry us straight to the bosom of the real. It is the artificial logical form in which

philosophy is necessarily clothed which makes it sometimes impossible for it to gain access to the heart of the real. If the artificial garb is thrown away, as it is done in poetry, the real stands out clearly before us. Poetry enjoys the great advantage of being able to make a direct appeal to reality. It is only a poet who can have such an intimacy with the real as to be able to say.—

> Je dors lorsque tu dors, je veille quand tu veilles.
> Ton glas est un ami qu'attendent mes oreilles
> Entre la voix des tours je démêle ta voix;
> Et ta vibration encore en moi résonne
> Quand l'insensible bruit qu-un moucheron bourdonne
> Te couvre déjà sous les bois!

Self-identification with the world, merging of oneself in the great ocean of reality is the characteristic feature of all poetry. In poetry the spirit throws away all restraint and enters fully into the heart of the real. The insight which poetry thus gets into the nature of reality is very great. Indeed, the great charm of true poetry is the

revelation which it makes of the nature of the world. The secret of the wonderful charm which the writings of such a poet as Rabindranath have for us is the insight which it gives into the nature of the world of beauty and of truth. As Shelley says, the perception of the beauty of an imagined virtue or deed and the translation of the image into a fact, constitutes the essence of poetry.

The perception of the inner meaning of things which poetry gives should, in Dilthey's opinion, be utilised to correct the narrowness of philosophy. If the romantic element is to be made use of for the sake of supplementing orthodox philosophy the best romanticism for this purpose would be Dichtungsromantik. Poetry is better able than other principles to supply the necessary romantic element. As Dilthey says in his article, entitled *Das Wesen der Philosophie,* in "Systematische Philosophie", "romantic thinking has very often brought into prominence the relation between religion, art and philosophy. The same world and life-enigma appears before poetry, religion and philosophy; a similar relationship with the

socio-historical environment of their spheres of life presents itself to the devout, the poet and the philosopher." Poetry deals as much as philosophy with an *Erlebnis* "obtained from the connexion of the world and from the relations of our will and our interest to it". And the chief value of this *Erlebnis* is that it reveals something of the nature of life. Poetry, says Dilthey, is an organ of Lebensverständnis in which the mysterious process takes place by which the hard, rough stuff of experience is heated and melted in a most extraordinary manner. The greatest effect of poetry is seen when it binds the ideas of life into a connected and universal world-view. The centre of this world-view is life, its highest synthesis of nature as well as its most comprehensive view of things rests upon the central idea, which is the significance of life.

Poetry has in great measure influenced philosophy. It prepares the way for philosophical reflxion, for it is the first to get an objective view of the world which is free from all subjective interests. Thus, the joy of life of the Renaissance artists led to the philosophy of

Immanence of Bruno and others. Goethe preached in his Faust the new doctrine of the power of man to lose himself in the whole and this was responsible for the philosophical view of the high destiny of the human race. But it is not merely as a preparation for philosophical reflexion that poetry has value for philosophy. The poetic view of Nature and of life directly influences the philosophic. Goethe's poetic pantheism set rolling a great wave of pantheism in philosophy. Schiller, too, helped this process. Herder also contributed his share towards this movement. Philosophy in its search for a comprehensive world-view cannot but take account of the depth and richness of the poetic view of nature as well as of mankind, for poetry is the "highest manifestation of the work of Nature" and it is "with the eyes of the great poet that we perceive the value and connexion of human things". (*Erlebnis und Dichtung*). What Dilthey has done is to revive this old movement in German thought in a new form in keeping with the conditions of the present day.

But it is not poetry alone from which Dilthey

wants to derive a principle for philosophy. He makes an equal appeal to Religion. The religious world-view is one which has its origin in a special kind of experience which arises from intercourse with the invisible. "Wherever", says Dilthey, "the name religion appears, this has for its characteristic intercourse with the invisible, for this is found not only in its primitive forms but also in the latest products of its evolution" (*Wesen der Philosophie*, "Systematische Philosophie", p. 39). Through this intercourse with the invisible, religion reaches the highest and the most unconditionally valid object-values. Thus the Invisible is the source alike of values of life and action. But the importance of the religious consciousness lies not simply in its immediate perception of what is invisible and intangible, but in the fact that it brings into play the "totality of our soul-life", the entire range of our spiritual faculties. Religion is an expression of our total spiritual life, not merely of that portion of it which is amenable to logic.

What Dilthey calls the invisible is the alogical. Religion always brings us near that

which cannot be comprehended by reason. Herein lies the romantic element in the religious consciousness. Not merely that which is accessible to the logical understanding, but even that which stretches beyond it into the realm of the non-rational is an object of the religious experience. Religion looks upon the portion of the world to which our reason has access as only a very limited portion of the entire world. It gives us a peep into a land, "where no one comes or hath come since the making of the world". This region, where the light of reason cannot penetrate, is, however, illumined by the glow of the devout feeling, by the halo of pious contemplation. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that this 'invisible' element in religion serves to introduce any kind of indeterminateness into its scope or method. The truth rather is, that this 'invisible' element gives religion such a determinate character that it is able to embrace with its help the whole region of our spiritual activity. We do not think, therefore, we advance a paradox when we say that the indeterminate element in religion serves to give it a most determinate character. It is one of the

strangest facts of the human race that its most important thoughts cluster round something inexpressible and incomprehensible. In India the highest thoughts of the great rishis were grouped round that from which वाचो निवर्त्तन्ते अप्राप्यमनसा सह (words come back with a mind which has failed to attain its object). In Greece they had for their centre the indescribable One of Parmenides or the inexpressible flux of Heraclitus. The noblest thoughts of Christianity were animated by the doctrine of Logos. The best thoughts of the present day owe their origin to such mysterious entites as the "Unknowable" of Spencer, the "Ding-an-sich" of Kant, the "Unconscious of Hartmann, the "Over-man" of Nietzsche, the "Over-race" of Chamberlain.

The romanticism of Dilthey is one of the noblest types of this form of thinking that have ever existed. The fault of all romanticism, even the best, is its one-sideness. Some one faculty, whether feeling or will or any other equally immediate one, is raised by it to the rank of a world-principle. Dilthey's system by appealing to what is most universal and abiding in human nature has escaped this one-sideness.

CHAPTER V.

Voluntarism and the Doctrine of Freedom.

Another result of the neo-romantic tendency of the present age is the growth of voluntaristic systems. We have already dealt with the main idea of these systems in our account of Willensromantik in Chapter I. The type of this mode of thinking is, as we have shown there, the philosophy of Schopenhauer. The chief feature of this philosophy is its assertion of a blind will as the principal factor in the universe. This feature we also notice in the system of Von Hartmann, though it appears here in a much more subdued form.* The 'unconscious' of Hartmann is a relic of the irrationalism of Schopenhauer, though it has received through the influence of Hegel a strong rationalistic colouring.

* Aliotta points out as the reason of this the necessity of unifying scientific intellectualism. Vide *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 29.

Indeed, von Hartmann's system is a synthesis of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The world is neither wholly logical, as Hegel conceived it, nor wholly illogical, as Schopenhauer would have it. The eternal opposition between the logical and the illogical is reconciled in a unity underlying both these, namely, in the unity of the Unconscious. Will and idea continually strive with each other for supremacy. Out of this strife arise the struggle for existence in Nature and the struggle of classes in human society. This fundamental conflict is the epitome of the universe.

The concurrence of both Will and Idea in the production of phenomena forces us to look upon these two not as distinct substances but as attributes of one Substance which it would be best to call Unconscious, in order to remove all possibility of its being confused with a personal conscious Being. The Will, apart from the Idea, is empty and blank. The Idea without the Will is similarly absolutely inoperative. The combination of the two gives rise to the world-process. Such being the nature of the world, it is clear that it cannot exhibit any great

degree of rationality. The world-process, however, is the way in which the Idea comes to be liberated from the Will. One cannot resist here the temptation of noticing the close connexion between this thought and that of the Sânkhya, as expressed in Sânkhya Kârikâ 58 :—

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्त्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्त्ततेतद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥

When Will and Idea unite to give rise to the world-process, the rational first becomes real, as Erdmann says,* and "since the logical in its final result is what is in conformity with an end, everything manifests an orderly arrangement which is in conformity with an end". So that, as Hartmann himself expresses, "the logical element guides the world-process in the wisest way to the goal of the highest possible development of consciousness". Thus, one result of this philosophical view is belief in the purposiveness of the world. Hartmann, consequently, is opposed to Darwinism. In his *Wahrheit und Irrtum im Darwinismus*, he strongly opposed Darwin and Haeckel. We

* *History of Philosophy* Vol. III p. 240.

shall deal with this aspect of his philosophy in a subsequent chapter.

There is a great deal of confusion in Hartmann's system regarding the Unconscious. If, as he says, "the logical element guides the world-process in the wisest way to the goal of the highest possible development of consciousness", how can the world be said to be a manifestation of the Unconscious? How can the Unconscious give rise to a well-ordered, rational process? If the doctrine of the Unconscious is to be maintained, it can only be done by asserting, as Schopenhauer did, the irrationality of the world-process. If the Unconscious is postulated simply with a view to avoiding the difficulties of the Hegelian Absolute, there are surely better ways in which this can be done. The real protest of Schopenhauer, and indeed, of all Willensromantik, against Hegel is that the world is too complicated to be capable of being expressed in terms of the Hegelian logic. If Hartmann had intended to join this protest, the best way for him would have been to create a new logic of the real which could explain the world better than Hegelian logic did. Or, he

might have proved the hopelessness of thought as an expression of reality and taken recourse to some other principle. It is perhaps for these reasons that his followers, the Correlativists, have given up the Unconscious. But their difficulties are greater, for they are faced with all the troubles of the occasionalists.

The failure of Hartmann points to the necessity of freeing voluntarism from all forms of the philosophy of the Unconscious. The modern advocates of voluntarism assert that voluntarism has no necessary connexion with the theory of the fundamental irrationalism of the world-process. Its difference from rationalism, according to them, lies not in its assertion of the irrationality of the World-ground but in its postulation of the will as the fundamental psychical experience. The most important representative of this class of thinkers is Wundt. The fundamental psychical experience is, in Wundt's opinion, an act of the will. "All other psychical processes", he says, "are to be thought of after the analogy of volitions, they, too, being a series of continuous changes in time, not a sum of permanent objects,

as intellectualism generally assumes, in consequence of its erroneous attribution to ideas of those properties which we attribute to external objects."* Mental experiences are of the nature of occurrences, processes, and are not to be conceived of as objects. They are themselves realities and not merely phenomenal manifestations of any underlying substratum. There is, in fact, no underlying substratum, the entire reality being in the processes themselves, the actual psychical experiences. What Wundt asserts against intellectualism is the immediate reality of psychical experience which is made up "not of unchanging contents, but of an interconnected system of occurrences".

Psychology, therefore, teaches us that we shall have to discard the double system of reality to which intellectualism is pledged, and which makes a set of inner reality correspond to a set of outer reality. There is no correspondence between the one set and the other but both represent one undivided experience. From the point of view of voluntaristic psychology, "the

* Wundt: *Outlines of Psychology* p. 15.

question of the relation between psychical and physical objects disappears entirely. They are not different objects at all, but one and the same content of experience." Aliotta's criticism, therefore, that "while the older speculative idealism took the subject as its starting-point, deducing the object therefrom by means of dialectic, Wundt reverses the process, starting from the objective presentation and endeavouring to reconstruct the knowing subject by essentially psychological means" does not seem to have any point in it. For Wundt expressly states that in undivided immediate experience, the distinction of subject and object does not arise. It is only for purposes of *explanation,* and that, too, an intellectualistic one, that a subject is assumed to which the feelings, ideas etc. are ascribed, while for the presentations a similar objective substratum is supposed. The demand for a mind-substance, says Wundt, is due to the demand for a psychological causal explanation; it is an afterthought and psychical experience alone would never have led to it. The distinction of subject and object, moreover, is a difference in the point of

view. "The phases of experience dealt with in the natural sciences and in psychology are nothing but phases of *one* experience regarded from different points of view; in the natural sciences experience is treated as an interconnexion of objective phenomena and, in consequence of the abstraction from the knowing mind, as *mediate experience*; in psychology experience is treated as immediate and underived."* There is, however, no warrant for the assertion that as between the subject and the object, the priority is given by Wundt to the object. If all reality is first experience and then subject or object, according to the needs of explanation and the point of view from which the matter is considered, it is difficult to see how any priority is claimed for the object. Rather, in calling reality one and undivided experience, greater prominence is given to the subjective than to the objective aspect of the question, for experience is nothing if not subjective.

But if there is no danger of any objective or materialistic bias wrecking the system, there is

* *Outlines of Psychology* p. 361.

some danger of the psychological bias leading it to the pitfalls of a *Bewusstseinsmonismus,* such as that of Lipps in his earlier days. Indeed, Wundt at times comes dangerously near the doctrine of "experience for experience' sake." There is, of course, a good deal of justification on his part for taking a purely experiential standpoint. One of the reasons, as shown in his article on *Psychology* in the collection of philosophical essays published under the title "Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts", is the physiological bias of orthodox scientists like Helmholtz. It is as a reaction against the "Sinnesphysiologie" of the latter that Wundt propounds his psychological theory. There is another reason, however, for this. The two acquisitions, he says in the article on Psychology already mentioned, of modern psychology are experimental psychology, on the one hand, and folk-psychology, on the other. Both of these demand a severely critical analysis of human experience viewed as experience.

Wundt, however, is conscious of the limitations of the psychological method and the

dangers to which it leads if it is allowed to remain unchecked. Thus, in his work entitled *Sprachgeschichte und Sprachpsychologie* he speaks of the great help which a historical study of languages renders to a psychological study of them. The mistake of such writers as Delbrück, he says, is in thinking that the main problem of a *Sprachgeschichte* is to apply the principles of psychology to the questions relating to the history of language. The opposite problem, however, "die Thatsachen der Sprache für die Psychologie zu verwerten" seems to him much more important. The point of view of psvchology requires to be enlarged by the wider outlook which a historical study produces; there is need of an infusion of new blood into the methods of psychology.

Wundt's practical bent of mind, moreover, saves him from the one-sidedness of a purely psychological method. We must not forget that the original cry of Wundt was, Back to the Kant of the Critique of Practical Reason. His pure will is nothing but a development of Kant's notion of practical reason. He cannot therefore rest content with a purely descriptive view of

human experience which ignores its practical aspect. Experience is experience for the self, for an active, self-assertive spirit. This truth is the basis of his voluntarism and is one which he never loses sight of. The psychological method, as we have already said, he adopts for the purpose of bringing the totality of human experience to widen his philosophical outlook. The task of the philosopher is not to build somehow a system but to comprehend the totality of our experience and ascertain its value. The philosopher, therefore, will fail to achieve his end if he does not take notice of any body of human experience. Loyalty, therefore, to the philosopher's chosen task leaves no other course open to Wundt than that which he has chosen.

Renouvier.

Wundt's psychological bias is continued in modern French voluntarism. Renouvier develops a psychological voluntarism, the key-note of which is the proposition that the postulates of practical reason have their sphere of validity within the bounds of human experience. Philosophy is not concerned with anything that goes beyond our psychical life but considers

what is operative within the limits of that life. This task brings it into clear perception of the fact that the most essential element in our psychical life is will. All knowledge is a form of belief which again implies a voluntary choice. The will, however, does not exist independently of the experience but has its whole being in it. So also the categories which serve as a guide and regulator of experience do not transcend experience but on the contrary, must be verified constantly through it.

Renouvier's philosophy, thus, is a thorough-going phenomenalism. It considers the idea of substance inadmissible, for substance implies continuous existence in time, whereas all phenomena are characterised by discontinuity. Discontinuity is the soul of all world-process. All processes which appear continuous are really composed of a series of initiatory acts. Continuity in fact is continuous initiation, perpetual creation. Renouvier thus foreshadows what was later more fully developed by Alfred Fouillée and Bergson.

The chief defect of this theory is that it makes memory an impossibility, inasmuch as

it destroys the continuity of mental phenomena. "If", says Aliotta,* "time be discontinuous ...., then each moment as a fresh beginning of being neither can nor should know anything of the moments which have preceded it, but must be regarded as isolated........." We shall see later how Bergson escapes this defect with the help of his view of a continuously evolving self. But this course is not open to Renouvier since he denies any substantiality of the soul. His voluntarism, however, comes partly to his rescue here, for it makes possible a continuous renewal of experience by successive acts of volition. Had it not been for this, his system would have failed to satisfy the needs of our psychical life. In fact, in spite of his open rejection of all substance, the will acts, to all intents and purposes, like a substance in his system.

French philosophy of freedom.

Modern French voluntarism, however, does not stop at Renouvier's phenomenalism but proceeds to build up a philosophy of freedom. The French voluntarists wish to make a plea for an unshackled

* *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 47.

life, for self-development and self-progression. What these philosophers seek is escape from the bondage of the mechanical order created by science. The world of Science is an artificial world, a world of conventions. The real, however, is entirely a product of its own creation, a result of self-development. Whatever happens to it, happens through its own exertion, striving or effort; whatever is a fact for it is not only its own discovery but also its own creation. The best word by which to characterise it is therefore freedom. The real is the free, the self-creating, self-evolving entity which knows no arbitrary law, no external compulsion.

The world of Science is the very antithesis of this. It is a world of necessary laws, of actions initiated *ab extra*, of forces directed from outside. It is a world of order, for whatever is disorderly is excluded from it. Where all self-initiation and self-exertion are excluded, what remains is a rigid lifeless mass which can easily be governed by inflexible laws. The existence of rigid laws, therefore, far from

proving reality, is an argument against its presence.

Against this rigidity and lifelessness of scientific forms, Ravaisson and Secretan assert the unfettered expansion and free creation of aesthetic contemplation. The world is not a mechanical system of rigid and inflexible laws but a work of art in which the free, creative human spirit has full play. The real is the world of freedom, the world of active, creative spirits where nothing happens except by self-initiation and self-direction.

Emile Boutroux, too, looks upon the world of reality as the world of beauty and morality.

Boutroux.

The most intense form of freedom is realized in aesthetic and moral consciousness. Science is not an impression stamped by things upon a passive intelligence but an *ensemble* of symbols imagined by the mind in order to interpret things by means of pre-existent ideas. "A scientific fact," says Boutroux, "is a reply in a book of questions, and this question-book is nothing else than the series of laws already imagined by the mind in

order to give an account of phenomena that are similar. It is by means of our theories, of our definitions, of an already existent science, that we enumerate, that we determine, that we perceive the facts which are to take the name of science."*

The current view of an opposition between Religion and Science rests upon a misconception. Science, like Religion, strives to attain unity. Its object is to reduce the diversity and intricacy of natural laws and exhibit their fundamental unity. The only difference between the attitudes of Science and Religion in this respect is, that while the former looks upon the reduction of all diversity to unity as an ideal, as a far-off goal, which we have always to hold before us but which we can hardly ever hope to reach, the attitude of religion is much more confident, as it has no doubts about the realization of this ideal. What Science proposes timidly as a very distant goal, Religion wants to put forward confidently as an actual existence, as a realised fact.

* *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* p. 248.

This difference in their attitudes is to be traced to their attainments in the province of knowledge. Science stops just short of a complete knowledge of things. It just fails to give the final explanations. Its limits, as Boutroux happily expresses it,* are "the privation of a knowledge which would be necessary in order to convert our science into complete knowledge." Science herself involves the possibility of a superior form of knowledge. "Reason's final move consists in recognising that there are an infinity of things which go beyond her".† The very method she employs for obtaining a knowledge of things gives her no possibility of going beyond the world of hypotheses. Milhaud says, "The exact determinations, the fixity and absolute determinism which characterise scientific relations do not re-appear in the real relations."**

But it is no disparagement of science to say that she does not get access to final truths. Her

* Vide *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* p. 260.

† Ibid.

** *Boutroux, La Philosophie en France depuis 1867* ("Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale," 1908 p. 701).

main purpose is to make the world as perfectly intelligible as possible. Where, she finds it difficult to achieve this end, she overlooks the inconvenient mass of complexity which the world presents rather than exhibit any disharmony in its constructions. The result is a harmonious whole, in which unity is reached by ignoring all inconvenient diversity.

If we take away this necessity for making its work perfectly intelligible, what becomes of the world of science? Can it in any way claim to be real? Scientific law presupposes the persistence of phenomena under similar conditions. Charles' law, for instance, states that if the temperature of a gas is raised by 1° C. its volume is increased by 1/273. Whenever a gas is placed under such conditions that its temperature rises by 1° C. its volume is sure to be increased by 1/273. This persistence, says Boutroux, is precisely what we don't find in the real. The real is the irrepeatable. Whatever is absolutely identical with its previous state is an abstraction and not reality. Reality therefore can never be subject to universal laws, because no two similar states of it can be found

which are capable of being linked together by means of a law. Each state of the real is a unique state and cannot be calculated beforehand by means of any general law.

Freedom consists in this uniqueness, this irrepeatability. The free act is a unique act which it is impossible to repeat. Time, place and other circumstances are an integral part of it and it cannot be reproduced through changes of these. For what is reproduced is not the original act but an abstract concept of this. No general law can be asserted of it because it is never the same at two moments of time. This irrepeatability stamps a certain individuality upon it, for being unlike any other known act, it is to be studied only by itself.

The reason for this uniqueness is self-creation. No fixed and calculable laws determine the course of the real but it is the product of its own law of evolution. This law is self-imposed and is itself subject to evolution. Reality is continuous self-creation, perpetual evolution of self-created forms.

In this region of freedom moves Religion. Its relation to Science is the relation of a concrete

total to an abstract, incomplete part. It grasps reality in its living essence, whereas Science gets only a symbolical view of it. "However determinate", says Boutroux, "she (science) may be in pursuing the real into its smallest recesses, she remains an onlooker contemplating and objectifying things; she cannot, without contradiction, become identified with reality itself".* Science further commits in his opinion the mistake of identifying the categories of thought with pure being *a priori*. "In real science the categories of thought are themselves mutable, seeing that they have to be adapted to facts regarded as a reality which is *a priori* distinct and unknowable".†

As science is concerned with the general, so Religion is concerned with the individual. It is true that propositions expressing the standpoint of the individual have not got that objectivity which scientific generalisations have. But what they lose in objectivity, they more than gain in depth and fulness. For they respond to

* Boutroux, *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 361.

† Ibid.

human needs which are more real than the need of bringing things into harmony with one another. Religion rests upon the belief in the value and reality of the individual. "Each of my acts, of my least words or thoughts, signifies that I attribute some reality, some worth to my individual existence, to its preservation, to its part in the world."*

The free, therefore, the object of Religion, is not only the irrepeatable but the irrepeatable individual. It is further a Person, that is, a concrete fulness that is at the same time an individual, "a being who is one and multiple—not like a material whole, made up of elements placed side by side, but like the continuous and moving infinity of a mind, of a person", as Boutroux happily characterises it.

Aliotta objects† to this notion of freedom on the ground that life seeks some constancy, some objectivity. It is absurd to suggest that this constancy, this objectivity is supplied by the identity of the ideal striven after by every

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* Boutroux, *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* p. 366.

† Vide *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 124.

being. Without repetition, no habit, no persistency is possible. This objection does not seem to us to have much point in it, for the constancy that is important for life is not the constancy of facts but the persistence of the individual character. The fond mother who cannot pass a single day without her darling child does not expect her child to be a mere repetition of its previous states. In fact, she would feel very uneasy if the child exhibited no change for weeks and months. What we want therefore is the unity of a single personality and not the constancy of this or that phenomenon.

Irrepeatability is, however, a very superficial characteristic of freedom. The essential element is self-initiated movement, self-directed change. On account of continuous self-creation, the states of a free being are irrepeatable. But irrepeatability would equally arise if the continuous movement was effected by an external force. It is, moreover, in no way a proper expression for individuality. The individual need not be unique ; there is no harm in two individuals having the same characteristics, so

long as the sameness is not due to subordination to the identical external law.

Boutroux, however, does not seem wholly to lose sight of this, for this final principle is not the irrepeatable or the unique but a Person. He recognises that what freedom finally implies is personality, a "Being in whom all that is positive, all that is a possible form of existence and of perfection, coalesces and subsists; a Being who is one and multiple—not like a material whole, made up of elements placed side by side, but like the continuous and moving infinity of a mind, of a person."*

Boutroux's philosophy, thus, is essentially a philosophy of freedom. It is one of the strongest protests against the mechanical order of Science. This protest runs through the whole of contemporary French philosophy but is especially noticeable in the systems of Boutroux, Fouillée and Bergson. We shall discuss the philosophy of Bergson in a separate chapter. For the present, therefore, let us turn to Alfred Fouillée.

* *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* p. 393.

Alfred Fouillée.

In Alfred Fouillée's system the doctrine of freedom receives full recognition, while at the same time the strong point in the system of Wundt and Renouvier, its psychologism, is firmly maintained. Like Wundt Fouillée does not believe in any distinction between the outer and the inner sense. All experience is inner experience, for it is the expression of the activity of the self. There is no essential difference between the cognitive and the volitional element in our life. There is no cognition which is without a volitional element. Rather, it is the volitional element which gives reality to cognition. The real is the *idées-forces,* the ideas which are instinct with activity, which have all the characteristics of forces. Fouillée believes in the indissoluble unity between thought and action and he coins the word "idée-force," to give expression to this. Every state of consciousness, he says, is idea, so far as it covers a discernment, and a force, inasmuch as it denotes a preference, so that all psychical state is, in the last analysis, a willing. (Vide *Psychologie des Idées-Forces,* Introduction p. x.).

Fouillée thinks it is a mistake to suppose that all psychical states are essentially representations. They are primarily appetitions, which either opposed or helped, accompany painful or pleasurable sensations, and consequently, actions and reactions. Representations are a highly complex product which arises much later as the result of secondary and derivative processes. "When we feel" asks Fouillée, "is it necessary to change our sensation into an object of representation, to place ourselves on the outside and contemplate it objectively?" "No" he replies, "we have only a subjective consciousness of ourselves, such as, for example, the sensation of hunger, just as it is experienced, neither more nor less, confused, if it is confused, distinct, if it is distinct, feeble or intense, if it is feeble or intense."* There can be no consciousness which is purely objective. I do not have, besides my suffering and at the same time as this, the idea of suffering as an object; this idea, if I have it, is something altogether different, which comes after the suffering and

* *Psychologie des Idées-Forces.* Introduction p. xxx.

is joined to this but which itself is not the pain which I presently feel. But to say this is not the same as to say that the suffering is unconscious; the suffering is a spontaneous and immediate consciousness, but without any objective element.

Fouillée thus asserts in the first place, that all mental processes are subjective and not objective phenomena, and secondly, that the essence of subjectivity is choice or preference. Connected with this view and indeed, in some way following from this, is his idea of intensity as the psychical element corresponding to physical force. Intensity, in his opinion, is a characteristic of appetitive activity, of the will, and secondarily, of passion, of sensation. All voluntaristic systems make much of intensity, for herein they see an element which is most closely related to the volitional activity. One can therefore perfectly understand why Fouillée speaks of intensity in the following manner:—

> "Intensity is so inherent in sensation, in emotion, in appetition, that one cannot represent a state of consciousness which has not a certain degree,

which is not more or less strong or more or less weak, which does not involve, in other words, a discharge of activity more or less energetic."*

The activity of the self which manifests itself in the intensity of sensation is also the cause of the feeling which has given philosophers a good deal of trouble concerning its nature and origin, the feeling of pleasure. Pleasure, according to Fouillée, is produced by a superabundance of activity. It is a mistake to suppose that all pleasure is the satisfaction of a previously felt need. Pleasure is as much a positive fact as pain and can exist independently of it. Even when it results from the suppression of a pain, it is essentially positive. If pleasure meant only the suppression of pain it would be a neutral thing and would lack the element of life which constitutes its chief characteristic. Pleasure acts as an acceleration of the movement of life, as a force which tends towards progress. It is the outcome of an exuberance of vital activity, a "surcroît d'acti-

* *Psychologie des Idées-Forces.* Introduction p. xxxiv.

vité efficace". But this "activité efficace" is not the self-preserving activity of Darwin and Spencer. It is, on the other hand, spontaneous activity bubbling out of an excess of energy. Pleasure is in this way linked with activity, well-being with being, with an unfolding of life. In pleasure, therefore, there is marked volitional activity. And it is because this is the case, that pleasure has an ethical value. It is indeed curious that while the fact has long been recognised that all moral judgments are judgments upon conduct expressive of some volitional activity, the explicit recognition of this connexion was not made before Fouillée. The moral philosophy of Fouillée, as indeed may be guessed from his voluntaristic bias, is based completely upon an 'energetic' view of human nature. There is no external force acting arbitrarily upon us; whatever is a fact for us is the result of a conception, comprehension or choice. The point of view of the "Morale des Idées-Forces" is, that "however great may be the part which the environment has in the formation of the moral idea, the individual always makes it

its own in conceiving it, comprehending it and accepting it as idea and not simply as an external fact''.

The 'energetic' view of self makes the transition from egoism to altruism a very easy one. The 'solitary' view of the ego is only consistent with the conception of it as fixed being. Where the self is viewed as energising, other selves come to be recognised naturally as a field for its activity. In Fouillée's view, the existence of other selves is presupposed in the very activity of thought. ''La pensée'' says Fouillée, ''est nécessairement objective et les objects de ma pensée sont plus ou moins des sujets analogues à moi-même''. There exists therefore in thought a sort of naïve altruism and consciousness is a principle of unity and universality. The result is, as Fouillée beautifully expresses it, that in the so-called solitude, ''in this apparent desert of my consciousness, I cannot pronounce the word 'I' without an echo repeating the same word on the part of the others and so on *ad infinitum,* I cannot conceive scientifically except in company with others, and if

one proceeds to the end, except in company with the universe."*

The question of the freedom of the will likewise assumes in Fouillée's system the character of a social question. There is no such thing, according to Fouillée, as absolutely arbitrary will, independent of motive, independent of antecedent circumstances, independent of character. The problem of freedom is the problem of the greatest limit of individuality possible in a world of human beings. Freedom is the realization of the idea of personality in a society of *persons* and thus can have nothing to do with arbitrary choice. Motiveless action or action resulting independently of character is therefore absolutely foreign to the notion of freedom. So far, indeed, is the notion of liberty dependent upon that of person that to be free it is necessary first to have a self. Freedom puts this self over against other selves, "le moi devant le non-moi, devant autrui". The action of other selves, other conscious beings, introduces the element of necessity. This element of

* *Morale des Idées-Forces* p. 28.

necessity, however, is precisely the unknown element in our action. The ordinary ideas of freedom and necessity thus undergo a complete *volte-face* at the hands of Fouillée. Not freedom but necessity is the cause of the indeterminate factor in our moral life. The free act is a determinate act, the result of deliberation and conscious choice. The full force of personality is felt in it, it is the outcome of all that one is, the expression of one's inmost essence. To be free, says Fouillée, is to be able, by individual reflexion, to emancipate one's acts from unsystematised tendencies, from the physical surroundings, from social tradition not justified by reason; to be free is to make of life a conscious expression of a design chosen by the self. Necessity, on the other hand, is arbitrary, for it is the result of the operation of a number of independent forces, such as the physical surroundings, the social environment, fixed laws and traditions, the ways of which are a mystery to the person upon whom they act. Necessary actions are, therefore, to a large extent unknown and incalculable actions, while free acts are essentially determinate acts. The

most important of our necessary acts are those resulting from our social environment. As social beings, we are brought into contact with other human beings and our actions are greatly influenced by such contact.

Such a view of freedom, it may be said, is no better than determinism, for if our actions are always determined by our character, then we cannot escape determinism. But if our character is not a fixed and unchangeable entity but has a growth, then the determination by self does not introduce anything absolutely fixed. Fouillée seems to have perceived this, and so, after establishing his main thesis, namely, that freedom is the expression of personality, he goes on to add that this does not mean that he subscribes to the doctrine of liberty which makes it consist in determination by character. If by character one means innate character which is a fixed substance not liable to any change, then he certainly does not subscribe to it. "Innate character", he says, "is a work of nature which escapes our consciousness and does not constitute our true self. This latter only begins with the consciousness which we have (1) of this

innate character, (2) of our power to modify it, (3) of our power to modify the environment in which we exist by the idea of a superior mode of existence developing itself in these superior relations. To be truly determined by self is then, first of all, to be determined by its *acquired* and not its *innate* character. Moreover, it is necessary, in a certain measure, that we should be *independent even of the acquired character,* that we should not in any way be *slaves of ourselves* such as nature has made us and such as we have made ourselves *up to the present.* It is then by our character *virtual* and *ideal* that we are determined when we are truly free''*.

We have another aspect of the same question when we deal with the relation of the future to the present. The issue between the advocates of freedom and the advocates of necessity is often put in the form of the question whether or not the future is dependent upon the past. If the present completely foreshadows the future, if the latter has no surprises for us

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* *Morale des Idées-Forces* p. 279.

but is already clearly mapped out, then there is no room for freedom. The future must have something in it which no analysis or examination of the present can reveal, if there is any freedom of the will. On the other hand, if the present does not modify the future and has no effect upon it, then our psychical life becomes an impossibility. As spiritual beings, we must have a continuity of consciousness; if there is a hiatus between the present and the future, if what I am is separated by an impassable gulf from what I shall be, then there will be a break in the flow of our psychical life and therefore, a loss of personality. The voluntaristic theory possesses the great advantage over other theories that it can give a very simple solution of this difficulty. The self being essentially active, it continually pushes itself forward and so in a sense creates the future. In Fouillée's opinion, volition expresses the essence of the self and it consists "dans la détermination d'un acte par l'idée d'une chose, qui sera *par nous*, qui n'existera que par notre action consciente, par l'idée même et le désir que nous en avons". So that "our idea of what *can* be *by us*, above

all, what *ought* to be *by us* is one of the factors of the future''*.

The question, therefore, is not of the production of the future by the present but the gradual shaping of the future out of the continuous action of an active, evolving self. There is therefore at work here no principle of necessity which crushes all freedom but a principle of freedom which yet makes no violence to the relation between the present and the future.

This idea of a continuous evolution of the present and its gradual merging into the future is made later the basic principle of his philosophy by Bergson. The logical conclusion to which this leads is that the real is a continuously evolving present and that the distinction between the present, the past and the future is only one of convenience. Fouillée's conclusion falls just short of this, though it comes very close to it. Another result of this view is that it substitutes a spiritual for a mechanical evolution. The outlines of this spiritual evolution are sketched in his work entitled ''L' Evolutionnisme

* *L' Evolutionnisme des Idées-Forces* p. lxviii.

des Idées-Forces". In the introduction to this work, Fouillée says, "It is time that an evolution with physical forces, sensation-forces, idea-forces, volition-forces replaced mechanical evolution. There exists no doubt among things certain relations which can be defined completely and exclusively in terms of mathematics or mechanics. . . . But in the universe it is quite evident that there are relations which can only be defined partially by mathematics or mechanics" (Introduction p. lv). The struggle for existence is a principle more profound than the mechanical theory supposes. For life does not simply mean a process of metabolism but a complex spiritual entity in which action and passion play a prominent part. There is very little of the purely physical in it; its chief element is spiritual, for it is a struggle *for the least pain and the greatest welfare.* What takes place in this world is the operation of sentiments, desires, passions and wills and this operation is guided by an intelligible end. The process of evolution is thus a teleological and not a mechanical one. It is also a creative one, for a creative act of the will lies back of it, animating

everything that is wanting in life, thrusting into being all that is "en voie de se faire".

But does this lead to a truly creative evolution, in which every step is the result of an act of self-assertion and in which no extraneous element, no element that is not a product of the self, can enter? Does it suggest the continuous action of a free, creative spirit, every state of whose existence is the product of its own activity? We must confess that such a view of evolution was not fully realised in Fouillée's system but was left to be developed by a later philosopher. Fouillée discovered all the elements of this evolution but a development of them into a complete theory is not to be found in his system. He grasped the fundamental fact that all states of our conscious life are in the process of becoming, "en voie de se faire". This was a great advance upon the usual view which looked upon the states of consciousness as distinct static moments. Fouillée similarly traced all expression of self to an activity of the will. But there may be mechanism in the volitional process, just as there is mechanism in the process of representation. To escape mechan-



ism it is not enough if the process of evolution is guided by desires, passions or appetitions, for these desires, passions and appetitions may themeselves work mechanically. They may give only an initial push and then the process of evolution will be no more spiritual than the path of a projectile. What is wanted is that these will-elements exert themeselves at every moment, creating for us all our experience and moulding us in turn through this created experience.

Aliotta makes the following criticism against Fouillée's system. "If" says he "we approximate more closely to the universal will when we think than when we feel, then neither psychic reflex, obscure appetition, nor the impulsive will to live which aims at immediate satisfaction can afford us an explanation of that intelligent volition which is capable of setting universal ends before itself; we must rather look to the moral will infused with intelligence for the explanation we desire of the rudimentary forms of volition" *(Idealistic Reaction against Science p. 36)*. Our answer to this criticism is twofold. In the first place, Fouillée recognises

no such distinction between thought and will, between reflexion and appetition, as is here contemplated by Aliotta. His fundamental principle "idée-force" does away with all distinctions between the ratiocinative and conative aspects of our spiritual life. Secondly, the spiritual order of the universe is no better established by making the higher forms of our spiritual life serve as an explanation of the lower forms than by tracing the gradual evolution of the higher from the lower forms by a process of creative evolution. Philosophy expects us to see even in the rock-like fixity of thought something of the elasticity and changefulness usually associated with the will. The real is the idea-force, the complex entity which is as much reason as it is will, whose intellectual functions are animated by a constant striving for effectiveness, for self-projection into the world of action. It would be a bad thing if it were otherwise. Reality would lose greatly in its fulness and comprehensiveness if it were a mere product of thought or a mere tool of arbitrary will.

The romanticism of Alfred Fouillée lies

precisely in this grasp of the nature of reality. He united much more completely than either Schopenhauer or Hartmann the two most important phases of the real, the idea and the will. Instead of setting any blind will or unconscious activity in opposition to reason, he made the real both idea and will and thus saved his system from the narrowness of rationalism and the one-sidedness of voluntarism. It was a unique synthesis of two widely divergent elements and the complex-real *idea-force* behaved in his system with all the unity and coherence of a single principle.

CHAPTER VI.

Pragmatism.

One of the main objections of romanticism against intellectualism is that its constructions have a theoretical rather than a practical value. Out of this protest arises, as we have seen, voluntarism which sets up as the fundamental principle of philosophy the will, which is synonymous with practical activity. Pragmatism symbolises this protest in all its forms. It is pre-eminently the philosophy of practical life. Its essence is thus stated by Peirce* : "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object". It is the theory that the whole truth of a conception expresses itself in its practical results. To be true means for pragmatism the same as to be effective.

* *What pragmatism is,* Monist, April 1905.

It occupies in metaphysics much the same place that utilitarianism does in ethics. "The true", says James, "is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is the expedient in the way of our acting". Pragmatism, however, is very different from utilitarianism. For one thing, it does not believe in "the greatest good of the greatest number". For another, it prefers to keep the connotation of 'expediency' somewhat vague, instead of tying it down to a search for the maximum of pleasure. The expedient, it thinks, may mean, according to the context in which it occurs, that which helps the particular business in which I am engaged or the particular cause with which I have identified myself or the particular forces which lead to a better social order. We shall return to this point later.

As Prof. Ludwig Stein points out*, there is nothing new in pragmatism. Neither the name nor the doctrine is new. William James himself admits it. The name pragmatism can be traced to Aristotle. But in Aristotle the word is

* *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart* p. 35.

used in a sense different from that in which it is used by James and Peirce. For Aristotle understands by this word what is given in experience, as opposed to thought or the beings of thought (entia rationis). In his logical writings and especially, in his 'Metaphysics', he repeatedly distinguishes between thought (διανοια) and reality (πρα'γμασι). It is first in the writings of the Stoics that the word gets the Peirce-Jamesean meaning of 'practical' or 'useful'. Coming to modern times, we find Kant also using the term 'pragmatism'. Thus, Kant says*, "The practical law, derived from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic". This which he calls rule of prudence he contrasts with the moral law. So also he distinguishes between necessary and contingent beliefs, and says, with regard to the latter, "It is this kind of contingent belief which, nevertheless, supplies a ground for the actual employment of means to certain actions, which I call *pragmatic* belief"†.

The pragmatic method, too, is nothing new. Thucydides employed it, Polybius actual-

* *Kritik der reinen Vernunt, First Edition* p. 806.

† Ibid, p. 824.

ly employed the term 'pragmatic method'. The "Lehrbuch der historischen Methode" of Ernst Bernheim contains a whole chapter devoted to the pragmatic method in history.* This method he characterises in the following way: Here a substance has value not only in itself but for definite utilitarian purposes; one must learn something for practical purposes from events. This method has been in use for writing history for the last fifty years. Conrad Hermann wrote in 1867 a *History of philosophy treated pragmatically*. Hermann said, "Pragmatism is the only true scientific principle for the treatment of historical matters. The essence of all historical pragmatism is this, that it eliminates the accidental from history and places causal necessity in its stead". In another work he said that all historical pragmatism must have a determinate practical object.

The definite acceptance of pragmatism, however, as a philosophical method dates from 1878, the year of the publication of Peirce's

* For this and other information contained in this paragraph, we are indebted to Prof. Ludwig Stein's book, *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart*, pp. 44-47.

article, *How to make our ideas clear*, in the "Popular Science Monthly". Peirce, however, did not then use the word *pragmatism*. Nor did James either, for he used to describe his philosophy for a long time as radical empiricism. Only in oral conversation did Peirce use the term 'pragmatism', till James who had not used it in his *Will to Believe* took it up and made it a philosophical catch-word. The great champion of pragmatism in England, F. C. S. Schiller, chooses by preference the word *humanism* to denote his system. To James we owe the final acceptance of the name and "the proclamation of it as a philosophical war-cry".

What is new in James and the other pragmatists of the present day is the creation of a system of philosophy out of the principle of pragmatism. The chief merit of James and other philosophers of his way of thinking is the extension of the principle of practical activity to all possible regions of human thought. The English utilitarians confined the operation of the principle of utility to the domain of ethics. But this really had no meaning. If utility is to be the standard by which anything is to be judged,

its most essential value, its value in the domain of reality, is to be tested by it. It is impossible to stop short at the ethical phase of utility, for it leads directly to the metaphysical. There can be only one logically consistent utility-theory and this the pragmatists have managed to make their own.

Prof. Ludwig Stein characterises pragmatism thus:* "Pragmatism offers us no new theory of the world but gives a new colouring, a new appearance to that positivism which has been current from the days of Protagoras". Perry's remark, however, that it is dangerous to identify pragmatism too closely with any of the earlier doctrines which resemble it, seems very appropriate here. Pragmatism differs from positivism in so many essential respects that it is not possible to call it a form of positivism. It is no doubt positivism in that it accepts the data of experience, the sensible fact, as its basic principle. It is positivism, moreover, inasmuch as it deals with the concrete and shows an aversion for the abstract. But it is not positivism if

* Vide *Phil. Ström.* p. 47.

by this word is meant an unreflecting acceptance of crude sensuous experience. Pragmatism is a system with a purpose; it is concerned with experience, but only so far as experience reveals an end. It is the search for the end, the purpose of experience, which gives it its peculiar characteristic. This characteristic distinguishes it from positivism and shows its kinship rather with teleology, though as we shall see later, it falls short of true teleology.

The purposive element, indeed, is the most important element in pragmatism. As early as Peirce and Simmel, we find utility recognised as the basic principle of philosophy. Simmel even goes so far as to say that the utility of knowledge creates for us the objects of knowledge. That all reality is purposive—this, in fact, is the substance of the teaching of pragmatism. As Aliotta puts it, the ultimate problem of philosophy is summed up by pragmatism in the form of the questions: What is reality? To what end, for what useful purpose, is it real? "The nature of things is not determinate but determinable, like that of our fellows; the nature of the answers given is determined by our questions".

"At bottom", says Aliotta, "theoretical principles, like practical ones, derive the whole of their meaning and value from their utility to us. That alone is necessarily true which is necessary to our needs. The true is the useful, the useless is the false."[9] Pragmatism, however, is not utilitarianism for reasons we have already stated and which will be more apparent in the sequel.

Pragmatism seeks, like romantism, a "Götzendämmerung of the Eternal Ideas," to quote an expression of Schiller's, and like it, it tries to set up a restless striving towards a goal in place of the eternal rest of the Absolute Idea. There is in James the same hankering after a realisable end, the same love of purposive activity which is such an important characteristic of all romanticism.

This aversion for the eternal and the immutable we notice very clearly in John Dewey. Reality, for John Dewey, is not a complete, ready-made, fixed system, not a system at all, but a continuously changing and developing process. A 'real' philosophy must abandon the

* *Idealistic Reaction against Science* pp. 189-90.

search for absolute finalities and must confine itself to specific values and specific conditions. In an essay entitled "Does Reality possess Practical Character"?*, Dewey says, "*Sub specie aeternitatis* or *sub specie generationis*? I am susceptible to the aesthetic charm of the former ideal: who is not? There are moments of relaxation: there are moments when the demand for peace, to be let alone and relieved from the continual claim of the world in which we live, that we be up and doing something about it, seems irresistible; when the responsibilities imposed by living in a moving universe seem intolerable. We contemplate with equal mind the thought of the eternal sleep. But after all, this is a matter in which reality and not the philosopher is the Court of final jurisdiction......To try to escape from the snares and pitfalls of time by recourse to traditional problems and interests—rather than that let the dead bury their own dead. Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability,

* *Vide Essays in Honour of William Jones* pp. 79-80.

without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present."

Indeed, pragmatism, as Prof. Stein says*, is *logical evolutionism. Its genetic theory of truth makes* truth a process rather than a terminus. The true is what is always in the process of becoming. This idea plays in pragmatism the same rôle in logic that the Aristotelian conception of "ὀρέγεσθαι", the Stoic conception of "ἡγεμονιχον", the "tendance" of Leibniz, the "Zielstrebigkeit" of von Baer, and lastly, the "dominants" of Reinke play in metaphysics. Pragmatism in this way discards formal logic which looks upon truth as fixed and settled from eternity and sets up in its place what it calls instrumental logic.

In discarding in this way the immutable Absolute, pragmatism shows its leaning towards romanticism to which nothing is so repulsive as the postulate of eternal truth. But pragmatism shows not only its kinship with romanticism in its aversion for the eternal and the absolute but it shares with the latter its biological

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* *Phil. Ströme. der Gegenwart* p. 67.

bias. As Perry says, pragmatism is the "bio-centric philosophy". The pragmatist thinks *more biologico.* Activity and life-maintenance are for the pragmatist the proofs of the vitality of a truth. The Darwinian struggle-for-existence formula and the Spencerian doctrine of Evolution are applied by James to the problem of the struggle of ideas for supremacy, for life. And just as in Spencer the state of equilibrium of the universe is the end towards which evolution tends, and just as for Clausius, the entropy of the world tends towards a maximum, so says Prof. Stein, there is for James, in the remote future, "am Ende der Tage", an absolute resting place, a sort of "logical *nirvana*" "An absolute truth", says James, "meaning what no further experience will alter, is the ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine all our temporary truths will one day converge.*.

Pragmatism shifts the centre of gravity of philosophy from truth to life. As James puts it, the really vital question for pragmatism is, What is the world going to be? What is life

* *Pragmatism* pp. 222-23.

eventually to make of itself? And to ask these questions implies an alteration in the seat of authority which James compares to the Protestant Reformation. And just as to Roman Catholics, "protestantism has often seemed a mere mess of anarchy and confusion," such, no doubt, will pragmatism seem to ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy. It will seem so much trash, philosophically".

This placing of life in the forefront of the philosophical inquiry exhibits the romantic element in pragmatism. Romanticism in its search for a principle that can better understand the complicated processes of the world than reason, comes across life with its teleologico-mechanical structure. There is something inexplicable in life, something which refuses to lend itself to logical analysis. This something is the refuge of the romanticist when he wants to seek shelter from the dazzling glare of reason. Life, moreover, supplies him with a principle which is eminently concrete and which has the merit of blending harmoniously a multitude of divergent processes.

The teleological element in pragmatism is

also essentially an outgrowth of its biological character. The purpose recognised by pragmatism is a life-purpose, the value it assigns to a truth is its life-value. When pragmatism talks of utility, it means utility for life. It is a vitalistic teleology that pragmatism preaches and not a teleology based upon *a priori* grounds. "The importance to human life," says James, "of having true beliefs about matters of fact is too notorious. We live in a world of realities that can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful ......If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and follow it, I save myself"*. The vitalistic note of these sentences is too obvious to need any explanation.

The purpose recognized by James goes no further than this life-purpose. But other pragmatists, notably, Schiller, want to go much further. The reason for this is that purpose in the sense in which James accepts it, is some-

* *Ibid* p. 203.

what vague and indeterminate, as Perry has shown. When there are several purposes which an idea serves, pragmatism shows no way in which we can discriminate between them and determine which we are to accept. Perry gives as an illustration of this the idea of the life after death*. This idea may prepare me for what I am going to see, or for what I am going to be called upon to do. It may also serve the purpose of consoling me for the loss of friends. For this reason, Schiller wants to rise to a higher and more universal concept of truth. "Truth" he says, "is that manipulation (of objects) which turns out upon trial to be useful, primarly for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration"†.

This may seem to be hardly different from the idealistic standpoint against which pragmatism marks a reaction. But though Schiller lapses into the idealistic mood, he is true to the pragmatist's view of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical activities of the self. Thus,

* *Present Philosophical Tendencies* p. 205.
† Humanism p. 61.

he calls his standpoint ethical metaphysics and says that "our making of truth really alters reality."* He also frankly accepts voluntarism as the metaphysics of Humanism. "Voluntarism", he says, "is the metaphysics which most easily accords and harmonizes with the experience of activity with which all our thinking and all our living seem to overflow.†

The extremely logical bent of Schiller's mind likewise leads him to the excesses of monadism. Reality being in Schiller's view essentially individual, he formulates in his *Riddles of the Sphinx* a system of 'ultimate egos' or monads which is more radical than the pluralistic universe of James or Ward. According to this monadism, the so-called world of objects exists fragmentarily in the individual egos. In its complete form, the objective world does not even appear to God, who is only an ego among egos. Philosophy, therefore, in its search for the complete and total reality, only substitutes a hallucination for a dream and a dream for a hallucination.

* *Studies in Humanism* p. 438.
† *Ibid* p. 11.

This is extreme individualistic pragmatism. A similar extreme in the region of immediacy or intuition we notice in Papini and Le Roy. The real, says Papini, is what is immediately evident. Science therefore misses the real and deals only with conventions. In this he agrees with Le Roy, but he goes beyond the latter when he says that that alone can be called true which satisfies the craving of the human soul for what is indeterminate and incalculable. Here he approaches Bergson, but there is this important difference between his standpoint and that of Bergson, that while he looks upon a full and 'intensive' satisfaction of our nature as the criterion of truth, the latter views truth quite apart from any satisfaction.

This way of looking at truth is the logical consequence of the view that not theoretical but practical considerations determine the nature of truth. For that is most practical which satisfies the deepest cravings of the human nature, which fulfils the inmost desire of the human breast. The moderate pragmatism which James represents is the resultant of two tendencies, one, a pragmatic one, the predilection for what is

practical, the other a tendency which he has borrowed from English philosophy. Prof. Ludwig Stein in the admirable chapter on The Neopositivistic Movement in his work, entitled "Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart" has shown very clearly how James has successfully blended these two tendencies. This fact, however, does not prove that pragmatism is tied to the empirical standpoint of the English psychologists but only shows that James was too much under the influence of English empirical philosophy in his earlier years to be able to throw off its yoke later in life.

We come now to Perry's distinction between subjective and objective pragmatism, or, as he also expresses it, between idealistic and realistic pragmatism.* Schiller and Papini, according to Perry, belong to the former class, whilst James belongs to the latter. He quotes approvingly the following paragraph from James—"For him (the pragmatist) there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about...... This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully

* Vide *Present Philosophical Tendencies* p. 214.

pointed 'reality' *ab initio*, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist". The standpoint of the epistemological realist, however, is not quite consistent with that of the pragmatist, as Russell has shown in his *Philosophical Essays.* Russell says that pragmatism, meaning the pragmatism of William James, makes a confusion between the 'meaning' of truth which consists in the relation of agreement between thought and object, and the 'test' of truth, which is the practical end or purpose which it serves. J. W. Shellman in his criticism of this remark of Bertrand Russell* says that pragmatism is quite aware of the distinction to which he has drawn attention but considers the 'meaning of truth' in the sense in which he uses it too trivial to merit discussion. But if this is so, what becomes of the so-called 'realism' of pragmatism, for this realism consists precisely in the assertion of the agreement between truth and object?

The fact, however, is that James's pragmatism is in no sense realism as conceived

* Vide *The 'Meaning' and 'Test' of Truth* (*Mind*, New Series No. 78, April 1911).

above. Thus, James says,* "Why may not thought's mission be to increase and elevate, rather than simply to imitate and reduplicate, existence? No one who has read Lotze can fail to remember his striking comment on the ordinary view of the secondary qualities of matter, which brands them as illusory, because they copy nothing in the thing. The notion of a world complete in itself, to which thought comes as a passive mirror, adding nothing to fact, Lotze says, is irrational. Rather is thought itself a most momentous part of fact, and the whole mission of the pre-existing and insufficient world of matter may be to provoke thought to produce its far more precious supplement." But if thought has the power of elevating reality, then reality cannot be said to be fixed and immutable. What, in fact, is this but saying that "our making of truth alters reality"—an expression of Schiller's which Perry finds fault with, as indicating a subjective view of truth?

The truth is, there can properly be no 'realistic' pragmatism. James's object in calling himself an epistemological realist is to show his

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* *Meaning of Truth* p. 80.

opposition to the Absolutist. By realism, he certainly does not mean belief in a system of static, permanent substances, for such belief is in his opinion tantamount to faith in an Absolute. What he means is belief in the verifiability of truth, not it may be, at the present moment but at some future date. "True ideas", he says* "are those we can *assimilate, validate, corroborate* and *verify*. False ideas are those that we cannot". But if truth is verifiable and at the same time does not refer to any set of permanent experiences, what is the view of reality that we get? It is, as James himself has expressed,† that reality "is always in the making and awaits part of its complexion from the future". Indeed, the entire object of his *Pragmatism* as well as of his *Meaning of Truth* is to protest against a static view of reality and set up in its stead what we may call a fluxional or dynamical view of it.

This dynamical view is the basis of the teleological element in pragmatism. For of this is born its forward-looking habit, its tendency to peep behind the veil of futurity. As a teleo-

* *Meaning of Truth*, Preface p. vi.

† *Pragmatism* p. 257

logical system, however, pragmatism as has been repeatedly pointed out by its critics, is most imperfect. Its teleology is utilitarian and at the same time not quite utilitarian. Royce has tried to show in a recent work, entitled "William James and other Essays", that James's philosophy of life is far deeper than appears from the use of such words as "efficiency" and "cash values". He says, "Despite his own use in his 'Pragmatism' of the famous metaphor of the 'cash values' of ideas, he was certainly not a thinker who had set his affections more upon things below than upon things above", and continues, "And the 'consequences' upon which he laid stress when he talked of the pragmatic test for ideas were certainly not the merely worldly consequences of such ideas in the usual sense of the word 'worldly'." But though we may admit all this, we may well ask whether in James's system we really find a recognition of a higher kind of utility which views all things *sub specie aeternitatis*, as processes that make for totality? It will not do to point, as Royce has done, to James's love for the concrete, as opposed to what is worldly. The point is, what

this concrete means. Does it mean in James's system, to use the words of Bradley, a "reality which satisfies our whole being", a reality in which "our main wants—for truth and life, and for beauty and goodness—must all find satisfaction", for unless it does this, its concreteness does not come to much? We are afraid we do not find such a view of the concrete reality anywhere in James.

It is useless to dwell further on the imperfections of pragmatism as a teleological theory of the universe, for these lie on the surface. What is important to observe is that the purposive element in pragmatism is itself the result of its faith in the essential dynamism of the universe. The future is the realm of possibilities, the region where all our purposes are realized. We act in the present that we may realize our hopes in the future. Pragmatism believes so strongly in this that it starts with an imperfect world in order that there may be room for improvement.

This meliorism is the basis of the pragmatist's religious view. "Give us a matter", James

says,* "that promises success, that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever nearer to perfection, and any rational man will worship that matter as readily as Mr. Spencer worships his own so-called unknowable power". But as matter can never do this, James is led to accept God as the guiding principle of the world. Science gives us no hope that can sustain us, for it says that the world in which we live and which is the field of all our joys as well as all our sorrows, all our triumphs as well as all our bitter disappointments, is destined to disappear. The spectroscope has revealed to us several cases of stars blazing out suddenly and then vanishing into nothing. "Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an echo, without a memory, without an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for similar things".

Pragmatism, thus, is optimistic voluntarism. Its optimism distinguishes it from the voluntarism of Schopenhauer. Optimistic voluntarism is always forward-looking, just as pessimis-

* *Pragmatism* p. 102.

tic voluntarism is backward-gazing. This difference produces a corresponding one in their logical theories. A system, all thoughts of which are centred in the past, favours formalistic or deductive logic, whilst a philosophical theory whose gaze is fixed on the future is likely to advocate 'instrumental' logic. Ends or purposes, again, are the chief themes with which a forward-looking system is concerned, whereas causes and antecedents are what a backward-glancing philosophy cares for.

To conclude, pragmatism is best characterised as a form of romanticism. It has more points of contact with the romantic mode of thinking than with empiricism or teleologism. Empiricism is caught up and lost in the scientific view of the world, whereas a thorough-going teleologism ends too often in ultra-rationalism. Both these extremes pragmatism dreads as much as romanticism. With romanticism, again, pragmatism shares not only its voluntarism but also its biological bias and its love of what is direct and immediate.

CHAPTER—VII

Philosophy of Values

In pragmatism we notice a vigorous atempt to give a definite form to the protest of romanticism against all theoretical tendencies of intellectualism. But though pragmatism aims at definiteness, at freedom from ambiguity, it ends, as we have seen, by formulating a principle which is full of vagueness and confusion. The purposive element which pragmatism recognises in all processes of the world is so vague and ill-defined that the mind cannot rest content with it but seeks a better and more definite formulation. This it does in the philosophy of values. The real meaning of the protest of pragmatism against intellectualism, says this philosophy, is that the real world is not a world of concepts but a world of *values*. And it defines a value as that which gives satisfaction to the self.

The philosophy of values takes its stand upon the Fichtean conception of the world as the

self-positing or self-assertion of the Ego. But whereas with Fichte this self-assertion gives us nothing else than a system of ethics with its categorical imperatives, the philosophy of values gives us in addition an aesthetics and a philosophy of history. If satisfaction of the self is the criterion of value, then there is no meaning in stopping at the ethical values, as Fichte has done. The very process which gives us the ethical values gives us, in addition, other values, especially, aesthetic and historical values. The philosophy of values, thus, is an extension of the ethical principles of Fichte to all possible regions, just as pragmatism is an extension of the principles of English utilitarianism to all domains of reality.

From what we have said above, it is evident that voluntarism is the soul of the philosophy of values. It supposes us to be in the midst of a world of wills which demand satisfaction in various ways and its problem is to find the quality and relative importance of these satisfactions. Indeed, so great is the connexion between value and volition that we may say that "every valuation presupposes a volition which takes up

a position and seeks satisfaction". We must, however, remember what Varisco has said with regard to the above statement, namely, that "if every valuation presupposes volition, so also every wish, nay, every conscious spontaneous activity, presupposes a foundation of valuation —presupposes a value not created by the volition or activity, a value which is an essential constituent of the volition or activity."*

Indeed, though volition is a necessary accompaniment of everything having value, the value depends upon its relation to the self, upon its capacity of giving satisfaction to the self. The presence of volition, in fact, serves only to distinguish the character of the self and to show that a thing which had no relation to the activity of the self would be outside the consciousness of the self and consequently, would have no value.

The metaphysical thery of values rests upon this volitional theory of the self and seeks to determine and classify the various forms which self-satisfaction takes and which is the basis of

Windelband.

* Varisco, *The Great Problems* p. 140.

the values. The first problem of such a metaphysics is to distinguish between what has value and what has not and to examine the claims of the various rival disciplines from the standpoint of value. Windelband takes up this problem and exhibits the fundamental difference between Philosophy and Science from the standpoint of the metaphysics of values. Philosophy, says Windelband, is normative and this character distinguishes it from Science which is idiographic. In his *Präludien*, Windelband has tried to vindicate philosophy as a normative discipline and show its essential difference from the natural sciences. Natural sciences deal with *Urteile*, or judgements expressing a relation between two representations. Philosophy, on the other hand, deals with *Beurteilungen*, or judgements of value which express satisfaction or dissatisfaction, approval or disapproval, acceptance or rejection. The difference between the two classes of judgement is thus indicated by Windelband: "In the first, the connexion of two representative contents is expressed, in the second, the relation of the judging consciousness to the represented object. There is a funda-

mental difference between the two sentences, "This thing is white" and "This thing is good", although they have the same grammatical form. In both the cases—according to the grammatical form—a predicate is ascribed to a subject; but this predicate is in the first case—as the predicate of an *Urteil*—a determination which is complete in itself and taken from what is objectively represented; in the other case it is—as the predicate of a *Beurteilung*—a reference to a consciousness which sets an end before it".* All predicates of an *Urteil* are positive and appear as generic concepts, as properties, capacities, conditions, relations etc. The predicates of a *Beurteilung*, on the other hand, express satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the part of a consciousness: a thing is pleasant or unpleasant, a concept is true or false, an action is good or bad, a landscape is beautiful or ugly.

What a *Beurteilung* does is in fact to create a value. And philosophy is "the critical science of universal values", the word "universal values" denoting the object of philosophy and

† *Präludien* p. 52.

the term "critical" indicating its method.* It does not, however, ignore empirical consciousness but examines it "in order to determine at what point of it normative universality comes in." "It is itself a product of the empirical consciousness; it does not appear to this a foreign element, but is based upon the conviction which creates all values of human life, that in the midst of the movements of empirical consciousness that have nature-necessity, a higher necessity appears and it seeks the points where this breaks out".†

The great field of this normative conscious- is History, just as Nature is the realm of Science. In the rise and fall of human institutions and organisations, in the clash of human interests, we see the play of the normative element in consciousness. The development of norms and the actual growth of the human spirit, as exhibited in history, are identical. While seeking the actual processes at work in building up this world, the processes that have developed in time and that exhibit the character of a

* *Präludien* pp. 51-52.

† *Ibid* p. 68.

continuous growth, history also exhibits a normative character, in that it unfolds the continuous working of norms which gradually come into full self-expression. It enables us to watch the progressive realization of universal norms. "The historical process of the human spirit", says Windelband, "can therefore be conceived in this way, that gradually in the midst of its work with individual problems, in the shifting of its interests, in the weaving of its threads, there comes into being the consciousness of norms".*

The highest problem of philosophy, Windelband thinks, is to unite Nature and History, the kingdom of *Sein* and the kingdom of *Sollen,* in "einer höchsten geistigen Einheit".* But if the kingdom of values is the only kingdom that counts and Nature is a valueless realm of necessary laws, what is the necessity of uniting the two regions? Moreover, what is this 'highest spiritual unity'? Is it or is it not a value? If it is a value, then it is included in the kingdom of values. If it is not a value,

* *Präludien* pp. 70-71.
† *Ibid* p. 23.

then something which is not a value becomes the ultimate reality and the whole fabric of the philosophy of values falls to the ground. In fact, we have here the Nemesis of all philosophy of values : when it tries to be an all-comprehending system, it brings in something which saps its very foundation.

Stern.

Windelband's distinction between normative and empirical consciousness takes the form of the distinction between the standpoint of persons and the standpoint of things in L. W. Stern. As Prof. Stein points out,* by *the standpoint of persons,* Stern understands the teleologico-spiritual view, by that of things, the mechanico-materialistic view. Person, according to Stern, has reality, spontaneity, individuality, activity and claims a separate value among the values of the world. *Thing,* however, is the opposite of this. It is mechanical; it serves a foreign purpose; it is composed of separate parts which have no connexion with one another and of which it is only the aggregate. Stern's problem is the relation between the person and the thing,

* *Vide Phil. Ström,* p. 22.

or, to express it in traditional terminology, between teleology and machanism.

Münsterberg.

In place of Stern's distinction between person and thing, we have in Münsterberg a distinction between the world of values and the world of facts. The former gives us history, the latter the natural sciences. The fundamental mistake of the scientific historian, he says, is in thinking that all knowledge has to deal with objects. "The most essential part of our pure experience is eliminated if we are to acknowledge only things and not subjects which we meet, by the suggestions of their attitudes. History is the science which "deals with ourselves and with all other men really as subjects in our will-reality, and which teaches us to understand our will-relations". The task of the historian is to understand the subjects in such a way that a closer connexion between them by identities of will becomes possible. It is a will-connexion that alone makes history possible.

Historical realities are not subject to the causal law. They are not even determined causally by themselves. It follows therefore

that there can be no conflict between natural science and history, as they move in different planes. "A naturalistic reply can never be the reply to a really historical question. The assertion of the identities of things can never satisfy the demand for the identities of volitions." Historical realities live in a region in which there are no causes, because the question of causes of the will is meaningless. As soon as the question of causes arises, the historical interest gives way to a naturalistic or psychological one. It is a world of wills in which the historian is thrown and this world is outside of space and time, outside of the causal nexus. But this world is not simply a world of wills; it is a world which is governed by *identities of wills*. Just as the naturalist is not content with merely enumerating the different kinds of energy but seeks to transform one kind into another, so the historian is not satisfied with merely asserting the existence of a world of persons but seeks to discover the ways in which one will is transformed into another. The transformation of one will into another may at first sight seem to have a mystical ring about it, but a little reflexion

will show that there is no mystery here. Will-transformations occur at every moment of our life. "When I agree with my friend in his affirmation or negation, or when I sympathise with his inclination, or when I feel with his suffering or his hopes, in short, when I understand him, his will must have really become my will............ His will remains for me the will of another, and yet it enters into my will-activity. His will does not lose anything by being my will, and my will does not lose its self-hood when it receives the other."*

Besides this connexion of persons which makes history, human life exhibits a number of other values, such as beauty, unity, development. The essential factor of human life is, in fact, the notion of value and the different kinds of value give to life the unity and complexity which we notice in it. Now the question is, What is it that constitutes a value? Munsterberg's answer is, that it is a will-act which creates a value. Value exists not in any object but in the will itself. This may be illustrated by the example of the moral value. The moral worth

* Münsterberg: *Eternal Values* p. 149.

of an action lies not in the result of the action but in that which the will wants to bring to realisation. It is in the effort of the will to realize itself, to be consistent with itself, that the moral character of an action lies. The value of a moral act, like truth and beauty, lies in the satisfaction of the will. As little as the thinking mind ever wants to think the error, so little does it ever want to prostitute itself, ever want to become disloyal to itself, ever want to give itself up. Even the criminal does not prefer the immoral act. He does not will the criminal act as action, in preference to the honest act. "He has never wavered between the will to moral self-consistency and the will to inconsistency; he never did not will the consistency; he never did will the inconsistency; in other words, he never did not will the moral. He did fluctuate between his will for the moral and his desire for a pleasure, and he chose the pleasure, but by that the moral never became something which he did not will".*

This satisfaction of the will is different from the feeling of pleasure. Pleasure may accom-

* *Eternal Values* p. 64.

pany this satisfaction but the satisfaction is independent of the pleasure. Pleasure always has reference to the personal equilibrium but the satisfaction of the will is an impersonal affair. It is therefore possible to get the deepest satisfaction in a sphere in which no pleasure of displeasure exists. In many cases there is a double play and we obtain a satisfaction of the will as well as a pleasure, but it is well to remember that the two sides of this experience are quite distinct from each other.

Value, then, has its origin in the satisfaction of the will and is an 'over-personal' element. It is different from an obligation, for in an obligation there is a distinction between that towards which our will is directed and that which is objectively right. In a moral obligation there is drawn a distinction between the action which we ought to do in accordance with our duty and the action which we want to do because it brings us pleasure. But the moral value of an action lies in the will and is never obtained by any not-willing. The moral value is never opposed to the true will; on the contrary, it is determined by it.

This will, however, is an over-personal entity which is not affected by personal pleasure or pain. The problem of values is therefore the problem of understanding "how our will can become an over-personal demand which, without reference to anyone's personal pleasure or displeasure, finds its satisfaction in truth and beauty and morality and religion".

The world which arises out of these acts of the will is a world which we ourselves build up. It is the world of history and of human institutions, the world of purposes and norms. It is a world of persons and not of things, of subjects and not of objects. As Münsterberg says, "mere life does not contain it; life is only the clay from which we have to make the world which has the value of truth" (*Eternal Values* p. 81).

Münsterberg thus protests against a pure system of norms, the absolute 'Ought' or the transcendental 'Sollen' divorced from all contact with persons. But though he makes this protest and though he considers the whole meaning of values to be contained in the notion of persons, still in his system value is an over-personal element. Value is concerned with subjects

and yet it has no subjective element in it. The question, therefore, is this: Can there be anything in persons or subjects which is not personal or subjective, nor, again, a norm or standard? Over-personal duties or norms are perfectly intelligible things but an over-personal personal satisfaction seems to be a contradition in terms. The thing is, the notion of person of which Münsterberg speaks partakes more of the character of an Absolute Consciousness than of concrete personality. Müusterberg tries to save his principle from its absolute character by calling it Will, but it is not clear how a *pure* will, that is, a will that enjoys over-personal satisfaction, can have any concreteness about it. In fact, it is a misnomer to call it will, for, as Aliotta says, "the will of which we have all had experience is always the will of an individual Ego, of a concrete historical subject" (Vide *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 227). What Münsterberg probably means is that 'pure' will is of greater value than a will which enjoys pleasure. But in that case the notion of value will have to be determined by something else. How can the will

determine the value of itself? But to admit that the value of the will depends upon something other than the will is to abandon his theory of the unconditioned character of the pure will-act.

There is another difficulty about Münsterberg's theory of pure will. If every will-act determines a value, it is impossible to deny value to that which is morally reprehensible or aesthetically impure. We have here the same difficulty which we experience in Green's philosophy where an act which is the object of a moral judgment is described as one with which the self identifies itself. But the difficulty in Münsterherg's case is really greater, for while Green could offer a solution by drawing a distinction between an abiding satisfaction and a satisfaction that is only temporary, Münsterberg has hardly any solution to offer. Let us hear what Münsterberg himself has to say on this point. He writes:—

> "The moral value never stands in real contradiction to our own will, and thus has no reference to an 'ought'. We have to consider carefully here

the whole situation which is very easily misinterpreted............We have indeed no right to claim that any moral value is involved in considering one action rather than another as the action which we ought to do. If a man has not learned what action ought to be done, he is not immoral but amoral. If he is practically unable to attach value to certain actions, we speak of moral insanity. We do not call a man a thief because he prefers the action of stealing to the honest action. On the contrary, if he had a view of life according to which stealing is the action which as action has a special value and if he lived up to his principles, we should try to protect society against such a dangerous individual and would put him in an asylum, but we should avoid any moral attitude. We call him a thief only if he feels that the honest action is

> the valuable action, and if he feels it as valuable, it is the action which he himself really wants, while the stealing as action he does not want. If there were only the choice between the two actions as such, stealing and not stealing, he would never hesitate, he would always prefer the valuable honest action. His difficulty is only that while he wills of the two actions, only the one, the honest one, he wills and desires at the same time the booty and to get it he has to steal."*

The immoral act is therefore not only willed but also desired, that is to say, referred to the personal state. A little further down, Münsterberg says that the immoral act is not willed as action but is desired in the service of an agreeable effect. So a distinction is here made between willing an action as action and willing it for the sake of some effect. But this distinction is one which appertains to the ob-

* *Eternal Values* pp. 60-61.

jects of the will and does not belong to the subject that wills. That Münsterberg himself is not quite satisfied with this account of morality is evident from the circumstance that a little later he speaks of moral acts as acts of self-consistency. Morality means loyalty to self. To say this, however, is to give up the voluntaristic basis upon which Münsterberg's system rests, for consistency is a logical quality which is without a volitional element. In fact, his account of morality lands him in ultra-rationalism.

Münsterberg's insistence upon the over-personal character of values leaves no justification for a new system of philosophy based upon the notion of value. For the Absolute of the German idealists has precisely such an over-personal character as Münsterberg demands for his principle of value. Fortunately, however, Münsterberg very often rises above the logical limitations of his system. Thus, in discussing the question whether love has any value, Münsterberg has to admit that love, so far as it is a personal jov and a satisfaction of individual gratification, has no value. Nevertheless, he makes an eloquent appeal for including it

in the scale of values. "The devotion of the souls," he says, "has nevertheless an unlimited "value, a value as absolutely valid as morality "itself, the eternal value of perfect unity......... "The unity of souls is not simply a charming "spectacle which adorns our existence and "beautifies the seriousness of life with pleasant "play. We called the total values of unity "æsthetic, because all art and beauty of nature "belonged in the same circle, but what is "meant is a holy and serious value which "grasps the deepest powers of our personality. "As the starry night in its eternal beauty makes "us feel the meaning of unity by its sublime "glory, the value of unity comes to us with no "less unlimited splendour when two souls have "become one for better or for worse in eternal "loyalty."*

Rickert.

Münsterberg speaks of an over-personal satisfaction. This is replaced in Rickert's system by the conception of a '*Wert an sich*. Rickert believes with Münsterberg that the most

* *Eternal Values*, p. 192.

important question is not the question of reality but that of validity. The object of knowledge is not Being (Sein) but Ought (Sollen), not the world of reals but the world of *norms*. Not being but 'ought' is the logically original concept. As Aliotta puts it, "the thing in its objectivity is reduced to a transcendental norm or rule of the connexions between the presentations which demands recognition." Even the causal law derives its necessity from the recognition of an ideal norm. Natural necessity itself is founded upon the notion of 'ought' without which it will have no objective value. There is thus no opposition between theoretical and practical activity, between knowledge and volition. They are, indeed, two "different manifestations of the same consciousness of duty, in which logical values find their superlogical basis."

Like Münsterberg Rickert also sets great store by the historical method. History deals with persons, whereas it is only with abstract concepts that science is concerned. The building up of a concept out of the manifoldness of individual experience invests Science no doubt

with dignity and makes its judgments accepted by all people. But what Science thus gains in point of dignity and universality it loses in point of reality. It thus fails as an interpretation of the actual processes of the world. For this it has to look to history which records the activities of free living beings. The process of realization of human faculties cannot be known scientifically but only historically, for we have here the world of free personalities and not of abstract concepts.

History deals with the unique, the irrepeatable, whereas science deals with what is common and recurrent. The object of the historical science, says Rickert, is "to comprehend the historical object, whether it is a personality, a people, an age, an economical, political, religious or artistic movement, in its *unqueness* and not repeating *individuality*."* But granting all this, does it necessarily follow that history deals with the kingdom of values and not with the kingdom of reality? And if it deals with reality, what becomes of Rickert's

* Rickert: *Geschichtsphilosophie* ("Die Philosophie im Beginn d. zw. Jahrh," p. 339).

distinction between sciences of values and sciences of reality? The truth is, Rickert's main object is to exhibit a higher form of reality than that presented on the one hand in immediate consciousness and on the other, in scientific conceptions. A will-act, in Rickert's opinion, can alone constitute true reality. History is the field where will-acts reign supreme, and therefore, in history we have contact with what is most essentially real. But Rickert also makes this will-act the criterion of value. What he does is in fact to establish the equation: will-act = reality = value. But when he does this he cannot any more oppose the question of value to that of reality.

The triple identification of will-act, reality and value results in fact in the merging of each of these in some higher conception, such as, Absolute Consciousness or Absolute Personality. But then we return to the classical idealism of Germany which the philosophy of values abandoned in its search for a principle that was less artificial than that of rationalism. Indeed, we have here the Nemesis of all Wert-philosophie; when it is unsystematic, it is not worthy

of the title of philosophy, and when it becomes systematic, it falls under the crutches of rationalism from which it originally tried to escape.

All the systems we have so far considered agree in taking an objective view of value. They therefore cannot avoid the contradiction we have noticed above, that a thing which has its essence in subjective satisfaction is given a trans-subjective character. An objective system of values, moreover, is hardly distinguishable from an absolute system, such as that of Hegel. For all these reasons a class of thinkers prefers to take a subjective view of values. The best representatives of this view are Brentano and his school. They take their stand upon psychology and exhibit the value-element of various experiences.

Meinong, a philosopher belonging to this school, points out in his *Über Annahmen*, the existence of a class of psychical states to which he has given the name *Annahmen*. Logic may decide the value of judgments but it hopelessly fails with regard to *Annahmen*. Annahme or supposition plays a very important part in

Meinong.

our psychical life, which would lose its meaning if we were to exclude it. The Law of Contradiction and all other instruments of the logician derive the whole of their importance from the erroneous idea that all that we are concerned with is the assertion or denial of some event or some experience. The truth, on the contrary, is, that a great part of our life has nothing to do with any such assertion or denial. Not all sentences express a conviction. In a sentence, for example, like 'Is the book in the library?', the mental attitude is one of uncertainty. Meinong draws a distinction between the objects of ideas and what he terms objectives, that is, things which we judge. Thus, in the sentence 'This man is a fool', the objective, that is, the thing judged, is 'This man is a fool', whereas the objects are 'this man' and fool. This distinction is of very great importance in Meinong's theory of desire. Desire, says Meinong, is concerned with objectives and not with objects. If what I desire actually exists, then my desire ceases. I may desire the continuation of a thing but I don't desire a thing that actually exists. Desire thus rests

upon an *Annahme*, and its value is distinct from a truth-value.

Witasek.

As Meinong developed a psychological theory of logical and ethical values, so Witasek propounded a psychological theory of æsthetics. In his "Grundzüge der allgemeinen Aesthetik," he states that the medium of expression of the beautiful in art and nature represents the psychical element of our experience. By this he not only means to emphasis the concreteness of this experience but also the capacity which we possess of visualising the phenomena of our inner life in the same way as those of the external world. The value of æsthetic perception consists, in fact, in the 'Seelenregungen' which it excites and in the opportunity which it gives of looking at the panorama presented by these with the inner eye. "The joy of witnessing the panorama constitutes the essence of the notion of 'Einfühlen.' "*

To these psychological investigations of

* Groos, *Aesthetic*, "Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwan. Jahrh." p. 512.

values, E. Husserl supplied a logistic. In his *Logische Untersuchungen* (2 Vols. 1900-01) as well as in his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913) he examined various kinds of experience, with a view to discovering their logical character. This examination brings him into contact with a new experience to which he gives the name 'Wesenserschauung', which possesses the directness of intuitions and the cementing quality of ideas. The analysis of this 'intuition of being' gives us the values, just as the analysis of pure thought gives us the categories. The discovery of the pure values which Husserl calls phenomenological reduction* is done in the spirit of Kant's Transcendental Deduction but Husserl's procedure is far more satisfactory than Kant's. His analysis of experience leads Husserl to perceive that the mental act which comprehends a given experience is more than a mere synthesis of opposed elements. His discovery of a "continuous organised *polythe-*

* Vide *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie* etc. p. 113.

tic synthesis"† links the phenomenology of reason with that of other activities of the mind. This discovery is fraught with immense possibilities and may turn out to be one of the grandest discoveries of the present century in the domain of logic.

Royce.

We return to the metaphysical theory of values from which we made a temporary departure for the purpose of examining the psychological treatment of values. Rickert's system, we saw, ended in the triple identification of will-act, reality and value and in the merging of these in some higher conception which we may call Absolute Consciousness or Absolute Personality. The great American philosopher Josiah Royce takes his stand definitely upon the Absolute as the highest principle of a theory of values. Royce's scheme of values gives as much importance to the notion of 'ought' as does Rickert's, but the 'ought' of Royce has a much higher meaning than the simple normative 'ought' of Rickert, for it signifies the

† Ibid p. 246.

presence of an absolute fulness and the operation of an Absolute Will.

Royce defines thought itself in terms of the will. All thought, according to him, is the conscious fulfilment of an end and is thus indistinguishable from a volition. The fundamental unit of the spiritual life is thus as much a thought as it is a will. The movement of all thought as well as all will is towards the discovery of an end, a purpose, a meaning. Meaning or value constitutes the essence of our life as spiritual beings. What we strive to obtain is our real and completed meaning. When we obtain that we know what we are and who we are as individuals. We know "what the whole individual Being called the World is, and who the individual of Individuals, namely, the Absolute or God himself is". An individual, therefore, is an incomplete or inperfect meaning; the complete meaning, the perfect value is the Absolute.

This mode of defining the relation between the individual and the Absolute reminds one of Leibniz's conception of the relation between a higher and a lower monad. The higher and

the lower monad reflect the same universe but the higher reflects it more distinctly than the lower. The difference is a difference of degree in the power of reflexion. More complete and less complete meaning, perfect and imperfect values have the same relation as distinct and indistinct reflexion, perfect and imperfect representation have in Leibniz's system. Royce's system, in fact, may be called a monadology of values.

It is only a further step in the same process of concretising the real when Royce says that as we advance in the scale of reality, we rise also in the scale of determinateness. When we pass to our real and completed meaning, we step into the region of determinateness. Indeed, greater reality means greater content and greater content is the same as greater determinateness, greater explicitness of meaning. What the real avoids is vagueness or indeterminateness of characteristics. "Increase of knowledge," says Royce, "would therefore really involve increase of determination in your present meaning. The universe you have always with you, as your true internal meaning.

Only this, you now, in view of the defect of your momentary form of consciousness, realize vaguely, abstractly, without determination."

This view of reality rejects the common conception that the correspondence of thought with an external object constitutes the reality of that thought. If the common conception were correct, it would mean a complete sundering of the realms of thought and the external world and consequently, the impossilibity of bringing the latter into any kind of relationship with the former. For any sort of relationship would destroy the alleged independence of the external world. The realist therefore who advocates the independence of objects is confronted with the dilemma that if he seeks to maintain his proposition he has to give up all attempts to know the external world, and if he wants to establish the knowableness of the world of objects, he has to give up his thesis.

The solution of the realist's trouble lies in perceiving that the essence of the real is not to be found in its isolation from the thinking mind but rather in its relation to it, in its *value* for it. What constitutes reality is, in fact, the *internal*

meaning of an idea. The external world and the idea of it are not two things but one, for the real element in both is the same, namely, the value or meaning revealed in them. "What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment in individual form and in final fulfilment of the internal meaning of finite ideas."*

This is the notion of reality which Royce arrives at after an examination of the various meanings that have been assigned to the real. It combines the breadth and comprehensiveness of the idealistic view with the richness and fulness of the mystic's standpoint. It has in it all the charms of the romanticist's world-construction, for it has the same longing for the total, the complete, the rich, the individual. It has, moreover, the qualities of explicitness and definiteness which characterise rationalism.

The net result of this double current in Royce's philosophy is his theory of what he calls 'individual determination'. In Royce's view, "every step towards Truth is a step away from vague possibilities and towards determina-

* *The World and the Individual* Vol. I. p. 339.

teness of idea and of experience". But this determinateness is the definiteness of an individual. We are not content until we fasten the determinate characteristics upon a single individual content. However determinate the qualities may be, it will not do if they roam about in stellar space without settling upon an individual object. Indeed, it is individuality which gives true determinateness; the perfectly explicit is also the perfectly individual, the highest definiteness is the highest concreteness.

It is a further merit of Royce's system that it makes a synthesis of the notions of *individual*, *value* and *will*. Reality, as Royce defines it, is "an individual life, present as a whole, *totum simul*, as the scholastics would have said" (*The World and the Individual* Vol. I p. 341). It is the "completed will, as well as the completed experience, corresponding to the will and experience of any one finite idea". It is called by him indiscriminately Being, Will or Life, for it is just as much being as it is will, just as much will as it is life. The world of my Being is simply the world of my own will in a determinate individual embodiment. So long

as my world remains a mere universal, a general idea, it lacks the character of reality. But when it becomes the definite expression of an explicit purpose, when it embodies a perfectly determinate individual character and a perfectly intelligible will-act, it acquires the character of a real world.

It is on account of this practical trend of Royce's philosophy that it has often been styled pragmatism. There are some passages in *The World and the Individual* where the pragmatist standpoint is only too apparent. Where, for instance, Royce calls ideas mere tools which exist for an end, the pragmatist leaning is quite obvious. But in Royce's system the practical end which an action seeks to realize is not mere utility as it is in the pragmatist's theory, but the Higher End which satisfies an Absolute Consciousness. The pragmatism of William James and others is only an extension in the domain of metaphysics of the ethical doctrine of Bentham and his school. Royce's system, however, sets up a real end or purpose which the whole universe seeks to realize and is therefore much more far-reaching than pragmatism.

The Absolute of Royce is richer in content than the Absolute of the classical idealists, for it is both an Absolute Experience and an Absolute Will. It is even more than this—it is Absolute Love, as we are told in *Conception of God* (p. 171). Also the contents of the Absolute Experience are "not only facts, but chosen fulfilments of ideals", and individuals are not only facts of the Absolute Experience, but "expressions, embodiments, cases—forms, if you will, of the Absolute Love itself". This view of the Absolute exhibits the romantic element in Royce's philosophy, for it shows a love of the complex, a longing for the complete and total view of things, which is characteristic of all romanticism. That Royce has always in mind the complete, the total, and is never satisfied with a fragmentary view, such as is offered by intellectualism, is shown by the circumstance that wherever he mentions the Absolute, he mentions it in its double character of Absolute Experience and Absolute Will. The romantic element *par excellence*, however, in Royce's philosophy is his view of the Ultimate Reality as an individual. Romantic-

ism always seeks to give concrete form to universals and is never so happy as when it fastens the characteristics it is in search of, upon an individual. The individual, moreover, defies all exact definition and thus satisfies the craving of the romanticist for something indefinable.

But though the romantic element is so noticeable in the system of Royce, the rationalistic bias is too strong to allow of any real romanticism in his philosophy. It is a sad irony of fate that the two grandest systems that have been constructed out of the principle of values—the system of Eternal Values of Münsterberg and the philosophy of values of Royce—have both failed in their object. The intellectualistic current running through Münsterberg's philosophy has already been noticed. But the philosophy of Royce is more strongly influenced by it than even that of Münsterberg. In fact, Royce's system is a mixture of Hegelian idealism with a voluntaristic philosophy of values. The Hegelian element, however, is the dominant element and shows itself both in his conception of the Absolute as an all-inclusive Reality and in his

view of experience in general. The immanence of the individual will in the will of the Absolute is as strong in Royce's system as in that of Hegel, and though the purely logical relationship of a higher and a lower category which we find in Hegel subsisting between God and the world is replaced in Royce by a more complicated sort of relationship, still the relationship remains the same in all essentials, namely, one capable of being expressed in logical terms. Of the romanticist's "rätselhaftes Plus" we have as little in Royce's philosophy as in that of Hegel. The world, in Royce's view, is to be loyal to "loyalty", and that means that it is to be guided by some definite ideal and shaped according to some definite plan. The conception of the world in Royce's philosophy is in fact that of a fragmentary unity as compared with the complete unity of God. As he says in his *Philosophy of Loyalty*, "we need unity of life". But we never find it except in a fragmentary shape. "We get hints of a higher unity. But only a fragmentary unity is won at any moment of our lives. We therefore form ideas—very fallible ideas—of some unity of

experience, a unity such as our idea of any science or any art or any united people or of any community or of any other cause, any other union of many human experiences in one, defines" (*Philosophy of Loyalty pp.* 340-41).

This, then, is the final conclusion of Royce's philosophy, and also in a sense, of the philosophy of values. The one experience which is both will and knowledge, both a fact and a value, is a fragmentary unity when we view it in the light of the Total Experience which we call God. The total experience, as well as every fragmentary experience, is, however, an *individual* experience, an experience in which all the divers elements unite to form a harmonious, homogeneous whole.

A similar spiritualistic view of the world, but in a more teleological sense, is advanced by Prof. James Ward. Prof. Ward who in the work *Naturalism and Agnostism* laid the foundation of a teleological view of the universe, has greatly developed his system and is now ranked with Eucken and Royce among the leading

Ward.

exponents of the spiritualistic view of the world. In a recent work, entitled *The Realm of Ends*, Ward has tried to give a religious view of the world which in a way consummates the efforts of the philosophers of value. As Aliotta says, "the logical completion of the philosophy of values can only be found in a form of spiritualism, and to James Ward belongs the credit of having frankly recognised this fact" (*Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 265). The object of this work is much the same as that of Eucken's "Life of the Spirit," namely, that of exhibiting a religious purpose of the universe. But while the rationalistic bias in Rudolf Eucken is too great to make him a true philosopher of values, Ward is primarily and essentially a philosopher of values of a religious type and his rationalism is a secondary phenomenon which in no way affects his general philosophical position.

Ward begins by asserting that it is history and not science that has access to reality. The growth of science has only demonstrated its purely formal character (This conclusion, we may note in passing, agrees with that of Bradley

who declares, "Nature regarded as bare matter, is a mere convenient abstraction" (*Appearance and Reality* Second Revised Edition 1908, p. 481). The hard atoms which at one time formed the subject matter of Newton's natural philosophy have now been replaced by "non-matter in motion." The real has been divested of all its concrete tangible qualities, till it has become a spectre. The theory of "mass-points" of Boscovich and the hydro-kinetic theory of Kelvin have removed all vestiges of reality from matter and made it a mere phantom. This, however, has only served to bring into greater prominence the "kingdom of ends," the world of purposes.

Ours is a world of persons and not a world of abstractions. The essential reality is the presence of persons, a plurality of self-conscious individuals. This fact not only Science but all systems of Absolute Idealism seem to forget. For instance, says Ward, Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality* declares that pluralism "is no fact, but a theoretical construction; and so far as it has a meaning, that meaning contradicts itself and issues in chaos..............

The plurality then sinks to become merely an integral aspect in a single substantial unity and the reals (the many) have vanished." He quotes Bradley's prophecy that "pluralism on the whole will increase and will add to the difficulties which already exist" and says, "Whether the second half of this forecast will turn out to be as true as the first half remains to be seen. At any rate, the plurality of the realm of ends is what is most patent to us at the outset" (*Realm of Ends* p. 24).

After demolishing the scientists and the Absolutists, Ward begins to build "a realm of ends." The fundamental fact about this realm is "organic coherence." It is a society of persons who possess individuality and independence and are connected with one another by the idea of a common good. This society is "truly a living reality, though a complex and over-individual one." It exhibits a "universal tendency towards perfection as the very principle of life." This progress, moreover, consists "in the advance towards a 'higher unity.' " "To set over against this, though the problem of evil is still serious enough, there is for the pluralist

no 'evil one'—no principle of evil in the world; and no *pure* malevolence, no *radicale Böse,* as Kant would call it, in the individual" (*Realm of Ends* p. 129).

This, then, is Ward's conception of the realm of ends. It is based upon a pluralistic view of the universe and it shows no higher unity than that of a common good. What, however, is the place of God in such a system? The necessity of logic forces him to conceive God as the ultimate ground of the universe. "A plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, an ontological plurality that is yet somehow a cosmological unity, seems clearly to suggest some ground beyond itself. The idea of God presents itself to meet this lack" (*Realm of Ends* p. 241). This idea, too, he reaches by way of faith and not by way of knowedge. "Pluralism," he says in the Preface to *The Realm of Ends,* "though empirically warranted, we find defective and unsatisfactory; but the theism to which it points is only an ideal—an ideal, however, that, as both theoretically and practically

rational, may claim our faith, though it transcend our knowledge."

Such, in brief outline, is the philosophy of James Ward. It begins with the monadology of Leibniz and ends in the rationalism of Kant. The distinction which it makes after the example of Kant between faith and knowledge is its weak point, for it raises the old controversy regarding the relation of these two experiences. Its pluralistic standpoint, moreover, runs counter to Ward's theory of duality in the unity of experience. For, as Aliotta remarks, if subject and object form one indissoluble experience, how is it possible to distinguish a plurality of independent beings? "If other beings do not exist merely in so far as I think them, but exist also in themselves in their spiritual intimacy, my experience of them from without is of a different order from the experience which each one of them enjoys of itself from within. When I think another individual, his being, as present to himself, and the idea of him formed by me constitute an irreducible duality."*

* Aliotta, *Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 268.

The strong point of Ward's system is his moral philosophy and his philosophy of values as based upon morality. The individuals composing his realm of ends are concrete values and therefore superior to the abstract values generally contemplated by this type of thinkers.

CHAPTER VIII.

Vitalism and Energism.

In dealing with pragmatism we touched incidentally on the question of life and its importance for the romanticist. The romantic movement has, indeed, found in Life a more solid foundation upon which to build a system than feeling or will which at one time constituted its basic principle. The reason for this is obvious. Life is a subject of perennial interest but is also a thing which is even now shrouded in mystery. It is, moreover, a principle which was the centre of scientific activity during the nineteenth century and round which developed the wonderful speculations of Darwin, Lamarck, Weismann and a host of other biologists. Its importance is acknowledged on all hands. The scientist and philosopher, the poet and the artist, all unite in looking upon life as a subject of paramount importance. The validity of subjective feeling may be questioned, but it is impossible to doubt the great fact of life

of which we in comon with all animate creatures are conscious at every moment of our life.

But the charm of this principle, at least for the romanticist, is not its unassailability but the mystery which surrounds it. Although life has been the subject of a vast amount of research, its nature remains to-day as great a puzzle as it ever was. After all the attempts of the scientists to analyse and resolve the facts of life into their component elements, a residue remains, an unanalysable factor, a "rätselhaftes Plus." This unanalysable element, this enigmatic something which baffles all scientific analysis, is the favourite subject of speculation for the romanticist.

The importance of the problem of life is enhanced by the circumstance that it confirms the doubts which philosophers have long entertained regarding the tenability of the mechanical theory. The facts of life constitute the most unanswerable criticism of the mechanical view of the world. In the living organism, we have the whole world in miniature, for we see here the phenomenon of a vast number of separate parts working together for one common purpose.

The phenomena of life refuse absolutely lend themselves to any explanation by any sort of fortuitous concourse of blind atoms. As Merz says,* "the phenomena of life have still something mysterious about them. No theory of the nature and origin of life has gained acceptance: the very alphabet of biology, or the science of life, has still to be written. The description of the phenomena of life has necessarily to be kept most vague and general."

This is true of the most important of the biological theories of the present day—the cellular theory of Schleiden and Schwann who looked upon the cell as containing the essence of life and defined it as "a small vesicle with a firm membrane enclosing fluid content." The cellular theory, however, was soon replaced by the protoplasmic theory of Max Schultze which stated that the unit of life was "a small mass of protoplasm endowed with the attributes of life." The reason for this change in the biological theory was that the cell was found to be a

* *History of ScientiGc Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. II. p. 370.

complicated structure, that, in fact, it was itself an organism. Moreover, non-nucleated organisms were believed to exist and this belief struck at the root of the cellular theory. The result is, that the biologist has given up the hope of ever attaining finality in questions relating to life. "Ever and anon," says Merz, "after scaling the eminence just before him, he beholds a new and greater one rising into view which he contemplates with mixed feelings of discouragement and of eager desire for advance."*

Bichat.

Among the biologists who maintained that life contains something which cannot be expressed in terms of physics and chemistry, one of the most celebrated was Bichat (1771-1802). He coined the word "vitalism" to denote his conviction that there is an essential and fundamental difference between organic and inorganic processes and functions. Bichat defined life as the totality of the functions which resist death. To him, as to Darwin, life was a contest, a

* *History of Scientific Thought in the Nineteenth Century* Vol. II p. 374.

struggle, but it was a struggle of the living forces against the dead, and not, as it was with Darwin, the struggle of the living for supremacy.

Leibniz.

The mechanical interpretation of life received, however, its greatest check from the organic view of Nature first propounded by Leibniz. Every monad, according to Leibniz, contains in itself all the other monads, but it contains them in a way in which its unity is all the more apparent by reason of the presence of diversity. Leibniz believes in no dead matter; for him the world is a great whole, full of life, illustrating the characteristic of all organism, namely, unity running through all diversity. For this reason Windelband calls his philosophy "absolute vitalism."

Schelling.

The Leibnizian idea of organism was developed greatly by Schelling who created a philosophy of Nature, the avowed object of which was to demonstrate the teleogical character of the processes of Nature. Nature for Schelling was nothing but spirit in the process

of becoming. The natural and the spiritual world were, according to him, identical in their deepest root, the one containing unconsciously what the other did consciously.

Oken.

Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) was one of the most important followers of Schellingian Nature-philosophy and was the founder of the organic theory of evolution. He classified the entire animal kingdom from the standpoint of teleology and regarded the whole process of an organism as a movement which found its culmination in human life, in conscious intelligence.

Liebig.

The Schellingian idea of an organism inspired also the labours of Liebig. Liebig did not cut himself off from the prevailing ideas of the biologists of his time, but while giving due consideration to the principle of the continual change of matter which all life-process exhibits and to which he applied the term *Stoffwechsel*, he enunciated the second great principle of all phenomena of life, the principle which he called "Kreislauf des Lebens", the continuous interchange which goes on between the different

members of the living organism. The essence of life, said Liebig, was not so much a struggle against the forces of death as co-operation of different members for the fulfilment of one common end, the preservation of life, and the organisation of divers parts to form one compact whole.

Von Baer.

The idea of an organic unity through a common purpose is also the central doctrine of "Zielstrebigkeitslehre," a work written by von Baer, the celebrated embryologist who discovered the human ovum. Von Baer overcame the prevailing telephobia of his age and paved the way for a telephilism. He took his stand definitely upon the world of organism, as opposed to the unorganised world of mechanics. His influence upon contemporary thought was very great and there are even reasons for thinking that his thoughts exercised some influence over those of Spencer. Indeed, Spencer himself admitted in his *Autobiography* his indebtedness to Baer.

This mode of thinking is further de-

veloped by von Hartmann. Hartmann makes

Hartmann.

a violent crusade against all mechanical explanations of life, the last representative of which is Haeckel in his "Riddle of the Universe." In his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, his very first work, he begins his campaign against mechanical theories with great energy. The physico-chemical laws, he says, are not adequate to explain the phenomena of life. Mechanism must stop outside the door of life; to the inner sanctuary of life it has no access. His first-hand acquaintance with biology and natural science stands him in good stead and he is able to establish, by an exhaustive analysis of the researches of the physicists and the biologists, a "Zweckeinheit," as opposed to a causal unity. The mistake of all mechanical explanations of the world, even the very best, is in thinking that all necessity must be mechanical necessity. That there can be such a thing as a necessity of purpose, an order resulting from a striving to realize an end, seems to have escaped altogether the exponents of the mechanical view . As Prof. Ludwig Stein says,

teleology is *also* causal, that is, subject to purposive laws (*Phil. Ström.* p. 193). The question at issue between mechanism and vitalism is not one of necessity and arbitrary choice but one of nature-necessity and purposive necessity.

It follows from this that Hartmann requires no special vital force to prove his proposition. It is doubtful, indeed, whether after Lotze's destructive criticism of all vital-force-hypotheses, it is possible for any thinker to talk of life as having a special power of its own. Even if life had a special vital force, it would not be of any use to von Hartmann, for this vital force would serve only to build up another world quite as mechanical as the one with which the physicist was concerned. What is required for demolishing mechanism is to establish the existence of a necessity of purpose, a world governed by ends.

Such a purposive world is the theme of the greatest of v. Hartmann's works, his *Problem des Lebens* which Prof. Stein describes as the "clearest, richest and most fruitful work in the whole range of biological literature". The

fundamental idea of this work is that mechanical necessity is a subordinate principle working under the higher principle of necessity of purpose. The principle of causality has reference to fixed, immobile, static constants of thought and has no access to the living reality which is essentially dynamic. Causality applies when we take a retrospective glance, when we view any portion of our experience as *erlebt.* When we take, however, a forward-looking glance, when we try to peep into what is yet to come, we are guided by plans and purposes. The sphere of causality is the past that has been lived through, that awakens in us no hopes and causes in us no disappointments. But the life that has interest for us is the life that stretches out into the future, that is full of infinite hopes as well as infinite disappointments. In this life causality has no place. Mechanical causality can at best give us the delights of a trigonometrical surveyor, but it can never give us a taste of the rapturous joy of the discoverer of new territories.

But while von Hartmann is careful not to

give the principle of life any special name, J. Reinke and Hans Driesch do not hesitate to designate by special names what they consider the special features of a peculiar phenomenon. The "theory of dominants" of the first and the "doctrine of entelechy" of the second show how far they have proceeded in the way of hypostatising a particular class of experiences. His "theory of dominants", J. Reinke has developed in his book entitled *Welt als Tat*. The "dominants" are, like the monads of Leibniz, "überenergetische Kräfte" possessing intelligence. Their characteristic is that they work under the impulse of an inner causality. They are "direction-giving" forces or "system-forces". Under their action, the world is spiritualised and becomes the centre of spiritual activity. This idea he develops further in his "Philosophie der Botanik". It ought, however, to be stated here that although Reinke has not escaped wholly the temptation of hypostatising his fundamental principle, he rejects scornfully any theory which accepts a vital substance. His hypostatisation,

Reinke.

in fact, does not go further than that of Leibniz in his Monadology.

Driesch.

Hans Driesch follows Reinke closely in his attempt to construct a vitalistic world, in opposition to all the mechanical theories that are current in his day. He has revived the old Aristotelian doctrine of Entelechy, but he is careful to divest it of all traces of any "qualitas occulta", in the sense of the old vitalists. The 'entelechies', he says, are to be looked upon, just like other constants (physical, logical, etc.), as factors of a "broadened reality". In fact, it is a "broadened reality" which he seeks to establish as against the narrow constructions of the mechanists. The phenomenon of life, the 'Vitalagens' introduces us to this notion of a wider reality and this constitutes its value.

The basal principle of his system is the notion of entelechy. This notion he thus explains in his *Science and Philosophy of the Organism* (Gifford Lectures for 1907-08) Vol. I. p. 142 :—

"No kind of causality based upon the constellations of single physical and

chemical acts can account for organic individual development; this development is not to be explained by any configuration of physical and chemical agents. Therefore there must be something else which is to be regarded as the sufficient reason of individual form-production. We now have got the answer to our question, what our constant E (entelechy) consists in. It is not the resulting action of a constellation. It is not only a short expression for a more complicated state of affairs, it expresses a *true element* of nature".

Entelechy, in fact, stands for autonomy of life. It is a creative principle ; its mode of working is not morphogenesis but epigenesis, not evolution but creation.

Entelechy is unspatial, whereas causality has its sphere in the region of space. Entelechy is thus outside the region of causality. What governs it is purposive activity, ceaseless striving towards an end. Its mode of operation is a

continuous growth of its intensive manifoldness. "The single steps in the manifestation of entelechy are, as we know, univocally determined, but they are so by their being united in the intensive manifoldness of their realiser; thus they seem to be *acausal* with regard to real "causes" which are not embraced in this manifoldness, but are single changes in space. In other words, it is the essence of an entelechy to manifest itself in an extensive manifoldness: all the details of this extensive manifoldness depend upon the intensive manifoldness of the entelechy but not upon different "spatial causes".*

Helm and Ostwald.

Driesch thus shows the inadequacy of the principle of scientific causality and passes from a static to a dynamic concept of nature. This dynamic view of nature is further developed by Helm and Ostwald who call their system of philosophy *energism*. Helm formulates a "principle of becoming" based on differences of "intensities", it being his fundamental assumption that no becoming is possible unless there is

* *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, Vol. II. p. 157.

a difference of intensity between one state and another. There is also a rise of one "intensity" accompanied by a corresponding fall of another. Side by side with this differential theory we have the principle of Conservation of Energy which states that becoming does not change the total quantity of energy in the universe but that it leads to the transformation of one kind of energy into another. In calculating the total quantity of energy, however, account is taken of actual as well as potential energy, thereby rendering, as Hans Driesch remarks, the merely possible an actual reality. In the hands of Ostwald, the principle of energy gets a more universal colouring. As Wundt observes, the theory of Ostwald has reference not only to an energistic nature-philosophy but breaks all barrier between natural and mental sciences. Ostwald, indeed, creates a nature-philosophy on much the same lines as Schelling's similar effort, for we notice in it the same "Beseelung und Durchgeistigung" of the world which characterises Schelling's philosophy of nature.

Ostwald defines energy as "work and all that arises from work and can be transformed

into work".* Regarding the question whether reality can be ascribed to energy, Ostwald says that every concept has two aspects. It denotes, in the first place, an abstract notion, and in the second, all individual things which come under it. In the same way, the general concept of energy is abstract but the particular energies are real. About the reality of the individual forms of energy there can be no doubt, for we find them in all departments of natural and all provinces of mental sciences.

In applying the principle of energy to the phenomenon of life, Ostwald remarks that the great factor in organised beings which distinguishes them from inorganic matter, is time. The laws of the inorganic world are independent of time; the crystal form of the quartz, for example, is, as far as we can judge, the same to-day as it was five hundred years ago and we expect it to be the same five hundred years hence. We expect living beings, however, to be continually changing with time. Organic life thus introduces a new concept, namely, that of continuous change through time. "Life",

* "Naturphilosophie," *Systematische Philosophie* p. 612.

says Ostwald, "is a stationary energy-stream; that it may remain so stationary, it must have the power of self-regulation, that is, it must have the property of seeking or bringing about conditions which preserve this state and preventing or removing such as bring about its destruction."* This gives the reason as also the meaning of the continuous change which all living organisms exhibit. This definition is in striking agreement with that of Spencer, the only difference being that where Spencer speaks of adaptation to the environment Ostwald speaks of self-regulation. Indeed, as we shall see presently, the evolutionary doctrine of Spencer has greater affinity with the spiritualistic view of the universe than with the mechanical.

The process of self-regulation brings into existence another factor, namely, purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit). As the organism has the power to regulate its functions in such a way as to bring about conditions favourable to its life and prevent those that are destructive of it, every property which an organism possesses may be viewed in the light of its capacity to preserve the

* "Naturphilosophie," *Systematische Philosophie* p. 167.

life of the organism. The purposiveness exhibited in life is therefore one which is concerned exclusively with the power of self-maintenance. This purposiveness is seen in a more developed form in the social instinct which we notice in living beings. Here the life that is sought to be preserved is not the individual life of the creature but the corporate life of the large organism (Gesamtorganismus) of which the individual forms a part.

We are thus led from biology to the problem of Sociology, which is concerned only with the activity of self-conscious beings. The sciences therefore are not such closed systems as they are supposed to be. The natural sciences pass by easy stages into Geisteswissenschaften. The lines of demarcation between the sciences are highly arbitrary, and physical science itself is a part of the biological and mental sciences.

The chemist Ostwald thus follows the footsteps of the philosopher Schelling and spiritualises Nature and Life. Ostwald's result, moreover, has this advantage over Schelling's that it points directly to the most essentially spiritual

element in our life, namely, energy of activity. This result, however, he owes in some measure to the fact that the ground was prepared for him by the researches of Mach. Thus, Merz says,* "A great many aspects of physical science which have been more prominently brought forward by the modern school of 'Energetics' are to be found discussed in Mach's earlier writings". Mach's reduction of material atoms to sensations contains the essence of the later reduction of them in terms of energy. It may be, as Aliotta says, (*Vide Idealistic Reaction against Science* p. 65) that he has only replaced "mechanical by sensorial mythology", but this is the fate of all pioneer work, all first attempts which never attain the result they aim at. To Robert Avenarius, too, some credit must be given for making Ostwald's path smooth. His principle of "economy of force" which has a biological and psychological significance closely resembles in its practical bearings Ostwald's principle of Conservation of Energy.

Mach.

But to say this is not the same as to say that Ostwald's grand synthesis lacks originality

either in its design or in the results to which it leads. It is the grandest attempt that has been made to bring natural science into line with the sciences of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften). But are we quite sure that the Darwin-Spencerian theory of Evolution, in opposition to which, it is said, Ostwald propounded his doctrine of energy, is a mechanical theory? Are there not reasons for thinking that even the theory of Spencer contains germs of spiritualism which are only further developed by Ostwald?

Spencer.

Evolution, as Spencer defines it, "is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion by which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation" (First Principles, Williams and Norgate's Edition, Volume II. page 321). This definition would make any evolution in the mental and moral sphere impossible, unless one was prepared to say that even here there goes on a process of integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, which Spencer was cer-

tainly not prepared to do. This inconsistency is pointed out very clearly by Thomas Case (Vide his article 'Metaphysics', Encycl. Br. 11th Edition Vol. XVIII p. 227), but it only means, we think, that the essential element of Evolution, according to Spencer, is not an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, but a transition from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. But if Evolution means this, is there not discernible in it a spiritual element, for what is a coherent heterogeneity but a number of different parts acting together for the fulfilment of a common end? No coherence is imaginable which is not a unity of purpose. If we compare two instances given by Spencer himself of definite coherent heterogeneity, one taken from the region of physics and the other taken from psychology, we see their great difference. As an instance of the first kind may be mentioned the development of the Earth's surface, as an example of the second, the growth from childhood to manhood. The coherence noticed in the first case is little better than a simultaneous existence of different motions. Is anything

better than this, for instance, indicated in Spencer's statement, "Rhythmical motions of a constant and simple kind were, by increasing multiformity of the Earth's surface, differentiated into an involved combination of constant and recurrent rhythmical motions, joined with similar motions that are irregular". In the second instance, however, the coherence is due to the unity of a single personality.

The same is true of Spencer's view of life. Life, according to Spencer, consists in a continuous process of adaptation to the environment. But what is this adaptation but a purposive action? Adaptation means shaping oneself after a certain model, forming one's life to suit a particular end. It is thus a highly complex act presupposing various complex mental processes. We believe therefore that Hudson is right when he says that "unlike Darwin and Wallace, Spencer approached the question of general evolution not from the organic, but from the super-organic point of view—by the way of ethical and sociological investigations".

We thus see on all sides a growing recognition of the purposive view of the world.

Vitalism and Energism join hands with the great biologists of the nineteenth century in promulgating an active, dynamical theory of the universe in which the "phenomena of choice and conscious control" play the leading part. What our distinguished countryman Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal says of race and racial types, namely, that "no view of civilisation is sound or adequate which conceives Race and Racial types statically, and not dynamically as growing, developing, progressive entities" (Vide Address to the Universal Races Congress), is true of life in general. But the recent developments of physical and biological sciences satisfy not only the romanticist's sense of the teleological but also his deep craving for the inexplicable, the "rätselhaftes Plus".

CHAPTER IX.

The Philosophy of Bergson.

The romanticist in his endeavour to find a principle that can better comprehend the real than reason comes across the fundamental fact concerning the world of reality, namely, its ceaseless flux. Bergson takes his stand upon this. His chief complaint against rationalism is that it does not take sufficient account of the ever-changing nature of the world. Rationalism takes always a static view of things, and thus misses the true nature of the real, which is ever active, ever creative. The most essential fact about reality is its dynamic nature.

Of all modern philosophers, Bergson has understood best this characteristic of reality. And his philosophy can thus be best described as a philosophy of change. Change is the key-note of the Bergsonian system. The defect of all philosophy, even the most realistic, is, according to him, that it takes a geometric or spatial, instead of a dynamic or temporal view

of the world, as it ought to do. We try to picture everything as separate from and independent of everything else, whereas the truth is, that there is nothing which can be detached from its surroundings and viewed in its isolation. Everything brings with it the whole train of surrounding objects. An object detached from all other objects, a state of consciousness isolated from all other states, has no meaning. Every state of consciousness is a state of transition and prolongs itself into its next state. "If a state of existence" says Bergson, "which remains the same is more complicated than one thinks, inversely, the passage from one state to another resembles more than one imagines one and the same state which is prolonged" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 2.). The apparent discontinuity which we observe in life is due to our attention fixing itself upon one thing to the exclusion of all others. It is because we perceive things by a series of discontinuous acts of attention that we look upon them as discontinuous. In reality, everything is merged into everything else, borne along in the current of life on the breast of a wave. The past is

continually prolonging itself into the present and the present is ever projecting forward into the future. The past, in fact, exists in the present, which again continues itself in the future. As Wildon Carr says, "it seems as if a great movement were in progress, sweeping us along in its course. To exist is to be alive, to be borne along in the living stream, as it were, on the breast of a wave. The actual present now in which all existence is gathered up, is this movement accomplishing itself. The past is gathered into it, exists in it, is carried along with it, as it presses forward into the future, which is continually and without intermission becoming actual" (Vide *Henri Bergson*, Peoples' Books Series, p. 15.)

This is the view of reality which Bergson presents to us. There is nowhere any fixed and immutable being, there is everywhere continuous becoming. And what is more wonderful still, this becoming is continuous self-creation. There is no such thing as an external force changing the order of things. All change occurs from within, all development is self-development. Every moment of our life is a

sort of creation. "And just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed, in any case, is modified, under the influence of the works themselves which he produces, so every one of our acts at the moment it proceeds from us, modifies our personality, being the new form which we have just given ourselves" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 7). Thus, what we do depends upon what we are, and what we are depends to a certain extent upon what we do and we create ourselves continually.

Let us try to understand what Bergson means by this process of self-creation. Every being, according to Bergson, is a living reality. And the essence of life is the capacity for continuous modification. Now this process of modification is a process of continuous creation, and reality is not an inert material substance which only changes when some external force impinges upon it. True evolution, therefore is a *creative evolution*, and not the mechanical evolution with which Science deals. The mistake of Science is in thinking that inertia is the essential attribute of substances and that consequently, any change which occurs is the result of an

external impact. It is because Science takes this view that it finds it so very difficult to give an explanation of change. For it cannot give any reason why an external force should impinge upon a substance and impart to it a movement. Science, in fact, deals with an abstraction and not with a reality. The world of Science is, as Principal Trivedi happily characterises it, a वाङ्मय जगत् (a world of words). The real world, however, is a world of active, creative agents, where nothing happens except by self-exertion. The world is a world of life, whose guiding principle is self-directed movement, self-initiated, continuous change.

The essence of such a world is time. Our life as the inmost reality is time itself. There is nothing else in life than a time-existence, "a change that is a continuous undivided movement". Time is not a substance that is made up of successive moments. To think so is to make of time a spatial entity. Time is not composed of distinct moments, but it is one continuous evolving process. It cannot be divided into stages like the past, the present and the future.

"Notre durée n'est pas un instant qui remplace un instant : il n'y aurait alors jamais que du present, pas de prolongement du passé dans l'actuel, pas d'évolution, pas de durée concrète. La durée est le progrès continu du passé qui ronge l'avenir et qui gonfle en avancant" *L'Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 4-5.).

There is thus a continuous process from the past to the future. In fact, it is only one experience which constantly evolves itself. The past does not die but lives in the present and moves onward to the future. It maintains itself by continuous evolution, continuous creation. "The universe lasts. The more we grasp the nature of time, the more we understand that duration signifies invention, creation of forms, continuous elaboration of the absolutely new".

This view of time and of reality involves a wholesale revision of the customary view of them. The ordinary view is that a thing remains unchanged and that only its states change, these states being clearly distinguishable from one another and separated from one

another by a measurable distance of time. Movement does not belong to the thing as such but to its states, it being only a displacement of a thing. The thing is different from its movement which can be thought away from it. A movement, moreover, is composed of distinct moments and is not a continuous whole. It is, in fact, the result of isolated impacts. A material object, when it moves under the influence of an external force, is represented by us as composed of parts which themselves do not move. If these parts change, we divide them into smaller fragments. We descend thus from the parts to the molecules, from the molecules to the atoms and from the atoms to the generative corpuscles of the atoms and from these to the 'imponderable'. We carry the division thus further and further, till we reach the immutable. We thus say that the essence of a thing is always immutable and that motion means only a displacement of its parts as the result of the action of external forces upon them. The time taken by a movement is represented by us as a certain length which can be measured exactly as any distance in space can be measured.

Time, in fact, in this view consists of a determinate number of *simultaneities* of *correspondences* and hence is in no essential respect different from space. Again, as Bergson points out, (*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience,* pp. 74-75), the ordinary conception of time makes it quite as homogeneous as space, and hence the question arises whether "time as thus conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium would not be a bastard conception, due to the intrusion of the idea of space into the domain of pure consciousness." It is therefore a very true characterisation of this view of reality to call it with Bergson the spatial view. It takes away from time all that truly characterises it, all real flow, all real change.

This way of looking at time and reality not only vitiates all our ordinary reasoning but also all reasoning of metaphysicians. The mistake of all metaphysics, even the best, is in supposing that all difficulties arise through the recognition of movement and change. Even the metaphysics of Kant was not free from this error. For, as Bergson points out in his *La Perception du Changement*, it is Kant's belief that reality is

fixed and immutable. Our ordinary consciousness does not reveal this fixed and immutable character of reality, and hence, Kant says, it deals with phenomena only. To understand reality we must therefore have recourse to 'intellectual intuition', but as this 'intellectual intuition' can give no knowledge, Kant concludes that metaphysics is imposible. Plato also believed like Kant that ordinary consciousness, which shows us only the world of change and movement, can never bring us near reality but he believed in the possibility of an 'intellectual intuition' giving knowledge of objects and so in the possibility of metaphysics. But in the world of movement and change which, according to both these philosophers, leads to endless contradictions and is only a phenomenon, there is really no movement, no change. The movement and change of which they had such a terrible dread, lacked the true characteristics of these. Indeed, if they had obtained a correct view of change and reality, they could never have supposed that it was only an 'intellectual intuition' that was capable of reaching the real. "It", says Bergson with reference to Kant, "we could

prove that what was considered movement and change first by Zeno and then by metaphysicians in general, is neither any change, nor any movement, that they retained of change that which does not change and of movement that which does not move, that they took for an immediate and complete perception of movement and change a crystallisation of this perception...... it was not necessary to flee from time (we had indeed already fled too far from it !), it was not necessary to detach ourselves from change (we had indeed, detached ourselves too much from it !), but, on the contrary, it was necessary to restore by an effort change and time to their original mobility" (*La Perception du Changement*, p. 17).

Thus, the real world is one continuous flow, one continuous movement. It defies all division, all attempts to parcel it off into fixed classes and periods. Its flow is unbroken; it is, in fact, one continuous stream that rushes ever onward. To try to confine it by erecting dams is to break its flow and convert it into a stagnant pool. It follows that all such divisions, as the past, the present and the future, are only artificial land-

marks erected to meet our practical needs. In reality, the past, the present and the future form one continuous evolving whole.

The past thus lives. There is, in fact, only one eternally flowing present. As Algot Ruhe says, "there is nothing that need prevent us from pushing the boundary-line between present and past as far back as we will. If our attention to life were potent enough, and sufficiently freed from practical interests, it would embrace in one undivided present the whole previous history of our conscious personality, as something both ever-present and ever-changing like a melody. It is to this eternal present movement that we give the name duration". (*Henri Bergson*: *His Life and Philosophy*, p. 85). The present, moreover, determines our attitude towards the immediate future. Our resolves, our determinations, our calculations mark out for us the course of our future. But they do not absolutely determine it, for then we should have determinism. What my present does is to fix a tendency which evolves itself continuously and which changes as it evolves. And the future is

nothing but this continuous evolution regarded as a forward-moving process.

This view of a continuously evolving consciousness causes a through-going revision of our ordinary conception of freedom and necessity.. Our actions are determined by our whole personality which is an eternally evolving entity and not by any temporary antecedents. Indeterminate in the sense of being absolutely uncaused, no action is or can be. And even if there were any such action, it would not prove a free spirit, for it would mean a gap between this action and the self-evolving personality which we call 'myself'. An action that has no reference to my personality is no more my action than the action of a stranger. In order that it may be my action, 'I' must have something to do with it. I, then, my personality, must determine every action performed by me, and there is no sense in saying that my action to be free must be wholly indeterminate.

Equally fallacious is the idea that every decision is a choice between two alternatives, X and Y, and that freedom consists in the possibility of being able to choose differently from what

one actually does choose. John Stuart Mill, for instance, says, "To have the consciousness of arbitrary liberty, means to have the consciousness, before choosing, of being able to choose differently". This view of voluntary action, Bergson says, is due to the spatial view of time and can be represented by means of the following diagram :—(Vide *Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p. 135).

M

O

X

In this diagram M O represents the course already traversed by the self, O, the point where the conflict arises and O X, O Y, the two paths between which the mind oscillates. The advocates of freedom say that at the point O the mind had the option of choosing either of the two paths O X and O Y. The determinists, on the other hand, say that the mind had some

reason for choosing O X rather than O Y and that when we say that both the paths are equally open to it, we forget this reason. Both the defenders and the opponents of freedom thus agree in thinking that a mechanical oscillation between two paths O X and O Y must precede every action. This is their fundamental mistake. "Don't ask me" says Bergson, "if the self, after traversing the path M O and deciding for X, had or had not the option of choosing Y. I will reply that this question has no meaning because there is no line M O, no point O, no path O X, no direction O Y. To ask such a question is to admit the possibility of representing adequately time by space and a succession by a simultaneity" (*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p. 138). The diagrammatic representation of a voluntary action is in fact only possible if we take a spatial view of our mental life. In reality, there are never present two opposing tendencies between which one has to choose but one self which lives and grows by these conflicts themselves.

A like misconception exists with regard to the calculation of future events. The question

whether the *ensemble* of antecedents of an action being given, it can be predicated is devoid of all sense. There are two ways in which we may understand these antecedents. We may understand them dynamically as well as statically. In the first case, we are led by imperceptible stages to the series of states through which the action passes and thus arrive at the point itself where the action is completed. There is here therefore no question of foreseeing the event. We re-live the experience, and the future action about which the question of foreseeing arose, is nothing but the final portion of this experience. The other method is static. Here we have to substitute for the consciousness of the states their image, or, rather, their intellectual symbol, their idea. Only, we have to add to the states themselves an indication of their intensity, for here we no longer deal with the actual person who experiences them and cannot therefore feel their force. But this indication must necessarily have a quantitative character, whereas the actual mental state of the person whose action is to be predicted is purely qualitative. What is foreseen, therefore, is not the

actual state of the person having the experience but a quantitative intellectual representation of it. Thus, in neither case can we predict the future event. In the first case, moreover, we have this absurdity, that to be able to live through the experiences of A we have to become identical with him. As in the case of a voluntary action, so in this case, the fundamental error is in regarding time as a spatial quantity. Here, too, the ordinary view can be represented by a diagram (Vide *Les Données, etc.* p. 146):—

M O X Y

Thus, the curve M O X Y is supposed to represent the course of the self. M O is the portion already traversed, and the question, according to this view, is, whether knowing M O, we can trace the further O X Y which the self describes after passing the point O. The self, thus, resembles a projectile whose position at any moment can be determined with precision. This view of self, this belief that its life can be represented by means of a diagram,

vitiates the whole controversy concerning the freedom of the will. For both the defenders and the opponents of freedom agree in looking upon life as a line, the past being the portion we have passed through and the future that which lies stretched before us.

The ordinary view of the problem of free dom misses the real problem altogether. For freedom appertains to time as it flows and not to time that has flown, to living, flowing reality and not to reality as matter of history. The question here is not whether or not causality belongs to our psychical life. For causality means here something altogether different from what it does in the physical world. There we say that the causes being the same, the effects must be the same, too. Here, the same cause never occurs twice and the effects, too, are never the same. Every state of our mental life is a unique state and can never occur again, for time is its very soul. "Duration is a real thing for consciousness and one cannot speak here of identical conditions, because the same moment does not present itself twice" (*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p.

153). The question, therefore, whether in our psychical life the same causes do or do not produce the same effects, does not arise at all.

If then, neither want of casuality nor the possibility of choosing otherwise than one does, is the essential characteristic of freedom, how, one may ask, should one define it? Bergson's answer is, that freedom is a thing which can be felt but not defined. It is indefinable because here we have to do with a progress and not with a thing, with duration and not with extension in space. Every attempt to render the problem of freedom more clear, every effort to make it more comprehensible ends only by making time a form of space. It is known by a direct intuition and is the most clear and most intelligible fact of our life. "La liberté" says Bergson, "est donc un fait, et, parmi les faits que l'on constate, il n'en est pas de plus clair. Toutes les difficultés du problème et même lui-même naissent de ce qu'on veut trouver à la durée les mêmes attributs qu'à l'étendue, interpreter une succession par une simultanéité, et rendre idée de liberté dans une langue où elle est evidemment

intraduisable" (*Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, p. 109).

Our examination of Bergson's view of freedom has disclosed the fact that in Bergson's opinion freedom is indefinable and is known by a direct intuition. Indeed, it is by intuition that we know life. Life being all progress, all march, refuses to submit to the cut and dried formulae of reason. Reason intellectualises the facts of life which thus lose their real character. Intuition alone can preserve them in their original condition. As Wildon Carr, says, "it (intuition) is a sympathetic attitude to the reality without us that makes us seem to enter into it, to be one with it, to live it. It is in contrast to the defiant attitude that we seem to assume when in science we treat facts and things as outside, external, discrete existences, which we range before us, analyse, discriminate, break up and recombine." Intuition does not give us the power to perceive strange and unsuspected qualities of things, but it is that without which no perception of reality is possible. It is not the case that for one kind of knowledge of the real, reason is brought into requisition and for another, intui-

tion, but intuition is the sole method of approaching the real and reason gives us only an intellectualised form of it which is useful to us in systematising our experience and presenting it in a compact form for the needs of science. But for what the real in its naked form is, what it denotes in its coarse, unvarnished state, we have to go to intuition.

The operation of intelligence is to create a mechanical order of things. Fixed and rigid laws, uniform course of events, unbroken chain of cause and effect—these are the characteristic features of all intellectual constructions. Intelligence is nowhere more at home than in the domain of mechanics. "Notre intelligence," says Bergson, "telle qu'elle sort des mains de la nature, a pour object principal le solide inorganisé" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 168). Now, what are the most general properties of inorganic matter? Inorganic matter is extended, it presents to us objects which are external to other objects, and in the objects themselves, parts which are external to other parts. It also exhibits the reign of rigid laws, of a fixed and unalterable succession of events. Its changes are perfectly

determinate, perfectly calculable. Laplace's calculator can therefore accurately foretell the course of future events in the inorganic world. Its whole past, as well as its whole future, lies indeed, stretched before such a man. It is in this region that intelligence lives and moves freely. Intelligence, as Kant represents, is bathed in an atmosphere of spatiality with which it is as much inseparably united as the living body is with the air it breathes." (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 223).

But it is not inorganic matter which bears the palm in the world of reality. Life and not dead matter characterises the true nature of the real. The world of the real is a world of life; it is a ceaseless, breathless march of living, active beings. Intelligence, therefore, has no direct access to it. But this does not mean that intelligence has no place in the order of things. If knowledge alone were the end of human activities, then intuition alone would be of use to us and intelligence would be a hindrance. But we have to act as well as to know, and for the sake of acting we have to employ our intelligence. Intelligence is a faculty of invention, of manu-

facturing tools to suit the ends of life. It has thus always a practical purpose, the purpose of transforming matter into an instrument that will serve the needs of our life. Life, not content with producing organisms, wants to give them as an appendage inorganic matter and a power to convert this inorganic matter into an instrument of action. This power is intelligence and it is for this reason that intelligence appears to have a sort of fascination for crude matter. Hence also its surprise, its feeling of helplessness when it is confronted with life, with the phenomena of inorganic beings. But in its own domain intelligence reigns supreme. Its superiority here over intuition is the superiority of an unlimited power of manufacturing material tools over the possession of a few organic tools. Intuition can supply us with a few organic instruments but for the fabrication of instruments by which we can meet all requirements of our practical life, we have to go to intelligence.

But if intuition and intelligence are, thus, two faculties which have such distinct functions assigned to them, shall we not have a dualism of our psychical life? What becomes of the unity

of mind if we have two such independent units existing side by side? Bergson's answer is, in the first place, that these faculties are not so independent of each other as they are supposed to be. There is nowhere to be found instinct wholly unaccompanied by intelligence nor intelligence wholly divorced from instinct. Even the instinct of the most perfect insect is accompanied by some traces of intelligence which exhibit themselves in the choice of locality, of time and of materials. Intelligence, again, has need of intuition. To fashion crude matter presupposes a high degree of organisation and consequently, a great development of instinct. It is true Bergson says the two faculties are complementary and that no hasty reduction of the one in terms of the other is possible. Their difference is a difference of quality and not simply of degree. But in spite of this, there is no real division of consciousness into two parts. The apparent twofold partition of consciousness is due to the double meaning of reality as a flow and as rigid matter. "If", says Bergson, "consciousness is divided into intuition and intelligence, it is through the necessity one is

under of sticking to crude matter and at the same time of following the current of life. The doubling of consciousness would thus be due to the double form of the real." (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 194). But the double form of the real is no essential quality of the real: it is only the practical needs of our life which force us to view the one reality in two different forms. As life evolves, it creates its own necessities; it finds it convenient to view objects as subject to rigid laws and as moving along fixed directions. The mechanical view greatly simplifies matters. Its range is very great and it comprehends a vast amount of facts under a single law. It serves thus greatly to economise our energy and to facilitate the operations of our daily life. We cannot indeed imagine how difficult our life would be if we had to deal with objects every one of which had its own independent course and no two of which followed the same direction. To save ourselves from such a difficulty, to make the course of our life smooth, we *create* objects which follow definite laws, move along fixed lines and are related to one another in a way that is perfectly deter-

minate. We as *creating* such objects are *intelligent* beings. We as the law-givers of nature are said to make use of our intelligence. But when left to ourselves, when not faced with any necessity for acting, we cease to create objects for us and remain mere spectators of the eternal flow of reality. Our state is then called *intuition*. Intuition and intelligence, therefore, have their being in us and represent only two attitudes of ours towards the world of life.

Bergson thus postulates his theory of intuition and intelligence. It is a most wonderful theory, for it unites a realism of intuition with a pragmatism of intelligence. The pragmatist, in Bergson's opinion, is right so long as he confines himself to the domain of intelligence. We as reasoning, judging, scheming beings accept the useful alone as the essence of life. But life itself, the ever-rolling, ever-becoming stream which we call reality, has no useful end to serve, and the error of the pragmatist is in supposing that the practical end which characterises all intellectual activity, is also an essential factor of reality. The pragmatist is not justified in saying that the useful alone is real. To say

this is to confuse an intellectual construction of the world to suit the ends of practical life with an intuitive apprehension which alone can yield us a knowledge of the real. But it is not the pragmatist alone who makes this confusion. All philosophy, as Hans Prager points out in an article contributed to the "Archiv für systematische Philosophie" in 1910 (*Henri Bergsons Metaphysische Grundanschauung*) makes a confusion between intuition and analysis, between reality and concept. There is thus no great difference between empirical and rationalistic philosophy, for they both proceed analytically by a division of consciousness into separate chambers and then by reconstructing them in order to from the notion of 'I' or self, and it really does not matter if this 'I' is the empirical or the rational ego. The pragmatist's confusion between reality and concept takes the form of a practical view of the entire world of reality. The concept of utility is made the basis of the real. This is the climax of intellectualism.

Bergson has done great service to philosophy in thus pointing out the essential similarity between intellectual and mechanical systems.

In fact, intellectual systems generally only perfect mechanical constructions. The system of Spinoza may be cited as an instance. And Bergson did well in pointing this out so very clearly.

The real as such is not comprehended either by rationalism or by empiricism. Both are committed to the view of reality as fixed, unchanging being. "The mountain at rest" is the type of the real in both systems. The true nature of the real thus escapes the notice of both of these. Escape from the narrowness of mechanical theories is to be sought therefore not in rationalism but in a view which calls in question the representation of reality as a static being without any becoming. Hegel perceived this and so we find him saying that absolute being without becoming is a logical fiction. His dissatisfaction with the static view of reality was indeed the psychological motive of his 'Logic'. But his attempt to replace this view by a dynamism of reality led to the very same error which he tried to avoid, namely, to a rigidly logical view of things. The true dynamism is the view of reality as an evolution, not a "cascade of deduc-

tion, nor a system of stationary pulsation, but a fountain which spreads like a sheaf of corn and is partially arrested, or at least, hindered and delayed by the falling spray". "The fountain itself" says Le Roy, "in the reality which is created, is vital activity, of which spiritual activity represents the highest form, and the spray which falls, is the creative act which falls, it is reality which is undone, it is matter and inertia" (Vide *Henri Bergson: A study*, p. 109).

Reality, in fact, is creative evolution. It is a perpetual creation, perennial invention, a generation of continual novelty, incapable of being anticipated or repeated. The mistake of the Darwin-Spencerian doctrine of evolution is in thinking that the essence of evolution consists in a mechanical adaptation to accidental circumstances. "In reality, adaptation explains the windings of the evolutionary movement but not the general directions of the movement, still less, the movement itself. The road which leads to the town is obliged to ascend the side and descend down the slopes of the hill; it *adapts* itself to the accidents of the ground, but the

accidents of the ground are not the cause of the road nor do they impart to it its direction......... So also for the evolution of life and the circumstances through which it passes, with only this difference always, that evolution does not indicate one unique road, that it proceeds along divers directions without being able to perceive its end and that finally, it remains inventive even in its adaptation" (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 11-12).

It is a second defect of Spencer's doctrine of evolution that it supposes it to proceed along one fixed line. Evolution, according to Spencer, is a transition from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiation and integration. The process is always from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex, and the method is everywhere the same, namely, a differentiation of an organism and the growth of specialised parts and union of these parts to form an organic whole. The course of evolution is thus along a single, definite line. This view of a uni-linear process

of evolution is repugnant to Bergson. The course of evolution, Bergson thinks, is too complex to be represented by a single line. There is no one continuous march from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but the growth in heterogeneity is only one of the lines along which evolution proceeds. There are various other qualitative changes each of which gives a separate direction to evolution. There is no one unalterable direction along which evolution proceeds but the directions change as organic beings choose unceasingly and reject unceasingly old directions. The course of evolution thus becomes a highly complicated path. Bergson expresses this beautifully in a passage which occurs in *L'Evolution Créatrice*. "The evolutionary movement", Bergson says, "would have been a simple matter, we could easily have determined its direction, if life described a single trajectory comparable to that of a whole bullet hurled by a cannon. But we have to do with a shell which immediately bursts into fragments, which being themselves of the nature of shells burst into fragments themselves, destined

to burst again, and so on for a very long time". (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 107).

What we have said above is a brief sketch of the main principles of Bergson's philosophy. Its soul is the doctrine of the real. Indeed, no philosopher in modern times has laid so much stress upon the character of the real. But the real has been characterised principally by its negative qualities. It is not inert, it is not fixed and immutable, it does not develop along one particular line—this is the way in which the real has been described in Bergson's works. Such a description suffers from the defect of vagueness. This defect can only be remedied by formulating a logic of the real. For what is needed is to show the limits of the concepts of space and mechanism, and simply to say that reality cannot be represented by either the one or the other does not satisfy the requirements of philosophy. The most curious thing about us is, that though we may find reason inadequate to express our deepest essence, yet it is with the help of reason that we have to construct any system at all. We can never do without reason in any philosophical construction, even if the

avowed object of such a construction is to prove the inadequacy of rationalistic philosophy. A logical examination, therefore, of the fundamental concepts with which we have to deal is the pre-condition of all philosophy. A logic of the real must, by examining the nature of the concepts upon which a philosophical synthesis rests, prepare the ground for it.

The nature of intelligence and its relation to instinct also require to be stated more precisely than Bergson has done. How far an intellectual synthesis can proceed and where it has to be supplemented by instinct can only be determined if the limits of intellect and instinct are clearly defined. Bergson has characterised intellect as a practical activity. But can there be any activity which is purely practical and which does not contribute to the growth of knowledge? How can knowledge be divorced from the realm of practice? All knowledge serves some practical purpose, so that the distinction between intellect and instinct is not one of theoretical and practical activity but a distinction between one kind of practical activity and another.

Aliotta regards it as the most serious defect of Bergson's system that he has given intellect a much lower position than instinct. Philosophy, he says, must always work with concepts. "The concept is not just an expedient for rendering social life possible, but is the one and only way in which the universal can be manifested to consciousness; even that which the new philosophy terms intuition is at bottom but a vague, dim, indistinct concept, which is unconscious of itself" (*Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 148). It is no doubt true that there exist in man forces other than intelligence and that philosophy must take account of these, but Aliotta says it can only do this by means of concepts. "There can be no philosophy without concepts". "Philosophy which does not make use of the intelligence is a contradiction in terms: in order to set up a system of philosophy, any system of philosophy whatsoever, even the *new philosophy* itself, we must leave behind us concrete duration and the intuitively experienced moment and look at the world *sub specie aeternitatis*". This is Aliotta's main objection to Bergsonism. He also says that the creative activity of the mind

is revealed in concepts no less clearly than in intuition and that it is a mistake to suppose that spontaneous creation is a monopoly of intuition.

But whether creative activity is the monopoly of the intellect or of intuition, the fact remains that besides this creative activity philosophy requires a certan objectivity and fixity which intellect alone can furnish.

A wholly volatile condition of the world is a thing with which philosophy cannot rest content. It must find even in the seemingly hopeless volatility some anchorage, it must discover in what seems a ceaseless flux some halting-place, whence it can survey the whole process. It is a great defect of Bergson's system that it does not recognise this necessity for philosophy of having a solid basis. His theory of *durée*, though it is highly original and throws much light upon the nature of the real, is still too vague and indefinite to serve the purpose of a true philosophical theory. What philosophy requires is not simply a theory stating the mere fact of change or flux in the world, but one which indicates the precise nature of it and traces its successive phases.

It is a second defect of Bergson's philosophy that it has no adequate epistemology. This is indeed quite obvious, for a system that does not define the concepts with which it deals can hardly have a theory of knowledge. The relation between subject and object is treated in his system only from the standpoint of psychology and is never approached from the side of epistemology. The question of the limits of knowledge, likewise, has not been considered by Bergson except in its psychological bearings. In fact, it is the predominance of psychology that prevents an epistemological treatment of any question.

Indeed, a rigorous treatment of any question is foreign to Bergson's system. This is no doubt unfortunate from a philosophical point of view but is not without some advantage, if considered from the standpoint of system-building. For a philosophical system is a rigid system and it is a very good thing for highly original theories to have a certain amount of elasticity that renders them capable of improvement. It is sometimes an advantage to keep the way open for new philosophical systems rather than close it by

hastily formed constructions. Bergson has been careful not to close the road in any way and it is safe to predict that out of the numerous illuminating suggestions that he has thrown out, a philosophical system will grow at no distant date. Bergson himself has been gradually evolving a system out of the materials scattered in his works. His lectures before the University of Oxford, especially, his lectures on Change (published in the work entitled *La Perception du Changement*) show his capacity for a purely metaphysical treatment of a subject. His psychological bias, though it has been fruitful in original conceptions, has hitherto stood in the way of a thorough-going philosophical system. That he has been able very recently to get rid of this bias is an extremely good sign. We can therefore confidently look forward to an attempt at systematisation on the part of Bergson in the near future. But whether Bergson succeeds or not in creating a system, his name will be handed down to posterity as that of a philosopher who did more to understand the nature of the real than any other thinker since the days of Hegel.

CONCLUSION.

In the first chapter we tried to bring out clearly the fact that what the romanticist sought was to comprehend the real in all its fulness and complexity. His dissatisfaction with rationalism is due to the circumstance that he believes reason to be inadequate to express the real. But the various shifts to which he himself is put, the constant change of standpoint shows that if reason is inadequate to express the essence of the real, no other single principle is competent to express it. The various principles which he successively adopts in his attempt to understand the nature of reality clearly prove the hopelessness of all efforts to construct the real on the basis of any one principle. Bergson's attempt is perhaps the only one we have so far considered which does not postulate any one simple principle. His *durée* is not a simple principle, like feeling or will, but a complex of many elements. Some part of the vagueness with which his philosophy is charged is probably due to this

recognition on the part of Bergson of the complex nature of the real. For what is complex does not admit of an easy statement but has necessarily to be expressed by means of a number of assertions, each more precise than the one preceding it, and all tending towards an approximation of the reality which they are intended to express. But even in Bergson we don't find a full recognition of the extremely complex nature of reality.

To understand reality we have to take into account not only the fact of ceaseless flux but also the much more important circumstance that this flux is guided by a variety of ends. Intelligence and instinct are only two very broad classes which govern the world of reality and which do not by any means represent the sole principles at work in this world. The real is the totality of all principles and not simply this or that isolated element. Philosophy is Totalitätsdenken, the reference of all things to the totality of relations.

The view which is represented here may be called *Unendlichkeitsromantik*. Its essence is the recognition of the infinite complexity of

the world. Its basic principle is the totality of all principles. It starts with the idea that any expression of reality, in terms of a single concept or a number of finite concepts, must necessarily be inadequate. Only a partial view of the real is possible with the help of any of the known principles; the complete reality stretches far into the realm of the inexpressible.

Philosophy, however, must alway attempt to express as much of the essence of the real as possible. To the extent, therefore, to which the real is inexpressible, to that extent is it beyond the reach of philosophy. The problem of philosophy is to create grooves into which as much of the real is to be fitted as possible. If there remains something of the real which cannot be fitted into a groove, philosophy of course must recognise this, but must never allow itself to be led into an easy-going acceptance of the impossibility of understanding the nature of reality. Hitherto, philosophy either abandoned the quest of the real as hopeless or reduced the real to a single unitary principle. The romanticists tried to avoid both these extremes, but in the end they fell into the same error as

the philosophers whose systems they found fault with. In spite of their protest against the one-sidedness of rationalism they formulated equally one-sided principles.

The rationalist, therefore, has again got an opportunity. It was his blind adherence to the formalism of the Aristotelian logic that discredited him in the eyes of the romanticists. He should now give up this formalism and make a sincere attempt to express the nature of reality in terms of reason.

This attempt on his part to view reality in the light of reason, gives rise to what may be called the logic of the real. This logic, however, is never complete, for reason can never have access to the whole of reality. But though incomplete, there is always the hope of its being more and more complete, as more of the real comes under the eye of reason. Is the relation between reason and reality, then, an asymptotic one? Probably, but reason is also sometimes like a tangent that is altogether at infinity. For the expression of reality in terms of reason is sometimes only possible through factors which are all infinite. And the logic of the real takes

account of this, although this involves a confession of its own weakness. What the real in its totality is, logic does not know, logic cannot say. But it does know that it can extend its range indefinitely and can bring an ever-increasing portion of the real under its cognisance.

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